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ESSAY




At the American Bar Association's National Public
Defense Symposium in May, 2010, I delivered a talk on
systemic indigent defense litigation.1 I spoke about this
kind of litigation with measured optimism. Specifically, I
described two pending suits of this kind - one in Michigan
and one in New York - as successful models of modem
litigation in this arena. In May, both suits had just survived
motions to dismiss before their respective state supreme
courts. I discussed the future trials in these suits and the
* Assistant Professor of Law, Columbus School of Law, The Catholic
University of America.
1 This essay is a by-product of the talk that I delivered at the 2010
American Bar Association ("ABA") National Public Defense
Symposium on May 21, 2010. The full transcript of those proceedings
appears in the same volume of the Tennessee Journal of Law & Policy
as this essay and may be relevant to readers who are confronting
excessive workloads or other aspects of a public defense system in need
of reform. A full discussion of systemic indigent defense litigation-
its history, trajectory and the current model for it-are outside the
scope of this Essay. In previous works I have discussed this kind of
litigation in depth. See generally Cara H. Drinan, The Third
Generation of Indigent Defense Litigation, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 427 (2009) [hereinafter Indigent Defense Litigation]; Cara H.
Drinan, Toward a Federal Forum for Systemic Sixth Amendment
Claims, WASH U. L.R. (Oct. 22, 2008) [hereinafter Systemic Sixth
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potential for litigants to replicate the success of these suits
in other jurisdictions.
Shortly after the Symposium, those who were
following the progress of the Michigan and New York suits
were stunned when the Michigan Supreme Court reversed
itself in the same case and granted the defendants' motion
for summary disposition. Not only is the decision
disappointing to the defense community, but also, litigators
in these kinds of suits are left wondering what impact the
decision will have on future systemic indigent defense
claims.
In Part I of this Essay I will describe the systemic
indigent defense suits in Michigan and New York, noting
their similar but ultimately divergent paths. Having done
so, in Part II, I will address the question of how systemic
litigation in the indigent defense arena is faring in the wake
of the Michigan suit. Despite the Michigan setback, this
kind of litigation may still be a powerful reform tool in
certain jurisdictions. Moreover, in some jurisdictions there
will always be the need for litigation simply because it is
the only path to reform. I note three jurisdictions where
litigation is either already happening in some fashion
and/or where systemic litigation may be on the horizon.
Finally, I conclude with the notion that the federal
government needs to play a more active role in indigent
defense reform, whether or not systemic lawsuits enjoy
success in state courts.
Part I: The Michigan and New York Suits
Duncan v. State of Michigan and Hurrell-Harring v.
State of New York were both filed in 2007, 2 and in many
2 Complaint, Duncan v. State (Mich. Cir. Ct. Feb. 22, 2007)
[hereinafter Duncan Complaint]; Class Action Complaint, Hurrell-
Harring v. State, No. 8866-07 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 8, 2007) [hereinafter
Hurrell-Harring Complaint].
9
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ways both suits reflect the model for successful systemic
indigent defense litigation.3 In both cases plaintiffs argued
that the state had abdicated its constitutional responsibility
under Gideon v. Wainwright4 by delegating the provision,
financing, and oversight of public defense services to the
state's counties. 5 Defendants in the New York suit filed a
motion to dismiss in April, 2008, making three central
arguments: that the named plaintiffs could only seek
redress in the appellate process; that the named plaintiffs
lacked standing to raise a claim of systemic deficiencies;
and that the legislature was the proper forum for the
plaintiffs' requested relief.6 Albany Supreme Court Justice
Eugene Devine rejected all three arguments, writing: "The
action primarily seeks a declaration that the State has failed
in its constitutional duty to provide meaningful and
effective assistance of counsel to indigent criminal
3 For example, the suits were filed as a measure of last resort; they
demonstrated system-wide proof of harm to clients; they reflected
strategic decisions on a wide array of procedural issues; they made
reference to accepted professional standards; and they relied upon a
wide network of professional allies. See generally Drinan, Indigent
Defense Litigation, supra note 1 (discussing the model for this type of
litigation and the New York and Michigan examples). The following
suits also reflect, in part or in whole, the model of modem indigent
defense litigation: Class Action Complaint, Rivera v. Rowland, No. CV
95-0545629S, 1998 WL 96407, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 20, 1998);
Lavallee v. Justices in the Hampden Super. Ct, 812 N.E.2d 895 (Mass.
2004); Amended Complaint, White v. Martz, No. C DV-2002-133
(Mont. Jud. Dist. Ct. April 1, 2002); Third Amended Class Action
Complaint, Doyle v. Allegheny County Salary Bd., No. GD-96-13606
(Pa. Ct. C. P, Nov. 21, 1997); Complaint, Best v. Grant County, No.
04-2-00189-0 (Wash. Sup. Ct. 2004).
4 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
5 See generally Duncan Complaint, supra note 2; Hurrell-Harring
Complaint, supra note 2.
6 See generally Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant's Motion
to Dismiss, Hurrell-Harring v. State, No. 8866-07, 2008 WL 7801294,
at * 1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 4, 2008).
10
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defendants... It would not require the judiciary to manage
discretionary aspects of an essentially executive function of
government. Rather it seeks a determination that the State
has or is likely to violate the plaintiffs' constitutional
rights.",7  One year later, an intermediate appellate court
overruled Justice Devine, finding that the plaintiffs' claim
was not a justiciable legal claim, but instead was "simply a
general complaint as to the quality of legal services offered
to indigent criminal defendants in this state." 8 In March,
2010, the New York Court of Appeals heard oral arguments
regarding the state's motion to dismiss. 9
The Michigan suit followed a similar path.
Defendants in the suit filed a motion to dismiss, arguing
that the government was immune from suit and that the
case was non-justiciable on several theories. 10 The trial
court denied the motion to dismiss, and the Court of
Appeals affirmed, holding that:
[T]he role of the judiciary in our tripartite
system of government entails, in part,
interpreting constitutional language,
applying constitutional requirements to the
given facts in a case, safeguarding
constitutional rights, and halting
unconstitutional conduct. For state and
federal constitutional provisions to have any
meaning, we may and must engage in this
role even where litigation encompasses
7 Joel Stashenko, Suit Proceeds over Providing Criminal Defense to
Poor, 240 N.Y.L.J. 1 (2008) (quoting Justice Devine).
8 Hurrell-Harring v. State, 883 N.Y.S.2d 349, 351 (N.Y. App. Div.
2009).
9 The oral argument may be viewed at:
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/CTAPPS/arguments/2010/Marl 0/Marl 0
OA.htm.
1o Duncan v. State, 774 N.W.2d 89, 97 (Mich. Ct. App. 2009).
11
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conduct by the executive and legislative
branches.' 1
The Michigan Supreme Court heard oral arguments
regarding the state's motion to dismiss in April, 2010.12
In both the Michigan and New York suits, oral
argument before the high courts in each state focused on
justiciability issues. At bottom, defendants in both suits
made two arguments: 1) that the plaintiffs' claims were
only appropriately addressed in a post-conviction
proceeding and 2) that public defense reform was a
legislative function.' 3 On April 30, 2010, the Michigan
Supreme Court issued a unanimous order ("Duncan 1")
stating that: "[t]his case is at its earliest stages and, based
solely on the plaintiffs' pleadings in this case, it is
premature to make a decision on the substantive issues.
Accordingly, the defendants are not entitled to summary
disposition at this time." 14 One week later, the New York
Court of Appeals followed suit and denied the defendants'
motion to dismiss in Hurrell-Harring v. State.
15
"Id. at98.
12 The oral argument may be viewed at the following site:
http://www.michbar.org/courts/virtualcourt.cfm.
B See Appellants' Brief, Duncan v. State, Nos. 139345, 139346,
139347 (Mich. Feb. 8, 2010), available at
http://www.courts.nichigan.gov/supremecourt/Clerk/04-
10/139345/139345-7-AppellantBrief.pdf; Brief for Plaintiffs-
Appellants, Hurrell-Harring v. State, No. 8866-07 (N.Y. Sept. 28,
2009) (on file with author). The oral arguments in the two cases may
be viewed at the following sites:
http://www.michbar.org/courts/virtualcourt.cfm (Duncan),
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/CTAPPS/arguments/201 0/Marl 0/Marl 0_
OA.htm (Hurrell-Harring).
14 Duncan v. State, Mich. Sup. Ct., Nos. 139345, 139346, 139347
(Mich. Apr. 30, 2010), available at
http://coa.courts.ni.gov/documents/sct/public/orders/20100430_si 3934
5_106_139345_2010-04-30_or.pdf [hereinafter Duncan 1].
'5 Hurrell-Harring v. State, No. 66, slip op. at 21 (N.Y. May 6, 2010),
available at
12
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While the April Order from the Michigan Supreme
Court denied defendants' motion to dismiss, the Court
declined to issue an opinion. On the other hand, the New
York Court of Appeals opinion created very good law for
future public defense reform suits. Despite the defendants'
claim that plaintiffs had an adequate remedy in the criminal
appellate and habeas process, the Court found that avenue
insufficient to address the systemic claims presented in the
Complaint. As the Court explained, the post-conviction
approach "is expressly premised on the supposition that the
fundamental underlying right to representation under
Gideon has been enabled by the State."' 6 Where plaintiffs
allege, as they did in the New York Complaint, that the
there has been a total breakdown of the defense system, the
Court held that the post-conviction approach is not
appropriate.' 7 Moreover, the Court held that what plaintiffs
alleged in the Complaint was not a "mere lumping together
of 20 generic ineffective assistance of counsel claims" 8 but
rather "a claim for constructive denial of the right to
counsel" on a systemic basis. 19 Finally, the Court rejected
the separation of powers argument with the following: "It
is, of course, possible that a remedy in this action would
necessitate the appropriation of funds and perhaps,
particularly in a time of scarcity, some reordering of
legislative priorities. But this does not amount to an
argument upon which a court might be relieved of its
essential obligation to provide a remedy for violation of a
fundamental constitutional right." 20 In sum, the New York
Court of Appeals opinion provides powerful precedent for
any state court considering the justiciability of these suits
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/CTAPPS/decisions/2010/may1 0/66opnl 0
.pdf.
16 Hurrell-Harring v. State, No. 66, slip op. at 7.
17 id.
IS Id. (Pigott, J., dissenting at 6).
19 Hurrell-Harring v. State, No. 66, slip op. at 14-15.
20 Id. at 20 (citation omitted).
13
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going forward. In particular, it alters the perception that
public defense reform is a purely legislative task, and it
rejects the notion that habeas review is the appropriate, let
alone exclusive, avenue for systemic public defense cases.
In mid-June, public defense reform advocates cited
both the Michigan and New York suits as success stories -
two examples where state supreme courts seemed to
recognize the crucial role that they had to play in indigent
defense reform. Accordingly, court watchers were stunned
in July 2010, when the Michigan Supreme Court reversed
itself in the Duncan suit and issued an order ("Duncan I/')
granting the defendants' motion for summary disposition -
only two and a half months after the same Court had paved
21the way for a trial on the merits.
In stark contrast to the New York Court of Appeals'
opinion in Hurrell-Harring, the Michigan Supreme Court's
opinion in Duncan II, vacating its earlier Order and
granting the defendants' motion to dismiss, creates
additional negative case law with which future plaintiffs in
similar suits must contend. The majority in Duncan II
simply stated that: "The defendants are entitled to summary
disposition because, as the Court of Appeals dissenting
opinion recognized, the plaintiffs' claims are not
justiciable. ' 22 Justice Markman, concurring in the opinion,
wrote separately and explained that the Court's earlier
21 Duncan v. State, Mich. Sup. Ct., Nos. 139345, 139346, 139347
(Mich. July 16, 2010) [hereinafter Duncan I]], available at
http://www.courts.michigan.gov/supremecourt/Clerk/04-
10/139345/139345-7-Order.pdf; see also David Carroll, Mich.
Supreme Court Reverses Course in ACLU Class Action Indigent
Defense Lawsuit, ACSBlog, July 19, 2010 (calling the decision
"stunning"), available at http://www.acslaw.org/node/16537; Court
Rules in Favor of Unequal Justice for Poor Defendants, DETROIT FREE
PRESS, July 20, 2010, available at
http://www.freep.com/article/20100720/OPNION0 1/7200318/Court-
rules-in-favor-of-unequal-justice-for-poor-defendants.
22 Duncan II at 2.
14
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Order had been in error for two reasons: 1) it had failed to
articulate any governing standards and 2) it had incorrectly
held that summary disposition was premature when, in fact,
summary disposition was appropriate based on the
Complaint itself.23 Justice Markman then cited ten reasons
why the defendants were entitled to summary disposition,
including the following: that the Supreme Court in Gideon
v. Wainwright was concerned with "results, not process;"
24
that plaintiffs' claims are non-justiciable; 25 that there is no
constitutional right to a "meaningful relationship with
counsel';, 26 and that plaintiffs were asking the Michigan
courts to violate the separation of powers doctrine by
seizing traditionally legislative tasks from state
lawmakers. 27 In short, Justice Markman's opinion adopted
wholesale the Court of Appeals dissenting opinion from
June, 2009.28
The Duncan II decision is flawed for several
reasons.29 First, in order for the Court to vacate its original
order and reverse its decision regarding the defendants'
motion to dismiss, the Court needed to find that its
"previous ruling rested on a 'palpable error.' 30 It strains
credulity to imagine what that error was since the Court's
new order comes only two and a half months after its
original order and is based exclusively upon the dissenting
opinion from the appellate court decision -- an opinion that
was before the Court when it originally ruled unanimously
23 id.
24 Id. (citation omitted).
25 Id. at 2-3.
26 Id. at 3 (citation omitted).
27id.
28 id.
29 The Duncan II opinion, its legal underpinnings, and its implications
will undoubtedly be the subject of future scholarship. My goal in
discussing the opinion in this essay is to offer a preliminary response.30Duncan II at 5 (Kelly, C.J. dissenting).
15
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in favor of the plaintiffs. 3' As the dissenting opinion in
Duncan H correctly notes: "we were certainly aware when
we issued our previous order that, by affirming only the
result reached by the Court of Appeals, we were remanding
the case without a controlling standard., 32 Moreover, as
the dissent states: "plaintiffs correctly note that defendants'
motion [for reconsideration] merely repeats the arguments
it made earlier and that defendants are effectively asking
this Court to issue an advisory opinion." 33 As a procedural
matter, the opinion in Duncan II was inappropriate.
Second, to the extent that the Court's decision rests
upon adoption of the appellate court's dissent, the decision
rests on misguided legal foundations. For example, it is
simply not the case that the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel is "concerned with results, not process." 34 In fact,
the contrary is true -- no defendant has the right to an
outcome of a certain verdict or sentence; but every
defendant has the right to certain procedural safeguards,





34 1d. at 2; U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
35 See Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 554 U.S. 191 (2008) (reaffirming
that Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches at the initiation of
adversarial proceedings in order to protect the defendant's rights as the
state moves forward with its case). There are other ways in which the
Duncan II opinion rests on flawed legal analysis. A full discussion of
those issues is outside the scope of this essay, but for example, the
Court's reference to Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)
and its prejudice prong is completely inapposite in a case like Duncan
where plaintiffs seek prospective relief. See Cara H. Drinan, The
National Right to Counsel Act: A Congressional Solution to the
Nation's Indigent Defense Crisis, 47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 487 (2010),
SSRN draft at 22-23, available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id= 1448058.
16
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Third, the decision errs in its assessment that the
court cannot be involved in a suit of this kind without
stepping on the toes of the state's executive and judicial
branches. It is the province of the courts to identify
constitutional violations and to order parties to cure such
violations. 36  If, as a result of a court doing so, a state
legislature ultimately has to expend funds, so be it. That
outcome in no way undermines the Court's authority to
identify a constitutional defect in the first instance.
Finally, the Court's decision in Duncan 1I was
premature, as the Court recognized in its own initial order
allowing the case to move forward.37 In order to survive a
motion to dismiss, plaintiffs needed to state a legal claim
on which relief could be granted.38 This they did, as the
Michigan Supreme Court implicitly recognized when it
originally rejected the defendants motion for summary
disposition in its April Order. At this stage of litigation,
plaintiffs did not need to address the question of
appropriate remedies, the issue of funding for indigent
defense representation, or the extent to which future
potential injunctive relief would interfere with ongoing
criminal proceedings. All of these issues appear to have
been of newfound great concern to the Duncan I Court,
39
and they are entirely outside the realm of a motion for
summary disposition. This reversal is stunning, and it
raises doubts about the ability of elected judges to
36 Hurrell-Harring v. State, No. 66, slip op. at 20 (citing Marbury v.
Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 147 (1803)).
37 Duncan I, supra note 14 ("This case is at its earliest stages and,
based solely on the plaintiffs' pleadings in this case, it is premature to
make a decision on the substantive issues. Accordingly, the defendants
are not entitled to summary disposition at this time.").
38 MICH. CT. R. § 2.116(C)(8) (West 2010).
39 Duncan II at 2-3.
17
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impartially rule on questions that implicate the operation of
a criminal justice system which the bench itself oversees.4 °
Part II: Systemic Indigent Defense Litigation in the
Wake of the Duncan Suit
The picture of public defense litigation may not be
as bright as it was even two months ago when both the New
York and Michigan suits appeared to be moving toward
trial. However, there is still much to be said for systemic
litigation as a tool for defense reform advocates. First, as
the New York suit demonstrates, these cases can make it
out of the gates - something many reformers did not think
was possible even ten years ago.41  The lesson of the
Michigan and New York comparison may be that parties
bringing these types of suits need to be very thoughtful
about the states in which they choose to seek judicial
reform. Second, the Michigan experience may indicate that
systemic litigation can be effective, but that now, more than
ever, litigants need a federal forum in which to bring these
types of suits. 42  Third, defense reformers may need to
40 See STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID AND INDIGENT DEFENDANTS,
AM. BAR ASS'N, GIDEON'S BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA'S CONTINUING
QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE 20-21 (2004) (discussing the problem of
defense functions that do not have independence from judicial
influence and citing examples in Michigan), available at
http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/sclaid/defender/brokenpromise/full
report.pdf; See also Amanda Frost and Stefanie A. Lindquist,
Countering the Majoritarian Difficulty, 96 VA. L. REv. 719, 731-40
(2010) (discussing the evidence that suggests elected judges are, in fact,
influenced by majority preferences, especially in comparison to
appointed judges).
4 See, e.g., Webb v. Commonwealth, 528 S.E.2d 138 (Va. Ct. App.
2000) (rejecting challenge to statutorily-capped court-appointed
attorney fee system and determining reform was legislative concern).
42 I have written on the need for a federal forum for these types of
claims in prior works. See also Drinan, Indigent Defense Litigation,
18
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think about a two-tiered approach to litigation where
systemic suits and individual suits, challenging, for
example, excessive caseloads, are brought simultaneously.
In this way, when and if a systemic suit makes its way to a
state Supreme Court, that court has a body of individual
challenges before it that substantiate the breadth of the
systemic challenge. Finally, it is important to note that, in
some jurisdictions, litigation - regardless of its risks and
costs - may be the only available path to meaningful
indigent defense reform.43 For example, Texas, Georgia,
and Utah are states where the indigent defense crisis is
acute. If the legislative and executive bodies in these states
cannot reform the systems sufficiently, systemic litigation
may be necessary,
Texas is notorious for its public defense
shortcomings. Before its passage of the Texas Fair Defense
Act in 2001 44 the county-run system was referred to as a
"national embarrassment. 4 5  This reputation was due to
several factors: a lack of independence in the appointment
of defense counsel; a lack of state financing for public
defense; and a lack of statewide standards for the
supra note 1, at 467-75. See generally Drinan, Systemic Sixth
Amendment Claims, supra note 1.
43 NAT'L RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMM., THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT,
JUSTICE DENIED: AMERICA'S CONTINUING NEGLECT OF OUR
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL 210-211(2009) (discussing need
for litigation when other options have been exhausted), available at
http://www.constitutionproject.org/manage/file/139.pdf.
44 See Diana Jennings, Legal Defense for Poor Is Looking Better:
Agencies Taking Steps Required by New Law, but the Jury Is Out,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 13, 2002, at 39A (describing
components of the law).
45 Fox Butterfield, Texas Nears Creation of State Public Defender
System, N.Y. TIMES, April 6, 2001, at A14 (quoting state bar
association report).
19
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appointment and performance of defense counsel.46
Unfortunately, today, almost a decade after the state's
enactment of public defense reform legislation, "Texas is
reaching a crisis point, putting itself at risk of a civil rights
lawsuit.''47 In particular, the state has failed to contribute
meaningfully to public defense financing, and because the
overall costs of public defense in Texas have nearly
doubled since 2001, the counties are struggling to close a
48huge fiscal gap. In 2009, statewide public defense
services cost $186.3 million dollars, but the state
contributed only 15% of that amount.49 The persistent lack
of independence in the appointment of defense counsel in
Texas5 and the chronic under-funding of defense services
by the state, coupled with the state's tough-on-crime
reputation, make it a jurisdiction ripe for litigated reform,
as local experts have already noted.5'
Like Texas, Georgia has a long-standing reputation
for failing its indigent defense clients, and it also has
attempted to improve its defense services through
legislative reform. In 2003, responding to years of
46 Id; see also TEXAS APPLESEED FAIR DEFENSE PROJECT, THE FAIR
DEFENSE REPORT: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF INDIGENT
DEFENSE PRACTICES IN TEXAS, (2000)
http://texasappleseed.net/pdf/projects fairDefensefairreport.pdf.






50 Editorial, Fix the System: A Public Defender Office Would Improve
the Quality of Justice Here While Saving Taxpayer Dollars, HOUSTON
CHRON., March 20, 2008, at B8 ("Although judges are supposed to use
an impartial rotating list of available attorneys, in practice the system is
easy to manipulate in favor of particular lawyers who might be friends
or political contributors. An attorney who displeases a judge can be
removed from the appointment list.").
51 Grissom, supra note 47 (quoting the Texas Fair Defense Project's
Executive Director as saying "The situation in Texas is not that
different from the situation in states that have seen litigation.").
20
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criticism of its county-run system, Georgia enacted
legislation that established a public defender within each
judicial circuit, and in 2004 state funding for the system
was enacted.52 At the time, the state's reform efforts were
cited as a model for other jurisdictions to follow.
53
Unfortunately, the state has not maintained its
exemplary status. Facing rising public defense costs,
especially related to conflict cases, state legislators have
considered returning thousands of indigent defense cases to
county control - the very type of control that the 2003
legislation was designed to change. 54 Jamie Weis's case
illustrates well the extent of the state's public defense
crisis. In February, 2006, Mr. Weis was arrested and
charged with a capital crime.55 More than three years later,
his case was finally placed on a trial calendar.56 Despite
Mr. Weis's claim that a lack of state funding for his defense
counsel hampered his case and deprived him of his right to
a speedy trial,57 the Georgia Supreme Court ruled that the
state may move forward with its case against Mr. Weis.
58
Moreover, as a result of the Court's ruling, Mr. Weis will
need to work with replacement counsel, despite the fact that
those public defenders are already overworked and lack the
52 GIDEON'S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 40, at 30.
53 id.
54 See also Bill Rankin, Indigent Defense Legislation Delayed Until
Next Year, THE ATLANTA JOURNAL CONSTITUTION, Apr. 22, 2010,
available at
http://www.ajc.com/news/georgia-politics-elections/indigent-defense-
legislation-delayed-484553.html. See generally Bill Rankin, Proposal
Would Split Public Defender System, THE ATLANTA JOURNAL
CONSTITUTION, Feb. 24, 2010, available at
http://www.ajc.com/news/georgia-politics-elections/proposal-would-
split-public-326988.html.
55 Weis v. State, 2010 WL 1077418 at *1 (Ga. Mar. 25, 2010).
56 Id. at *3.
51 Id. at *3-7.
58 Id. at *7; see also John Schwartz, Murder Case May Proceed in
Georgia, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2010, at A13.
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investigative and expert resources necessary to defend
him.59 The Southern Center for Human Rights has filed a
petition for certiorari with the United States Supreme Court
on Mr. Weis's behalf, arguing that Mr. Weis has a right to
continuity of counsel and that Georgia's failure to provide
funding for Mr. Weis's lawyers for over two years
constitutes a "systemic breakdown in the public defender
system" which "should be charged to the State for speedy
trial purposes."
60
Even though Georgia has had experience with
systemic public defense reform litigation in the past,61 its
current state of affairs begs the question whether the
jurisdiction may be ripe for litigated reform again. Indeed,
if the state's public defense funding crisis can bring most of
its capital cases to a "standstill, 62 leaving defendants like
Mr. Weis with no representation for years, the reform
efforts of 2003 have not cured the state's fundamental
defense problems, and a new round of systemic litigation
may be on the horizon.
Utah remains only one of two states nationally that
provides no state funding toward public defense services,
63
and it ranks forty-eighth in the nation for per capita
spending on indigent defense. 64 Further, the state provides
no oversight, training or quality standards for the various
counties that provide representation to indigent
59 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Weis v. State, (No. 09-10715), 7-
8, 23-24, (May 10, 2010),
http://www.abajournal.com/files/WeisCertPetition.pdf.60 Id. at 26 (citation omitted).
61 See GIDEON'S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 40, at 30 (citing lawsuits
by the Southern Center for Human Rights and the NAACP designed to
improve the state system prior to the 2003 legislative overhaul).
62 Brenda Goodman, Georgia Murder Case's Cost Saps Public Defense
System, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2007, at A16.
6TJUSTICE DENIED, supra note 43, at 54.
64 Tim Gurrister, Ethridge Keeps Defenders, Waits for Dentist,
STANDARD-EXAMINER, May 8, 2010, 2010 WLNR 9568022.
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defendants.65  Counties are free to choose their own
systems for the delivery of public defense services, and
historically, most counties have chosen a contract or
assigned counsel system.66 Recently, one of the two Utah
counties that had been operating a public defender office
closed that office and moved to a flat-fee contract system as
a cost-saving measure.
67
The American Civil Liberties Union (the "ACLU")
recently intervened in a Utah capital case where the state
has tried to remove the defendants' two lawyers, both of
whom were previously employed by the now-defunct
public defender office. 68 The ACLU and the public defense
attorneys in the case argue that their client is
constitutionally entitled to continuity in his representation,
similar to the claim asserted in the Weis case in Georgia.
69
Further, the ACLU brief raises systemic concerns, in
particular the fact that the state fails to fully comply with
any of the Ten Principles that the ABA uses to measure the
efficacy of a public defense delivery system.70 The state's
persistent absence from the public defense function,
excessive caseloads, and a high-profile capital case that
drives home the cost of a broken system, make Utah a
jurisdiction that may see systemic litigation in the near
future.
65 David Carroll, Gideon Alert: Right to Counsel Threatened After Utah





68 Tim Gurrister, ACLU Accuses Weber of Cost-Cutting in Double-
Murder Defense, STANDARD-EXAMINER, April 23, 2010, 2010 WLNR
8442940.
69 Request for Leave to File Brief of Amicus Curiae in Opposition to
Motion for Substitution of Counsel, State v. Ethridge, No. 018901539
(Sec. Jud. Dist. Ct. Weber County April 20, 2010),
http://www.acluutah.org/Ethridge 042010_motion amicus.pdf.
70 d. at 3.
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Part III: Conclusion
Even in the wake of the Michigan Supreme Court's
Duncan II decision, there is a role for systemic indigent
defense litigation to play. Litigation can be an impetus for
legislative action; it can generate media attention that
informs the public; and it may, as the New York suit
demonstrates, even make it to trial. Going forward,
litigants need to be thoughtful about selecting jurisdictions
where they seek judicial reform. At the same time, they
need to continue to press for a federal forum for these types
of claims in order to minimize the majoritarian pressure to
be tough on crime that may weigh on elected state judges.
Finally, the federal government needs to be at the forefront
of nationwide indigent defense reform. It can do this in a
number of ways, as scholars have discussed and as the
newly created Access to Justice Initiative within the
Department of Justice has explained.71 For example, the
federal government can file amicus briefs in ongoing state
litigation like the New York suit; it can generate critical
data that enables states to measure systemic defense
shortcomings; and it can use its bully pulpit to inform the
public as to why access to counsel is so vital to all citizens.
Whatever priorities it chooses to set in this realm, it is clear
that going forward, when state judicial and legislative
bodies turn a blind eye to indigent defense crises, the
federal government cannot stand on the sidelines.
71 On June 19, 2010, at the American Constitution Society National
Convention, a panel of experts discussed the "federal role in improving
indigent criminal defense." Many proposals, including some
mentioned here, like the filing of amicus briefs, were discussed by
panelists. The panel may be viewed here:
http://www.acslaw.org/node/16402.
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LAURIE ROBINSON: Thank you, Norm. It's good to see
you again, and it's great to be here among old friends and
colleagues.
I'd like to thank the sponsors of this symposium:
the University of Tennessee College of Law, the Tennessee
Journal of Law and Policy, the Justice Project, and of
course the American Bar Association-where I spent my
formative years as a criminal justice professional.
I'd be remiss if I didn't begin by acknowledging all
the great work the ABA has done to advance the cause of
adult and juvenile indigent defense over so many decades.
I know a lot of people. No small number of organizations
has devoted their energies to this issue, but the ABA has
really been in the vanguard. Some might say I have a little
professional bias here, but I doubt many would dispute the
claim.
Of course, one of the pioneers in indigent defense is
seated at my table here. I don't want to embarrass him, but
I don't know where we'd be without Norm Lefstein. I can
think of no one who has done more to diagnose the
problems in public defense and to improve the
professionalization of the field.
Norm understood, early on, that the promise of
counsel pronounced by GideonI was not enough. The
effectiveness of representation was essential. As he said
back in 1982 in his report, Criminal Defense Services for
the Poor, "If providing an attorney to the poor is to be
meaningful, it is essential that the lawyers render effective
legal assistance.
' 2
Norm has always believed that our responsibilities
to the disadvantaged in the justice system do not end with a
perfunctory nod to the Constitution. We must work
1 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 341 (1963).
2 Norman Lefstein, Criminal Defense Services for the Poor: Methods
and Programs for Providing Legal Representation and the Need for
Adequate Financing, American Bar Association (1982).
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diligently to overcome the obstacles to ensuring effective
counsel, whether they be inadequate training, excessive
caseloads, insufficient resources, or just plain apathy.
We all owe Norm a tremendous debt of gratitude for his
work. So thank you, Norm Lefstein.
As you can see, I'm proud of my association with
Norm and with the ABA. Their work in indigent defense is
finally getting the attention and respect it deserves on the
federal level, thanks in part to an Attorney General who
values the role of the public defense bar. At the National
Symposium on Indigent Defense that we held in February,
Attorney General Eric Holder said, "the fundamental
integrity of our criminal justice system, and our faith in it,
depends on effective representation on both sides."3
For Eric Holder and this Department of Justice
(DOJ), equal justice under law is not a mere outgrowth of
important legal principles, but the bedrock of American
jurisprudence. He shares the belief stated in the ABA's
Standards for Providing Defense Services, that "[o]ur
system of justice is a reflection of our societal
development, and the furnishing of adequate defense
services a measure of our justice system."4
Only a few months after he had been in office, the
Attorney General revived the Department's dormant efforts
to address the indigent defense crisis in our country. The
Department had already taken some serious steps in the
1990s, when I served my first stint as Assistant Attorney
General.
3 Eric Holder, Attorney Gen. of the U.S., Looking Back, Looking
Forward, 2000-20 10, National Symposium on Indigent Defense,
Washington D.C., Feb. 18, 2010, available at
http://www.justice.gov/ag/speeches/2010/ag-speech-100218.html.
4 American Bar Association Criminal Justice Standards Committee.
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROVIDING DEFENSE
SERVICES 26 (3rd ed. 1992), available at
http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/standards/providingdefense.pdf.
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Eric Holder was part of that work when he served as
Deputy Attorney General under Janet Reno. Now he's
picking up where we left off.
Last June, he spoke at the American Council of
Chief Defenders Conference, where he laid out the
Department's goals for improving the indigent defense
system. This is always something of a risky proposition-
committing an agency the size of DOJ, with all its
competing priorities, to a course of action on a major issue
like indigent defense. But this is something that Eric
Holder is passionate about. And I'm happy to say that,
under his direction, the Justice Department has already
taken a number of important steps.
First of all-as he promised in his speech last June
and as I mentioned earlier-we've already held a National
Symposium on Indigent Defense. We brought together
about 500 people from across the country, and from across
the criminal and juvenile justice spectrum.
Then the Attorney General brought in Professor Larry
Tribe from Harvard to head up the Department's Access to
Justice initiative. That was sort of a bittersweet moment
for me because I lost one of my key staff-a former Miami
public defender-to Larry's office.
But it was for the greater good, and Larry and his
staff have been working with components throughout DOJ
to determine ways to bring defenders to the table on issues
that affect the system as a whole. And I can assure you that
the program plans emerging from this new office will
feature indigent defense "front and center."
And then in my agency, the Office of Justice
Programs, we've found many ways to devote our resources
to supporting public defense.
Last year, our Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA)
launched an Indigent Defense Hiring Project. We funded
ten jurisdictions to hire additional public defenders to
reduce case loads and improve the quality of
28
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representation, including a site right here in Knox County.
We'll be funding four additional jurisdictions this year.
We're providing seed money for a National
Fellowship Program aimed at increasing the number of
qualified public defense lawyers. I'm really excited about
this because this is a great field-initiated program being run
by the Southern Public Defender Training Center in
partnership with Equal Justice Works. It's modeled on
Teach for America, which brings talented young people
into schools in low-income communities. It will provide
three-year fellowships to recruit and train top law school
graduates to work as public defenders in underserved areas.
We're also providing funding to expand the Bronx
Defender Holistic Advocacy Program. This is an
interesting initiative because it addresses both the causes
and consequences of involvement in the criminal justice
system. It offers both legal representation and social
support and advocacy. The project is developing an online
resource center and providing targeted technical assistance
to public defender offices across the country.
BJA has several projects designed to improve the
quality of access that defendants receive in court. For
example, this summer we'll be making an award under a
program called Improving Court Communication. This is
part and parcel of a research-backed movement to ensure
procedural fairness in the justice system. Basically, what
the research is telling us is that defendants who understand
what's going on in their encounters with the system-
including in court-perceive the process as fair, and this
perception of fairness leads to higher compliance with the
law.
What all of you know better than anyone is that
indigent defendants too often do not understand the court
process. The purpose of this project is to train judges and
other courtroom actors on communicating more effectively
29
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so that those who come into court get the information they
need to fully and fairly participate in the system.
BJA is also reviewing grant proposals under its
Wrongful Conviction Review Program. The purpose of
this program is to try to ensure that defendants with post-
conviction claims of innocence have high quality
representation.
And we're looking at applications under our Capital
Case Litigation Initiative, which supports training and
technical assistance on death penalty issues. These funds
go to state agencies, which then split the money equally for
the training of defense attorneys and prosecutors. I think
this is important to note because we know that public
defenders have historically been severely underfunded
relative to the rest of the justice system.
We're also taking great pains to address issues of
defense in juvenile proceedings. If we're experiencing a
crisis in indigent defense in the adult system, we should
probably call what's going on the juvenile side a
catastrophe.
On Monday of this week, our Office of Juvenile
Justice and Delinquency Prevention released a bulletin on
conditions of confinement, which summarizes findings
from the Survey of Youth in Residential Placement. 5
One of the Survey's findings is that just one-half of
those in detention facilities have a lawyer. This is a
disturbing finding given that it's been thirty years since the
ABA and the Institute for Judicial Administration
published their Juvenile Justice Standards advocating legal
representation for juveniles from the outset of the court
process. To be sure, the survey is based on self reports of
youth in custody, but I think that only serves to underscore
5 Andrea J. Sedlak, Introduction to the Survey of Youth in Residential
Placement, JUVENILE JUSTICE BULLETIN (U.S. Dept. of Justice Office
of Justice Programs), Mar. 2010, at 1, available at
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/218390.pdf.
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a persistent problem-that youth in court often perceive the
system as stacked against them.
We're still dealing with a host of problems in the
juvenile system: Youth who are explicitly or implicitly
encouraged to waive the right to counsel; courts that
appoint counsel too late in the process; and sub-standard
representation due to administrative impediments.
The National Juvenile Defender Center
characterized it this way in its recent publication, the Role
of the Juvenile Defense Counsel in Delinquency Court.6 It
said, "many juvenile courts still operate in a pre-Gault
mode in which the defense attorney is irrelevant, real
lawyering cannot occur, and the fair administration of
justice is impeded.",7 The result is that the situation
identified by the Supreme Court forty-three years ago
remains: juveniles in court still receive "the worst of both
worlds . . . neither the [legal] protection[s] accorded [to]
adults nor [adequate treatment]."
Our Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention (OJJDP) is working to improve the juvenile
justice system through a range of reforms-from detention
alternatives to juvenile reentry programs. Improving
juvenile defense is a critical component of our efforts.
In fact, I'm pleased that we recently posted a
solicitation to fund a Juvenile Indigent Defense National
Clearinghouse. We envision that this clearinghouse will
provide a broad range of activities aimed at raising the level
of systemic advocacy, improving the quality of
representation of indigent juveniles, and ensuring necessary
technical support for the juvenile indigent defense bar.
6 Robin Walker Sterling, Role of Juvenile Defense Counsel in
Delinquency Court, (Nat'l. Juvenile Defender Ctr.) Spring 2009 at 1,
available at http://www.njdc.info/pdf/njdc-role of counsel book.pdf.
7 Id. at 5-6.
8 Id. at 1.
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OJJDP will make one award for as much as
$500,000. We're accepting applications until June 24,
2010. I encourage those of you who represent juveniles, or
who work with those who do, to consider this opportunity
and let your colleagues know about it.
There are other areas in which we're working to
support public defense. For example, the President's
budget for next year seeks funds to augment the Census of
Public Defender Offices administered by our Bureau of
Justice Statistics. Currently, the survey focuses only on
publicly-funded indigent defense offices and omits the
work performed by contract attorneys and assigned
counsel. So there are no current data that provide national-
level estimates of public defense services. The expanded
survey will give us a clearer picture of the state of indigent
defense and will help us to better assess the training and
resource needs of the field.
The President's budget also requests funding for a
National Delinquency Court Improvement Program.
Addressing juvenile defense is a critical component of this.
Another bit of good news is that we're close to releasing
our solicitation for the John R. Justice Program. For those
of you who aren't familiar with it, John R. Justice is a loan
repayment program for state and federal public defenders
and state prosecutors who agree to remain employed as
defenders and prosecutors for at least three years. BJA is
working with the governor's office in each state to
designate an agency to administer the program, and we
expect funds to be awarded to the states by the end of
September.
I think-I hope-it's clear that our commitment to
improving indigent defense is serious. The Attorney
General has made a pledge to bolster the public defense
bar, and we are following through. I believe that our
nation's justice system is capable of great things.
Unfortunately, parts of that system too often have failed
32
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those who have been-as Anthony Lewis put it in Gideon 's
Trumpet--"tossed aside by life." 9  The system has
tremendous potential, but it needs guidance and support.
Justice Felix Frankfurter had written even before
Gideon, "the history of liberty [is] largely . . . [the]
history of [the] observance of procedural safeguards." 10
Sometimes, our highest ideals fail to play out amid
unwarranted fear and old habits. The way to overcome
those psychological barriers is to pull together and
recognize that we all share the same goal, and that is a
system of law that honors the dignity of every person.
That's what you're doing here through this
symposium, and that's what we're trying to achieve in our
work at the Department of Justice. I commend you for the
good work you do every day on behalf of the poor and
disadvantaged, and I hope you'll continue to see us as your
partners in improving the indigent defense system in our
country. Thank you.
'ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON'S TRUMPET (Random House 1964).
10 McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 347 (1943).
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PENNY WHITE: Good afternoon. It is my privilege on
behalf of the University of Tennessee College of Law, The
Center for Advocacy and Dispute Resolution, and the
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy to welcome you. I'm
Penny White and I am the director of the Center and the
faculty advisor for the policy journal. The law school
community is extremely honored to co-host this significant
event, because the fundamental issues which this
symposium address literally and figuratively make up the
bricks and mortar of this institution.
If you're a guest, you may have entered via
Cumberland Avenue. If you did and you looked up at the
entrance of the College of Law, you saw the phrase "Equal
Justice Under Law." But if you entered instead from the
White Avenue entrance and looked up you saw the words
of the Sixth Amendment, "To Have the Assistance of
Counsel.' 1 It is more than coincidence that these two
principles flank the University of Tennessee College of
Law, and that the Sixth Amendment's specific promise is
on slightly higher ground than its more inexact counterpart.
That juxtaposition should remind us that equal
justice cannot be accomplished without the more certain
guarantee of the right to counsel. But setting architecture
aside, at the UT College of Law, home of the longest and
continually existing legal clinic in the country, it is our
mission to do far more than chisel those fundamental
principles in the entryways of our buildings. It is our
mission and indeed our privilege to seek to instill them into
our students' hearts, and that is why we are so proud to be
involved in this important moment in history. Sometimes
great history is made in unexpected places by unsuspecting
and often unsung heroes.
Last year on April 4th, 2009, hundreds of Tennessee
lawyers, law students, and other volunteers spent thousands
of hours in dozens of legal clinics across the state providing
1 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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free civil legal service to some of Tennessee's more than
one million citizens who live at or below the legal services
eligibility threshold-as a part of the Tennessee Bar
Association's "Justice For All" campaign. They did so
based on a personal and professional commitment to equal
justice and the right to counsel-not for recognition. But,
at the end of the day, those lawyers and law students,
paralegals, and other volunteers were unsuspecting heroes
in the making of history. Just last week the ABA and the
National Legal Aid & Defender Association (NLADA)
announced that the Tennessee Bar Association would
receive the esteemed Harrison Tweed Award honoring
extraordinary achievements in increasing access to legal
services for the poor. Our state, our bar, and our judiciary
will take great pride in the receipt of that award, as well we
should. But that pride can be increased tenfold if we
devote equal energy and experience to similar success in
providing legal services for the indigent accused.
I would like to think that our state's success, and the
Tennessee Supreme Court's present commitment to the
issue of civil access to justice, can serve as a kind of dress
rehearsal for the work we must now do to improve
Tennessee's indigent defense system and the indigent
defense systems in this country. The necessary nuts and
bolts for that improvement will be in the programs of which
you will hear over the course of the next day and a half-
programs that will be presented by many unsung heroes. I
hope that one day we all reflect back upon the symposium
and realize that we played a role in the making of history
by taking steps necessary to achieve the promise of the
Sixth Amendment. 2 So thank you for being here and thank
you for being a part of this crucial endeavor.
Let me close by acknowledging very briefly what a
wonderful experience it has been for me personally to work
with Norm Lefstein, Georgia Vagenas, and Tamaara
2id.
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Piquion from the ABA on this project. It will become
abundantly clear to you how talented they are as you
experience the program for which they are responsible.
Also, I want to introduce you to a few extra sets of hands
who work with the Center in the College of Law and who
are here to help for the next day and a half should you have
any needs. First, Mark Ensley, who is the Center's
Administrative Assistant, and is basically responsible for
the technology and the fact that we are streaming this
presentation live. Behind him, simply by position at this
point, is Jeff Groah who is a tech advisor for the College of
Law. Also, Jessica Van Dyke, seated on the front row, is
the Symposium Editor for the Tennessee Journal of Law
and Policy, and we've even pulled Monica Miller, who is
Mark's wife, and outside right now, to help out should you
need more assistance.
We are transcribing the symposium proceedings
with the help of able court reporting staff from Watts-Boyd,
so I urge you to keep that in mind when you speak either as
a panelist or a participant. For those of you who are
contributing articles to the symposium which will also be
published, we remind you of the June 1 deadline and ask
you to get in touch with Jessica about making sure we have
your manuscript. And for all of you, if you're interested in
purchasing a copy of the symposium proceedings, you
simply fill out the blue form that you got at registration,
and we'll make sure that you get one.
Finally, all of the programs, except for tonight's
dinner, will be housed in this room. For those of you who
are attending the dinner, it is being held at the Howard
Baker Center for Public Policy, which is two blocks west,
across Cumberland Avenue on the north side of the street.
It took me about ten minutes to figure that out, because I'm
directionally impaired. If you, like me, are directionally
impaired, it is at the comer of 17th and Cumberland and it
is marked wonderfully on this map which is also at the
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registration desk.
So, I thank you again for being here. It is our honor
to be a part of this symposium. And I'm now pleased to
turn the podium over to Bob Stein, who is the chair of the
American Bar Association Standing Committee on Legal
Aid and Indigent Defendants, a major sponsor of this
symposium. Bob?
ROBERT STEIN: If this works, if I can figure it out.
Well, I'll stand.
PENNY WHITE: No, it will work.
ROBERT STEIN: It does work. Thank you, Penny, very
much. SCLAID, the Standing Committee on Legal Aid
and Indigent Defense, is really very happy to be a co-
sponsor of this program because for no other reason than
this is what we do. This is one of the issues that is of most
concern to us.
Let me provide a little background for those of you
who don't know about SCLAID. We are ninety years old
this year, and it is the ABA's longest running continuous
committee, which was established to examine issues related
to the delivery of legal services to the poor in both criminal
and civil matters. Over the past twenty years, SCLAID has
provided expert support and technical assistance to
individuals in organizations seeking to improve indigent
defense systems throughout the nation.
SCLAID has also commissioned studies and
research papers on a range of state and local defense
systems. We have authored policy proposals adopted by
the ABA through the House of Delegates that are used
throughout the country to improve indigent defense
representation. You can see the results of some of those
policies with our Eight and Ten Standards (ABA Eight
Guidelines of Public Defense Related to Excessive
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Workloads3 and ABA Ten Principles of a Public Defense
Delivery System, 4 which are available, I think, just outside
the door.
Currently, in addition to our continuing work, we
are beginning a project to develop language access
standards for state courts and also, thanks to a grant from
the Justice Department, CJA, and in partnership with the
Spangenberg Project at George Mason University, we are
going to be engaging in the training of public defenders.
Today's symposium is a result of the really successful
collaboration of many entities, including the Center for
Advocacy and Dispute Resolution and our host, the
University of Tennessee College of Law, the Tennessee
Journal of Law and Policy, the Justice Project, ABA Death
Penalty Representation Project, and the ABA Criminal
Justice section.
We are very grateful to the Atlantic Philanthropies
and the Justice Project for providing the grant that made
this event possible. The program is part of a larger three-
year-long project that involves the development of ABA
standards on workloads and the publication of the first-ever
guidebook on how to secure manageable caseloads in
public defense. Norm Lefstein will make sure that you
learn about the guidelines in the publication in great detail
throughout this program.
I'd also like to thank those people who have worked
so hard for the past year to bring together this event. It
could not have been possible without their work.
I'll start with Norm, the chief architect not only of
3 ABA EIGHT GUIDELINES OF PUBLIC DEFENSE RELATED TO EXCESSIVE
WORKLOAD, (2009) available at
http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/sclaid/defender/downloads/eight_g
uidelines of public defense.pdf.
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this program but of the far larger project from which this
program emerged. For the past three years, Norm has been
working virtually nonstop on drafting and helping to pass
the ABA standards on workloads, called the Eight
Guidelines on Public Defense Related to Excessive
Workloads. As I said, those are available outside. He is
currently finishing a guidebook on a how to achieve
manageable caseloads. I've been told that Norm is
technically retired. The word that I use, rather than retired,
is re-focused. But, there is no re in his focus. His focus
has been consistent, and the public defender community is
the beneficiary of that effort. Norm has been a long-
standing member of SCLAID, leading its Indigent Defense
Advisory group for many years, and we sincerely hope that
we will be able to continue to claim him and his talents for
some time to come.
Next is Penny White, who helped plan this
symposium, in particular the death penalty portion of the
program, and she has already mentioned Mark Ensley of
her staff. There are two people from the Justice
Department: John Terzano, who is not here but I hope he
will be here shortly and Joyce McGee, who administered
the grant and helped with the planning. Brad MacLean of
the Office of Post-Conviction Defender in Nashville and
Robin Moore of the ABA's Death Penalty Representation
Project assisted on that portion of the program. As chair of
SCLAID, I use every opportunity that I can to thank our
staff who have planned the details, assisted with the
development of the guidelines and whose work really is
instrumental in SCLAID's work over the past years. Terry
Brooks is in the back, our counsel and director of the
ABA's Division of Legal Services. Georgia Vagenas and
Tamaara Piquion are here and also Lavernus Hall,
administrative assistant with our committee, who is not
here. All the number of members of SCLAID, including
Jean Faria, who is the chair of the advisory group, Adele
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Bernhard, Bob Weeks, and Kim Duggan, who is not here,
have worked hard on this as have the Indigent Defense
Advisory Group members-Jim Neuhard, Bob
Boruchowitz, Ed Bumette, Jim Bethke, and Dennis
Murphy-who I think are all here. The consultants that we
have worked with, I've mentioned the Spangenberg Project
and Jon Gould, are here. Finally, I would like to thank all
of you. We could do all of this planning and produce all of
these materials, but if you didn't come to participate,
contribute, and let us know of your own expertise it would
not be the success that I know it will be. Thank you.
NORMAN LEFSTEIN: Good afternoon, Ladies and
Gentlemen. I offer my words of welcome along with those
you've already received from Bob Stein and Penny White.
I want to thank Penny and Bob for their generous
comments about my role in planning this conference. It's
been in the making for a while, and we're glad to see so
many folks here this afternoon. I know we'll be joined by
others later in the program. This is an unusual program,
because it combines both indigent defense in non-capital
cases as well as indigent defense in the capital area. I can't
recall another program that has covered both of these
subjects in a single program.
There is a comment in the program announcement
about my presentation which involves a bit of false
advertising. It indicates that I've been working on a book
dealing with caseloads in public defense and that a pre-
publication copy of it would be available. In fact, the book
is not finished, but much of it is finished. You've all been
given a flash drive which includes six chapters of the book,
and I invite your comments on my draft. If you access the
flash drive and have comments on what has been prepared,
I would welcome hearing from you.
There will be some additional editing of the chapters
and the footnotes. I do have an admonition at the very
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beginning of each chapter in which I indicate that I ask that
the material not be quoted, cited, or reproduced for
publication without my written permission. But, if you
have a good reason for why you want to reproduce it or to
disseminate it to others, very likely I'd be glad to give my
written permission. I expect to complete the book by the
end of the summer and have it published, I hope, sometime
later this year.
Bob Stein seemed to imply that the book will
somehow solve the problem of excessive caseloads in
public defense in the United States. I think that may
overpromise what I'm able to deliver. But I hope it will,
nevertheless, be quite helpful. There has been a review
committee for what I have been drafting that has been
extremely helpful to me, known as the Indigent Defense
Advisory Group. Bob Stein already named the members of
that group. They also are listed at the very beginning of the
booklet of the Eight Guidelines of Public Defense Related
to Excessive Workloads and chaired by Jean Faria, the State
Public Defender of Louisiana. I also want to make clear,
however, that if there are things with which you disagree in
my drafts or find errors or mistakes of any kind, those are
my doing and certainly not attributable to my review
committee.
Incidentally, all of the materials for this conference
are on the flash drive that you should have received when
you registered. The only part that is not part of the flash
drive is these Eight Guidelines that have just recently been
printed. In fact, they arrived from the printer this week.
The same version of them is on the ABA's indigent defense
website, www.indigentdefense.org.
For many years, and especially recently, as all of
you I suspect are just as aware as I am, there have been
countless reports, both local and national, that have talked
about the terrible problems of excessive caseloads in
public defense and how they intrude upon the ability of
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lawyers to provide competent and diligent representation as
required by Rules of Professional Conduct, and they lead,
as I have often said, to the rendition of second-rate legal
services in public defense, through no fault of the lawyers
themselves.
Two reports of national scope were released in
2009. One of these was one on which I worked on behalf
of the National Right to Counsel Committee-Justice
Denied: America's Continuing Neglect of Our
Constitutional Right to Counsel5 -and an abbreviated
version of that report is available for distribution here at
today's meeting. The other report, which was published by
the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers,
deals with the lower courts in the United States, and also
documented the problem in the lower courts where the
caseloads are sometimes absolutely outrageous. Just this
past Sunday, once again the New York Times editorially
commented on caseloads, stating, "Public defender offices
are perilously short on financing and struggling with
overwhelming caseloads."
As a law professor-someone who likes to see
lawyers trained properly while in school, see them graduate
and go into public defender offices throughout the country,
and then sees what those caseloads do to the lawyers and
their ability to deliver effective representation-it is truly
heartbreaking. On behalf of the Knoxville Public Defender
Program here in this city, I testified as an expert witness in
2008 for Mark Stephens, the public defender who heads
that program. One of my vivid memories was listening to
the testimony of a recent law school graduate, who came
from what appeared to be an outstanding criminal defense
clinic of this law school. She explained what happened to
5 NAT'L RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMM., THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT,
JUSTICE DENIED: AMERICA'S CONTINUING NEGLECT OF OUR
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL (2009), available at
http://2009transition.org/justicedenied/.
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her when she went into Mark's program. Although she still
had the same dedication that she had as a law student,
because Mark's office was overwhelmed with cases, she
was unable to provide the kind of representation that she
had been accustomed to providing as a member of the
criminal defense clinic here at the law school.
In the book that I'm writing, I try to illustrate the
problem of excessive caseloads and explain how the idea of
writing a book on the subject developed. A couple of years
ago, I got an e-mail out of the blue from a public defender
in a northeastern city-he had a read an article of mine
dealing with excessive caseloads. He said, "I've got 325
cases. People are charged with misdemeanors and some
felonies and are going to jail because I cannot adequately
represent them, and I need to file motions to withdraw." So
I told him, "You need to go to your supervisor, to the head
of the office, and then file motions to withdraw if relief is
not provided." So he did what I suggested. He went to his
supervisor, and he went to the head of the office. To make
a very long story short, the head of the office said, "We do
triage here. If you file a motion to withdraw, I'll have you
fired because that would not be good for this office."
Ultimately, under enormous pressure from
management of the defender office, applied over a period
of about five or six months, he backed down. He never
filed any motions, and he quietly left the office. But there
are defenders-I'm absolutely convinced of it, and I have
heard stories anecdotally-who have been fired for
challenging their caseloads just like the lawyer in my story
did. Excessive caseloads in this country among public
defense programs have persisted for years despite all kinds
of efforts to avoid the problem. There are ABA standards
dealing with the subject. There is an ABA ethics opinion,
with which SCLAID was very much involved. I was
personally involved in that effort, as was Jim Neuhard, the
State Public Defender in Michigan, and we urged the
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ABA's ethics committee to write its opinion on the subject,
and they issued an opinion that was published in 2006. The
most recent effort to deal with the problem has been the
ABA's Eight Guidelines on Excessive Workload. And, of
course, there have been efforts made in various states to
deal with the problem both formally in court and
informally. Well, what can be done about excessive
caseloads?
What I want to do in these remarks is two things,
and I want to try to finish as close to 2:30 as I can-when
our first panel is scheduled to begin. The first thing I want
to do is to give you an idea of what my book will cover.
Hopefully, my remarks will give you an idea of why I have
undertaken this project. Secondly, I want to talk about
some of the conclusions and recommendations I have to
offer on a subject that has received all kinds of conclusions
and recommendations from many over a period of many
years. The title of the book is what you see before you on
the slide. Chapter One begins by explaining why there has
been a failure to implement the right to counsel due to
excessive caseloads. The reasons are ones with which you
are familiar. Obviously, there's not enough money, and the
defense function often lacks independence. But I'm
absolutely convinced that the reasons go beyond these,
because there are fundamental structural problems in the
way public defense in the United States is organized. And
one of the real problems for the defense is that frequently
they have absolutely no control over intake. The defender
program so often is at the total mercy of the prosecutor and
the numbers of cases that are pumped into the system.
Chapter Two is a detailed analysis of all of the legal
authority that supports defenders-both management and
individual lawyers-in resisting excessive caseloads.
Ethics opinions, rules of professional responsibility, and
standards, for example, provide strong support for
defenders.
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Chapter Three addresses the detrimental effects and
risks of excessive caseloads. And, in looking at this slide
this morning, I realized that I left something out-the risk
of disciplinary sanction that arises from excessive
caseloads. There are cases where lawyers have gotten into
all kinds of disciplinary trouble and the lawyer's caseload
was the source of the problem. I also deal with Section
1983 civil rights litigation in this chapter, and its
relationship to excessive caseloads. And I deal with
malpractice liability, as well as ineffective assistance of
counsel and their relationships to excessive caseloads.
Then in Chapter Four, I take up a subject that has
long troubled me and to which I thought there needed to be
an answer in this book. The subject is simply this: Why is
it that there are pervasive, excessive caseloads throughout
the country but there are almost no instances where
individual lawyers have challenged their caseloads in court
proceedings? Well, I think the answer lies in principles of
social psychology and organizational culture. Perhaps my
discussion of this issue will stimulate some additional
lawyers to challenge their caseloads. But I have concluded
that if there are going to be frequent caseload challenges,
they will have to be brought by management, and hence the
title of the Chapter Four is "Understanding Lawyer
Behavior and Why Leadership Matters."
Chapter Five talks about remedies for defenders
terminated due to caseload challenges, and it harkens back
to the story told in the book's Introduction. When a lawyer
is willing to challenge his or her caseload and is threatened
with termination or is actually terminated, does the
defender have any recourse available? The answer usually
is yes. Although the issue, insofar as I can determine, has
never actually been litigated in the U.S. This issue took me
into a realm of law of which I knew relatively little,
namely, employment law. Because there is a good
argument to be made that a public defender who is
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dismissed for challenging his or her caseload can bring an
action for wrongful termination or retaliatory discharge.
And I think lawyers who are providing defense
representation need to understand that area of law, and
management needs to understand it as well.
Now, the rules are different if there is a union
contract, as there are defenders in labor unions in a number
of places in this country. In such circumstances, the union
contract controls, and public defenders will not be, as are
probably a majority of defenders, employees-at-will. It is
really the employment-at-will doctrine that is principally
involved when there is a lawsuit for wrongful termination
or retaliatory discharge.
Chapter Six is a chapter I've not written yet, but it
will go beyond Chapter Three in Justice Denied, and deal
with caseload litigation. What I want to do in Chapter Six,
is talk primarily about the challenges to excessive caseloads
that have been launched since the ABA's ethics opinion
was issued in 2006.6
Chapter Seven is a subject that could really put you
to sleep at night. It has to do with weighted caseload
studies, i.e., determining how you decide how many
lawyers are needed and the budgets required for defender
caseloads. The chapter goes into the subject of weighted
caseloads and seeks to explain a subject that I don't think is
well understood. Although I mainly address weighted
caseload studies, I also deal with some other ideas,
including tracking the time that lawyers devote to their
cases. There is one public defender program in the United
States that has required their lawyers to track their time
since the 1980s. And that is the program in Lincoln,
Nebraska, headed by Dennis Keefe. And, for this reason,
I invited Dennis, who is seated in front of me, to speak on
our first panel this afternoon.
6 ABA Comm. On Ethics and Prof 1 Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-441
(2006).
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Chapter Eight deals with programs that I have
visited that substantially control their caseloads. They are
all somewhat different from one another. The
Massachusetts Committee on Public Counsel Services
(CPCS) is a statewide defense program, and its description
is on the flash drive. The D.C. Public Defender Service,
which I headed back in the 1970s, is an office that has
controlled its caseload for years, going back to my days
there in the late 1960s and early 1970's. The Private
Defender Program in San Mateo County is unique, but it is
not well known. I've spent time there visiting the program,
and I will be writing it up this summer.
In the time remaining, I want to talk about the
conclusions and recommendations that I've come to as a
result of looking at the subject of excessive caseloads.
Certainly, the first thing I ought to say is, just to underscore
the point, that no magic bullet is available. There's nothing
that is going to resolve this issue overnight, but I do think
there are some ways of thinking about the problem that
sometimes have not been given sufficient attention, and
there are some things individual defense programs ought to
consider.
First and foremost, if you look at the defense of
indigents around the country, so often what we see are
public defender offices with overworked lawyers who have
been asked to provide virtually all of the representation in
the jurisdiction. The role of the private bar has been de-
emphasized, and the caseloads of the defender offices have
outstripped their budgets, leading to disastrous results.
The ABA has long said in its standards that there
needs to be the substantial and active participation of the
private bar in defense representation. In fact, the private
bar is the essential safety valve if defender offices are to
avoid excessive caseloads, but that doesn't mean simply
having lawyers providing unsupervised representation and
receiving wholly inadequate compensation. The private bar
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needs to be adequately compensated, and their work needs
to be overseen by experienced lawyers, and new lawyers
need to be mentored. Also, the experience of the lawyers
needs to be matched with the cases, but that isn't done in
very many places. In Chapter Eight I write about the
statewide program in Massachusetts where this is done, but
this is not the usual situation in the U.S.
Certainly, if you look at Massachusetts and D.C.,
part of the reason for their success over the years in
controlling caseloads has been the involvement of the
private bar. If there were few private lawyers in D.C., for
example, the Public Defender Service could never have
achieved what it has over the last forty years. Avis
Buchanan, the head of the D.C. program is here, and she
will talk about PDS shortly.
In addition, I think it's important to consider some
legislative solutions for controlling caseloads. There are
statutes in several jurisdictions that make a difference, and
their approach deserves attention. For example, in D.C.,
the statute states that the agency shall determine the best
practicable allocation of its staff personnel to the courts.
7
Basically, this language has been used by the agency in
arguing that it is in charge of its own caseload.
Similarly, in Massachusetts, CPCS, which has over
200 public defenders, has language in its statute, which
states that the agency shall establish "specified caseload
limitation levels." 8  And the one time that this was
challenged, the Supreme Judicial Court in Massachusetts
said essentially that CPCS is in charge of its caseload,
absent any showing of bad faith on its part. In Iowa, there
is language in the state's public defender statute that says
that in the event of a temporary overload of cases, the
public defender-and it's a statewide program in Iowa-the
public defender shall return the cases to the court for
7 D.C. CODE § 2-1605 (2001).
8 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 211 D § 9(c) (2005).
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assignment to private lawyers. 9 I recently talked with the
head of the Iowa program, who told me that this provision
has been extremely helpful to the program and that
probably half the cases in the state are handled by private
attorneys.
On the other hand, there are statutes that present
serious problems for defenders. In Florida1° and Colorado,
I probably the two worst examples in the United States,
the statutes provide that if there is inadequate funding or
too many cases, it's never a conflict of interest for the
public defender to be required to take the cases, and thus
courts shouldn't permit assignments of cases to be stopped
or defenders permitted to withdraw. Here in Tennessee you
have Rule 13 of the Tennessee Supreme Court, which at
first blush you might read and say, well, that sounds pretty
good.' 2 I actually think it is a terrible rule, because it
basically says that the public defender can get out of
accepting additional cases if they make a "clear and
convincing" showing that effective representation might
not be possible. Well, where did that standard of clear and
convincing evidence come from in the first place? It isn't
part of the Rules of Professional Conduct. And the
standard should be competence, not effective representation
under the Sixth Amendment. 13  The reality is that in
Tennessee, and in so many jurisdictions around the United
States, the judges become the enforcers of excessive
caseloads. When, in fact, excessive caseloads ought to be
an issue between the defender program and its funding
authority. Despite the structure of the Rules of Professional
Conduct, which require lawyers to obtain court approval to
withdraw from cases, I think it makes far more sense for
9 IOWA CODE ANN. § 13B.9(4) (West 2005 & Supp. 2010).
10 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 27.5303(1)(d) (West 2009).
11 COLO. REv. STAT. § 21-2-103(1.5)(c) (2009).
12 TENN. S. CT. R. 13 (2010).
13 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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the issue of caseloads to be dealt with between the defense
program and those who actually provide the funding.
In Chapter Two and in the Conclusion of the book, I
write about the National Advisory Commission on
Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, and caseload
numbers that the Commission published in 1973: for
example, defense lawyers should not represent annually
more than 150 felonies and not more than 400
misdemeanors.' 4  And I simply say, without using this
exact word, that these numbers were "garbage" in 1973,
and they are equally wrong today. They never were
empirically based. The commission that came up with
those numbers did no work of their own. As the
commentary to the report explains, they relied upon an
earlier committee report of NLADA and they simply,
"accepted" the numbers suggested by the committee as
maximum caseload numbers. Good public defense
programs in the United States and private lawyers cannot
normally represent adequately, even with strong support
staff, 150 felony cases a year-and not all cases are
identical in any event.
The primary focus needs to be on how many cases
the lawyer actually has at a given time, and, in view of the
caseload, can the lawyers actually provide competent and
diligent representation? I also think there is a need for a
new culture among defense programs, in which caseloads
are routinely assessed by lawyers and management. Too
often, defender offices are overrun with cases and there is
no time for this to happen. And, because the offices do not
have strong supervision and mentoring programs, the
lawyers often don't fully appreciate what they are not doing
and what they need to be doing to adequately represent
their clients. And sometimes, in litigation, where
challenges have been brought by the defender office, the
14 NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE
STANDARDS AND GOALS - COURTS, CHAPTER 13, THE DEFENSE (1973).
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individual lawyers don't want to step up to the plate and
acknowledge that they might not have been doing what
they need to do. The ABA's Eight Guidelines on Excessive
Workload deal with this issue. The Guidelines are aimed at
changing the culture in public defense in the United States
because they require management to assess the caseloads of
their lawyers on a regular basis and to make adjustments if
those caseloads are too high. They also deal with the
training of lawyers and encourage defenders, through the
training they receive, to come to management if they have
concerns about their caseloads. Obviously, I think there
needs to be adherence to the ABA's Guidelines on
Excessive Workload, which are intended to help implement
the ABA's 2006 ethics opinion.
I want to conclude with a few comments about
litigation. I feared that there might not be time for
questions, but there will be time for questions at the
conclusion of the first panel. My hunch is that the next
thing I'm going to say will be especially provocative to
some of you. The slide before you suggests that there has
been minimal use of litigation since mid-2006. It was July
2006, though dated May 2006, when the ABA issued its
ethics opinion. At the time, there were some people who
predicted there would now be all kinds of efforts made to
challenge excessive caseloads throughout the country. The
reality is that this has not happened. There have been four
prominent cases brought in courts, and these were direct
challenges to excessive caseloads. In three of the cases, the
challenges were brought on behalf of an entire defender
program. In a New Orleans case, however, the case was
brought on behalf of a single defender lawyer, but the head
of the New Orleans office basically brought the case. The
other three cases were in Kingman, Arizona; Knoxville,
and in Dade County, Florida, and in each of the cases the
defenders were assisted by pro bono counsel from civil law
firms: in the Tennessee case, by Max Bahner and his law
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firm in Chattanooga, which did outstanding work; in Dade
County, by the law firm of Hogan & Hartson in the Miami
office; and in Kingman, Arizona, by a firm headed by Mark
Harrison along with his partners in Phoenix, Arizona.
The Kingman case was won in the trial court and
was not appealed. The New Orleans case essentially
fizzled out after it went up to an appellate court which
remanded for a further hearing, and the caseloads in New
Orleans are still too high. In Knoxville and Dade County,
the cases are still in the appellate courts even though the
hearings in the cases were held in 2008. And just this
morning, I learned from Rory Stein, who is here at the
conference and serves as General Counsel of the Dade
County Public Defender, that the Florida Supreme Court
finally decided to hear the case. A year ago a Florida
intermediate appellate court reversed the trial court in
Miami, which ruled in favor of the defender program and
granted significant caseload relief.
There was also a declaratory judgment action
brought in Kentucky. The case was ultimately dismissed,
although I understand that the state program in Kentucky
received some additional funding from the legislature,
which was attributable to the litigation.
Overall, if you survey what has been done in this
area of litigation to challenge excessive caseloads during
the past few years, there have been few formal complaints
filed. The nationwide response to the ABA's 2006 ethics
opinion has been anemic. As a result, I have come to the
conclusion, perhaps because I've gotten old and become
impatient, that there need to be many more motions filed by
individual defenders doing exactly what the ABA's ethics
opinion says, exactly what is stated in the ABA's Eight
Guidelines, and exactly what is stated in every state's Rules
of Professional Conduct. If individual defenders and
defense programs cannot provide competent and diligent
representation and clients are receiving second- and
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sometimes third-rate legal services, relief must be sought!
And that may mean either stopping the assignment of new
cases, seeking to withdraw in current cases, or both Thus, I
believe that motions to withdraw or to halt assignments
should be filed repeatedly in numerous cases and whenever
the situation calls for such motions! But such an approach
isn't going to be adopted by individual lawyers acting on
their own. It is only going to happen if it is orchestrated by
management. And, just to be clear, I am suggesting that
motions should be filed routinely whenever they are
deemed legitimately appropriate. And why do that?
Well, one of the reasons is that you protect the
client in the event of a subsequent guilty plea or a trial, and
you also protect the lawyer. In cases where there has been
litigation, public defenders have been reluctant to sign
affidavits indicating that they are not doing what they
should be doing in representing their clients. Since they
had never before complained in court and they had long
had exceedingly high caseloads, they felt quite vulnerable
by suddenly filing affidavits confessing to the inadequacy
of their representation. For a long time, they had simply
gone along with a system that had not allowed them to
provide effective representation. I also think the filing of
routine motions are useful because such an approach is
bound to attract media attention. I've become convinced in
this area that effective indigent defense reform requires the
use of the media, and we've seen examples of this in
several jurisdictions in the United States.
Let me conclude with this thought: Chief Justice
Warren Burger-most certainly not a liberal justice-was
involved in the ABA's Criminal Justice Standards Project,
and he believed in the defense function. One of the things
for which the Chief Justice is remembered is what he said
about defense lawyers. As Chief Justice Burger explained,
the criminal and juvenile justice systems, when properly
constituted, consist of a judge, a prosecutor and a defense
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lawyer. It is much like a "three-legged stool.' 5 But, as a
practical matter, there is no real defense lawyer doing what
is required by the Sixth Amendment 16 and the Rules of
Professional Conduct when the caseloads are
overwhelming, as they so often are.
Accordingly, I think that there is a need for far more
aggressive action in the defense community, much more
than what we have seen to date, because the message has
got to be sent that what we now have is simply not
acceptable in the United States. And while we are not
seeing a strong response from the defense community at the
moment, the tools are all there. These tools are state Rules
of Professional Conduct and the ethics opinion of the ABA,
the ethics opinion of some state bars, ABA standards of
various kinds and local standards, and most recently, the
Eight Guidelines, which may be cited as the policy of the
largest association of America's lawyers, the American Bar
Association. You can cite the guidelines' black letter and
the commentary, because both constitute the policy of the
ABA. So, now you know just how radical I actually am.
With that, I want to call up our first panel, not to
talk about litigation, but to talk about alternatives to
litigation as a way of dealing with the caseload problem.
First, we'll hear from one or two speakers and take a break,
finishing up afterwards with our first panel. I'm not going
to take questions now, but there will be an opportunity
later. Bob Boruchowitz, Avis Buchanan, Jim Neuhard.
Where did Jim go?
JIM NEUHARD: Right here.
NORMAN LEFSTEIN: I thought you'd left, because
you've heard me so often before.
15 U.S. v. Goodwin, 272 F.3d 659, 679 (4th Cir. 2001) (citation
omitted).
16 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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ROBERT BORUCHOWITZ: That would apply to all of
US.
NORMAN LEFSTEIN: You have the bios of all of these
folks, so I am not going to give lengthy introductions. To
my immediate right is Avis Buchanan, who is the director
the D.C. Public Defender Service, and adjacent to her is
Bob Boruchowitz, who is from Seattle, Washington, and a
leader in the defense community both in the State of
Washington and beyond. He was involved in writing the
NACDL report about the lower courts to which I referred
earlier and drafted much of the American Council of Chief
Defenders statement on workload, demonstrating in the
commentary to that document that the caseload numbers of
the National Advisory Commission adopted in 1973 are too
high. Next to Bob is Dennis Keefe, from Lincoln,
Nebraska. Responding to all of these presentations will be
Jim Neuhard, the State Public Defender for Michigan.
Now, Avis, you're going to begin, right? You can either
come up here or stay seated.
AVIS BUCHANAN: Thank you. I'm Avis Buchanan, and
I am the director of the District of Columbia Public
Defender Service. I'm the beneficiary of my predecessors'
work, and that includes Norm, sitting to my left here, who
made sure that the interests of the public defense
community and the interests of indigent clients or people
who cannot afford legal counsel in criminal cases were
protected back in 1960 when the Public Defender's Service
was created. It was the Legal Aid Agency then. It became
the DC Public Defender Service (PDS) in 1970 when the
District reorganized the court system.
From the very beginning PDS was set up to be a
model, and as part of being a model there were several
concepts or several principles that were incorporated into
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the creation of PDS and into its operations. In my view,
there are five operational principles that have kept the
office going, that have helped it to develop its reputation,
and that have helped it to maintain its reputation during that
time.
The main operational principle is independence.
PDS has been able to maintain its independence from all of
the branches of the government and to maintain its
independence essentially from everything. We are
governed by an eleven-member board of trustees, and our
statute is included in your materials. And the board is this:
the entity to whom PDS answers, to whom I answer. The
board has a number of functions, but the main ones are to
hire me, to hire the deputy director, and to protect and set
policy for the office. The importance of that is exemplified
by a couple instances where the importance of
independence, where that independence has been
threatened. The office has made an effort to make sure
that all of its clientele and the quality of its operations and
the quality of its litigation are all protected. One example
of that, as I was saying, is that early on in the office's
existence, the D.C. Superior Court tried to assign more
cases to PDS than it had the capacity to handle, and being
able to handle its cases was important pursuant to the
criteria it had set for itself. The office responded by
pushing back and refusing to take the cases. That standoff
eventually was won by PDS and that has laid; it not only
laid the groundwork but added to the sense of the office's
independence and its ability to maintain and to distance
itself from external pressures to practice in a way that's
antithetical to quality representation. We are a quirky
institution, so we're not quite the same as public defenders
across the country. The reason for that is because we're in
the District of Columbia which has its own special status.
That special status led to some political considerations back
in 1997 which led to our being a federally funded public
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defender. We're not a federal defender; we're a local
defender, but we are now funded by the federal
government. So now we're not only independent from the
three branches of the government in the city, but we're
independent from the three branches of government in the
federal system, apart from the fact that they give us our
funding. So, that has been the way that we've been able to
protect our clients. We don't have interference from
outside entities, and to the extent that there is an effort to
do that, our board protects us. In one special set of
circumstances, our board was a threat to our independence,
back twenty years ago when I was a staff attorney in the
office, and PDS was able to fight that off as well. The
board is appointed by four members, a cross between the
federal system and the DC government. The eleven-
member board which consists of seven lawyers and four
non-lawyers by statute, is appointed by the chief judge of
the DC federal trial court, the local court of appeals for the
District of Columbia, the local trial court for the District of
Columbia, and the mayor. Those are the four "people."
After that, they don't have anything to do with PDS. And
in many ways we influence that process, because we have
developed the screening process for board members, but
there is no prescription in the statute for a specific
nomination process. So what we do is propose board
members to that panel. They are free to do the same. And,
of course, they are ultimately the selecting officials, but we
participate in the process of selecting board members. So
independence is very important. The independence is what
allows us to maintain the caseload numbers that PDS tends
to be known for.
I talk with other public defenders, and my
predecessors have also talked with other public defender
offices. When they hear the kinds of caseloads we carry,
they tend to write us off as an outlier. But I'd like to
encourage you to think that it's within the realm of the
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possible, because we think it is. PDS is special but it's not
an unattainable set of criteria. We have felony attorneys,
senior felony attorneys, and less serious felony attorneys
and we have attorneys who do juvenile practice. Right
now, we have about fifty-five attorneys. On average, we
target, for felony one, the most serious cases, and this is a
nonsupervisory attorney. We target from fifteen to twenty
cases for the felony-one level. In D.C. that's probably
comparable to capital cases in other jurisdictions. For the
less serious felonies-what we colloquially refer to as guns
and drugs-the target numbers for those attorneys is about
twenty-five to thirty cases. We don't do misdemeanors by
statute except in a limited set of circumstances. We're part
of a hybrid system.
PDS is taking the most serious cases on the juvenile
adult levels, because we have the training and the resources
to do that. So we only take a small percentage of the guns
and drugs cases. The Criminal Justice Act (CJA) is what
established the panel attorney system. Then for our
juvenile attorneys, who are usually the least senior
attorneys in the office, spend a year in juvenile court and
then rotate to adult court. When they start out, because
they are brand-new, we have them carry relatively low
caseloads, and they build up over the course of that year.
They might be handling ten to fifteen cases at any one time
by the time they're rotating out of juvenile court to adult
court. Those numbers are important, because they allow us
to do the quality work that the other principal training helps
to achieve quality representation. Before our attorneys
handle a case, a real client, we have them undergo eight
weeks of training, and that's an all-day, eight-week training
program. We incorporate PDS alumni into the training
program so that they can understand the history of PDS and
how they fit into the history and the pantheon of attorneys
who have gone on before them. It incorporates exercises as
well as lectures, and it culminates in a full mock trial.
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We're observing their progress; we're observing their
absorption of the material and evaluating them at that point.
As they finish the training program, they start picking up
cases and that leads to the fourth principle, which is
supervision.
Our attorneys are supervised from the time they
start picking up cases in juvenile court up to the time they
achieve felony-one status. The supervisors at the junior
level are expected to know the supervisee's cases just about
as well as the supervisees know their cases. They are
responsible for observing court proceedings, more at the
beginning than toward the end. They observe every trial
that a junior attorney is involved in until there's a comfort
level with that person's performance. They go over
motions and sentencing letters. They communicate the
standards of practice to the junior people, which includes a
Client Bill of Rights, and set out all of the points at which
there is an expectation of a certain activity, whether it's
filing suppression motions or visiting a client within a
certain amount of time after an appointment. We review
the kinds of bond hearings or detention hearings in juvenile
court that they're expected to participate in and do mock
crosses as well as mock directs, pretrial and listening to
openings. We have a policy in the office that no opening is
done in trial before a supervisor has heard it in the office
first.
Another aspect of the practice that helps PDS
maintain its reputation is investigation. We don't have an
open discovery jurisdiction. Our opponent in adult court is
the U.S. Attorney's Office, and they have, I guess, a federal
standard, or they just blow us off. It doesn't matter. They
don't have open discovery. We have a discovery rule, and
they stick to the minimum requirements of the discovery
rule. That practice varies from assistant to assistant, but,
generally speaking, we don't know who the witnesses are,
we don't know the witness's names. We have to find out all
62
7 Tennessee Journal of Law & Policy (Special Edition) 63
of that information on our own. So we train our own staff
investigators to pursue every angle, to pursue every fact, to
find out as much as they can about the government's case.
And it's often the case that we know more about the
government's case, than the government itself knows. We
find witnesses that they're not aware of. Our investigators
are trained to do things like take measurements, and they
go to the crime scene at the time that the incident is
supposed to have occurred. We have stories of
investigators going the extra mile to work with a nickname.
All they have is a person's nickname, and they've been able
to trace someone out to a federal institution. That's all that
they had to go on initially, but they kept trying and trying.
Our investigators are investigating right up to the day of
trial and through the day of the trial, because sometimes we
learn things as the trial progresses. So we're continuing to
add to the knowledge base of the attorney and
incorporating that into the trial experience.
So all of these things together go to help us to have
the respect and regard that we do have both within the
District of Columbia criminal justice system and in the
larger public defender community. And we value that and
it helps us attract good people, which helps us again to
perform well and allows me to come in here with pride and
say, I'm Director of the Public Defender Service.
NORMAN LEFSTEIN: In case there's any confusion
about it, the caseload of the DC Public Defender Service
consists of common law crimes. These are not federal
prosecutions in that sense. They are not under Title 18 of
United States Code. But I wanted to state that just so
everyone was aware of it. The Public Defender Service is
an analog to any other public defender program in the
United States in a major urban community. We're going to
hear from Bob Boruchowitz and then we'll take a break.
But, Bob, go ahead, and we'll ruthlessly cut you off when
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your time is over.
ROBERT BORUCHOWITZ: Thank you very much. I'm
going to try to talk for twenty minutes, which was what I
was promised, on what I could talk about for a couple of
days. Jim told me he was going to come up here and
strangle me if I actually tried to run through 100 slides. I'm
going to look through 100 slides. I'm just telling you that
up front, but I will not talk about many of them for very
long but I will make this available to you.
I agree with what Norm said about the role of the
ethics rules and the ethics opinions and the importance of
individual lawyers standing up and saying enough is
enough. I'm going to talk about some of the experiences
that we've had in the State of Washington, particularly in
the county that I come from. The things that I'm going to
talk about have been evolving over the course of three or
four decades, and so they all can't be done overnight. But
the fact that they have been done elsewhere, I hope will be
an inspiration for folks to feel that in fact you can do them
wherever you are from.
What we did in Washington was to development
standards focusing on caseload but with a whole range of
other things including support services, training,
accountability, and compensation. Other than
independence, which is also key, the caseload and
compensation are probably the most critical of all of those
important standards. And what we were able to do was to
develop standards that initially were developed by our state
defender association. We have a county-based public
defense system in Washington. We developed our own
state defender association with a small grant from what was
then called the ABA Bar Information Program. We
developed standards, published them, got the state bar to
endorse them, and ultimately got the legislature to say that
they should be used as guidelines. We've got local
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legislation. We have a law in the City of Seattle that limits
the number of misdemeanors that a lawyer can handle in
Seattle Municipal Court. Because we're a non-profit
organization, we have contracts with the county
government that limit caseloads, and now there is a small
amount of state funding provided to local governments that
is linked to trying to implement the standards. We've built
alliances for support, and I'm going to talk a little bit about
what you can do before litigation.
There are the Rules of Professional Conduct. The
very first rule is 1.1, Competence. 17 If you have too many
cases, you can't be competent. We have our state bar and
defender association standards and the ABA ethics opinion,
the guidelines, the opinion and statement by the American
Council of Chief Defenders (ACCD). Norm talked about
the statement, but there's also an ACCD ethics opinion and
case law that can help.
I recognize all the practical considerations that all of
us face as local defenders. I was a chief defender for
twenty-eight years. I understand the politics and the budget
problems. But it is possible to use moments of financial
crisis to our advantage. You can build support in the
community, and you can get judges sometimes to help you.
There's the question that Norm talked about, about whether
management is going to support or oppose efforts by
individual lawyers. And then, of course, there are pressures
from clients.
There are a lot of informal things that you can do to
increase resources. Obviously, you can reallocate cases
within an office. I evaluated an office in Idaho a couple
years ago. The chief defender was totally unaware that he
had two misdemeanor lawyers. One had X number of
cases, the other had two X number of cases. He had no
idea that that was going on in his office. You can move for
caseload relief. I don't consider that litigation when it's
17 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2008).
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done on a case-by-case basis of the sort that is going to be
talked about later. There are motions for additional
resources. I'm going to mention a particular example of
that. You can declare that you're unavailable, which is a
California practice. There is litigation which will be talked
about. And then there are alternatives to traditional
prosecution, because if you can persuade the prosecutor to
move in that direction you can take huge numbers of cases
out of the system. In many states around the country
driving with a suspended license is between thirty and fifty
percent of the misdemeanor caseload. That's nuts. In the
State of Washington, it's 100,000 cases a year. This is not a
public safety concern. It's because people generally get
their licenses suspended because they didn't pay a ticket or
couldn't afford to pay the ticket. And so now we're making
them a criminal, giving them more fines and putting them
in jail, which costs more money. They'll be back again,
because they have to drive.
Possession of marijuana, which I realize is a very
controversial topic-but what are those offenders doing in
jail and prison? What about minor possession? I don't
know about this particular university town, but there's a lot
of university towns that I've visited as an evaluator of
defender systems where it's a rite of passage for kids in
fraternities and sororities to go to jail for minor possession
of alcohol. That's also crazy. Shoplifting is another
example of cases that can be diverted. Some of these cases
can be reclassified, if the prosecutors are unwilling to divert
them, by going to the legislature. But often you can
persuade a prosecutor, who has complete discretion on all
of those areas, not to file them.
Getting media interest in the state reports that Norm
talked about is the problem. I would love to see more law
school participation. I've been chatting a little bit today
with folks here about some of the great things that are
going on and other things that could go on. I'd like to see
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more law school participation in reform efforts. And as I
said, suggesting ways to improve and holding litigation out
is an option.
The New York Court of Appeals just very recently
ruled that a systemic litigation case can go forward, and in
the process, talked about how it really was more than
simply ineffective assistance that was being claimed. But
no lawyers at all were the effect. Padilla, everybody
knows about that just came out, out of Kentucky states that
the right to counsel includes the need for advice on the
decision to plead guilty. 18 If you have so many cases that
you can't even give your client advice on whether to plead
guilty, you have too many cases.
In Washington State, we have a case, and I'm going
to give you all of these briefly in a second called ANJ 19 in
which the court said in finding effective assistance and
reversing the guilty plea of a trial that standards can guide
the evaluation of effective assistance of counsel. The New
York case is Hurrell, H-u-r-r-e-l-1, Harring, H-a-r-r-i-n-g.
20
Padilla, I talked about. This is language that even reverses
Strickland.21  The defendant is entitled to effective
assistance of competent counsel, 1.1.22
This is the Washington case that just came out. It's
an amazingly good case; it reversed the conviction of a 12-
year-old whose lawyer spent about an hour with him, and
in the process cites to our state standard. Our Washington
Supreme Court has now twice talked about standards. It
was in a case of impossible caseloads. In the other case, it
was in the case of judicial misconduct. I'm going to skip all
this stuff. I put the constitution in there, because it is
important to remember where our rights come from. The
18 Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010).
19 State v. A.N.J., 225 P.3d 956 (Wash. 2010).
20 Huffell-Herring v. State, 15 N.Y.3d 8 (N.Y. 2010).
21 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
22 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2008).
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recommendations of the reports-Norm's is out there. We
talked about how counsel has to spend enough time, and if
they can't, they have to seek relief.
One of the things that I increasingly have been
talking about in the last couple of years, and this is partly at
Jim's suggestion, is that there's an ethical obligation, and
we need to recognize that fundamental rights are being
denied to millions of people in the places that should
protect them the most-the lawyers on both sides of the
table and judges. Either they are actively participating in
the denial of rights or they are standing by with their eyes
closed. The economic penalties, the collateral
consequences, and the racial disparity that infuse this
problem are everywhere.
If we go back to some of the fundamental cases like
Argersinger,23 it talked then about things that are still true
today: Long calendars, speed substituted for care, casually
arranged out-of-court compromise substituted for
adjudication. It describes many, many misdemeanor courts
today. The National Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers (NACDL) recommended that lawyers should seek
to discontinue. I talked to you about the Washington
experience.
First, we had our county bar develop standards, then
the state defender's association, then the state bar, then
legislature. There's a really good article. I like it, because
it talks about how my former office is wonderful, but it
talks about how lawyers can work with others, their
comrades as well as the legislatures, to develop standards
and get them implemented. Our statute, which is Wash.
Rev. Code 10.101.030,24 requires local governments to
have standards and include caseload limits, and tells them
that they're supposed to use the Washington State Bar
Association for guidelines. This is the Seattle law; I think
23 Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
24 WASH. REV. CODE § 10.101.030 (2008).
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it's the only law in the country. I know New York is
talking about having one that limits the caseload of public
defender attorneys to 380 cases. I think it's more than it
should be, but it's way less than almost any place else.
The ABA Ten Principles-I think there's copies of
them out there-talks about controlling workload. This is a
case, Mount Vernon v. Weston,25 in which we came in as
Amicus, and the court said that these lawyers are well in
excess of the standards, and they should be allowed to
withdraw. This is an unbelievable case in which the public
defender was also the judge. I won't take time to deal with
it, but I love talking about it. The public defender in
Miranda v. Clark County 26 was held liable in a 1983
27action. These are standards, Model Rules of Prof'l
Conduct 1.1, everybody should look at from time to time.
Concerning billable hours, I run through this
analysis of how many billable hours there are in a year.
And if you use either of these numbers, 1,650 or 1,838, you
can figure out how many hours you have, depending on
how many cases you have. When you think about what
you have to do in a case, from interviewing the client all
the way through, you could persuade funders as well as
people in the public that that's not enough time. Two or
three hours is not enough time. If you're doing 600 cases,
you've got three hours. If you have 1,200 cases you have
an hour and a half. What I say to people is think about if
you have a loved one that is charged with a crime. If I had
people to raise their hands in here, everyone in here would
have a loved one, friend, acquaintance at work who has
been charged with some kind of crime. Would you want
that lawyer representing that loved one to say, "I'd be
happy to take your case, I'll work on it for three hours?"
25 City of Mount Vernon v. Weston, 844 P.2d 438 (Wash. Ct. App.
1992).
26 Miranda v. Clark Co., Nevada 319 F.3d 465 (9th Cir. 2002).
27 42 U.S.C. 1983 (2006).
69
7 Tennessee Journal of Law & Policy (Special Edition) 70
You'd walk out the door. But that's what our clients have to
face.
Obviously, you can have state bar ethics opinions.
The State of Oregon did one following the ABA, the Eight
Guidelines are there. So what can you do? You can move
to withdraw; you can move for additional resources. We
did that in King County on two different occasions, because
we have something that's called the Sexually Violent
Predator Law, which we imposed on much of the country.
That work is funded directly by the state. We weren't
getting enough money. It hadn't been changed in years and
years. We went to court on two different occasions; both
times we got the court to order increased funding on an
hourly basis. We were able to get the resources we needed
to represent the clients that we had. You can move to
appoint other counsel; you can declare unavailability. The
Mohave County case28 in Kingman is a tremendous
example of a well- prepared motion to limit caseloads. The
judge at the end of it said, in the future, don't give me all of
this motion stuff, just tell me you're too busy and I'll
appoint somebody else. Individual lawyers can move to
continue. If entire offices move to continue, and I
recognize this may be hard for some clients, but if entire
offices do that, then it will have an impact. There's a
Washington case called State v. Jury,29 J-u-r-y, which is
good on that. The Ohio case you probably all know about
involved that wonderful judge who had the gall to have
Lincoln in his courtroom-who held a defender in
contempt. The appellate court said that the lawyer only had
two hours for the case and that wasn't enough to prepare.
You can seek legislation; we talked about that. You
can set caseload limits by negotiation with a funder. You
28 State v. Lopez, No. CR 2007-1544, (Ariz. Super. Ct. 2007) available
at
http://www.mohavecourts.com/news/motion%20to%20withdraw.pdf.
29 State v. Jury, 576 P.2d 1302 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978).
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can make informal efforts to change the way the funding is
provided and you get more, perhaps you get supplemental
funds or grant funding. This is the Kingman case-which
involved a motion for increased resources. We made a
motion and put on all kinds of declaration evidence and got
the court to order that we get $85.65 an hour for attorney
time and $46 an hour for investigator and paralegal time.
This was in January 2006-four years ago. That allowed
us to do the job that we needed to do.
I talked about all these other things, diversion,
decriminalization, marijuana, and so many of those cases. I
just wanted to mention media interest. This is an editorial
that we got in the state capitol's newspaper after doing a
forum at the state Supreme Court. You can do that
anywhere-have a forum at the state Supreme Court, get
public attention, talk to the press, and get them to write
about it. Then you can remind local governments that if
they don't do what they should do, they're going to get
sued. This was a settlement agreement in Grant County in
Washington in which, as partial payment, the county had to
pay half-a-million dollars in attorney fees.
And then I just want to close with these comments
from William Hellerstein, who's a great defender and
professor from New York. "[T]he misdemeanor court is
[such] an abomination., 30  This was in 1970 pre-
Argersinge,r but it's true about a lot of places I've seen
since then. Our courts do not even have the appearance
that justice is dispensed within them. I'm sure that all of us
could give examples of courts that would fit this
description. And he says, speaking to defenders, it's not
enough to shuffle our feet through the courts, go through
two-minute arraignments, and seven-minute trials and go
home at night calling ourselves attorneys.
And then I just want to close with Margaret Mead's
30 William Hellerstein, The Importance of the Misdemeanor Case on
Trial and Appeal, 28 THE LEGALAID BRIEFCASE 151, 155 (April 1970).
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admonition that a small group of thoughtful committed
citizens can in fact change the world. I've probably gone
into the break time, but thank you.
NORMAN LEFSTEIN: We actually are about on time, not
because of me, but because our speakers have been very
disciplined. We're going to take about twenty minutes. I
realize this is a long time to sit without an opportunity to
interact with the audience, but when we come back we're
going to have the two final presentations and then we'll
open it up to the audience. And I think we'll have ample
time to have some interaction then, because we're very
interested to hear your views, comments and questions. So
let's come back and be ready to go at 3:30. Thank you.
(A brief break was taken.)
NORMAN LEFSTEIN: Thank you all for returning so
promptly. And Dennis, are you going to speak from up
here or down there?
DENNIS KEEFE: I'll come up there.
NORMAN LEFSTE1N: Okay. We're going to hear from
Dennis Keefe who I referred to in my remarks. Dennis has
for many years been the head of the public defense program
in Lincoln, Nebraska, Lancaster County, Nebraska. He can
explain to you how it's been done and how it's been
received because his office has been keeping time records
for many, many years. Dennis?
DENNIS KEEFE: That gives you a clue how old I am.
NORMAN LEFSTEIN: No, we both are that.
ROBERT BORUCHOWITZ: Really, really, really old.
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DENNIS KEEFE: I was getting ready to come here this
weekend and a friend of my wife's asked me what I was
coming here to do, and I said I'm going to be talking about
public defenders tracking time. And she said, well, I can
see the audience yawning already.
NORMAN LEFSTEIN: I was worried about doing this
after the break, I must admit.
DENNIS KEEFE: Oh, yes. Well, the only thing that keeps
me awake here is that I know that Jim Neuhard is listening
to what I say and he's going to respond. And that's
intimidating, I promise you. I'll give you a little bit of
background. I've been the public defender in Lincoln since
1979. We have a population now of about 250,000 people.
My office consists of nineteen lawyers and five paralegals
and a number of support staff. We handle approximately
1,500 felonies, three to four thousand misdemeanors, and
around 1,300 juvenile cases a year. That's before the
percentage of conflicts that come out of those.
When I first became public defender, one of the
things that I realized was that the office had no system of
case management of any kind, no system. My predecessor,
who I worked for as a bartender, by the way, owned a bar,
and he kept most of his case notes on cocktail napkins. I
think that's exactly what we ran into when we hit this
office. Time tracking in our office came accidentally, if
you will, when the National Legal Aid & Defender
Association in 1980 rolled out a new product. It was a
manual case management information system called
Amicus. I thought it looked better than the cocktail
napkins. So they asked us to be a test site for this program.
After looking it over, I thought this would be a great idea.
We learned how to do case management and to produce
reports. We had nothing to begin with, so we readily
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agreed to be one of their test sites.
As part of that Amicus Case Management System,
the lawyers were required to track time. The way they did
it was, basically, on one side of the file you have a case log
sheet where you make notes about talking to your client or
being in court, visiting with the prosecutor. As part of
making those notes, you indicated in tenths of hours how
much time you spent doing that particular activity. If you
took ten misdemeanor files over to court for an hour, you
divided the hour by those ten cases and assigned it to each
one of those cases.
I was a relatively new manager in the office. When
we started this, there was resistance. And quite frankly and
honestly, the resistance, at least parts of it, was due to the
fact that I did not do a very good job of explaining to
people of why I thought it was a good idea that we track
time and keep time. But the ultimate goal was to be able to
provide some type of a weighted caseload figure so that we
could not only distribute the work equitably within the
office, but we could also tell our county board why we
would need the money that we were requesting.
The attorneys resisted at first, but eventually, they
did begin tracking time. This was around 1980 or 1981.
The problem was that we didn't have a workable system for
using the data that we gathered. At the conclusion of a
case, there was a closing sheet as part of the Amicus
system, and the attorneys would complete this closing
sheet. It would have information about the client, including
his or her prior record. It would have information about the
case, including what the charges were, whether there were
evidentiary hearings, whether the client was out on bail-
those types of issues. The closing sheet had an area for
recapping the attorney time, which we kept in six simple
categories: court-related matters, negotiations for client
contacts, waiting, travel, research, and fact-finding. So it
wasn't complicated, but during the first few years of using
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the system nobody saw a real benefit from keeping the
time, because we didn't really have a way to produce any
information or to use or analyze the information. The one
thing that did affect the attorneys and their willingness to
use the Amicus case tracking time system was one of my
senior attorneys-who probably was part of the core of the
resistance. This attorney went into a post-conviction
hearing with a file that had been created in the old system
and realized that he had no independent recall of virtually
anything that happened in the case, talking to the client or
the prosecutor, and had no system for giving him notes that
would refresh his recollection. So he became a big fan of
the Amicus system, particularly the case log sheet, and that
senior attorney brought along whatever resistance
remained.
Over the years, our experience has been this: That
the attorneys bought into the time tracking system. They
did not see it as burdensome, and they eventually saw some
of the big benefits, one of which I will talk about in a
minute with regard to our caseload study. We actually
have had attorneys who have left the office and who've
taken some features of this time tracking system from
Amicus into their private practice and use it still today. So
that'll give you some idea about how we not only overcame
the resistance, but that attorneys have bought into it
completely and are using it in their practice to help their
clients.
There were a couple of events-National Legal Aid
& Defender Association-around 1985, which produced a
report from a researcher with the National Institute of
Justice. This researcher used some of our time data and
other sites that had been test sites for Amicus-the State of
Hawaii Public Defender System and then Jim Weatherly's
office in Nashville. They produced a report on budget
preparation. Many people found the book a bit confusing.
I think one of the problems with it was that the researcher
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tried to take a number of variables that we tracked with
regard to the case and tell people how to use that with
regard to adding time to cases after they figured out how
many cases that they had. I think it was somewhat
confusing for folks, especially if they weren't using the
Amicus system, because not everybody had access to the
data that the researcher was talking about in the report. It
was the first time that somebody took the closing sheets
and produced averages for us in terms of hours per case and
average life of the case, and so it gave us something at least
to move forward on. The big break was when we were
offered and actually got a mainframe case management
information system. I literally told the people in our local
information services office what we needed. I gave them
the Amicus books, including all of the reports and all of the
forms and I said this is what we want, and they created the
system basically just like that. So, we didn't really change
anything, other than how the information at the end of the
case was being entered into a computer and how reports
could be produced on a regular basis providing us with
information about average lives of cases and average times
per case.
What we did with that were a couple of things.
Before I get into that, however, I want to talk about an
important factor here. In about 1991, Bob Spangenberg
came and did an evaluation of our workload in our office.
He looked at the average life and average time figures that
we had and actually used the average life of the cases to
give us what he considered to be his recommendations in
terms of workload based on the NAC standards originally.
But he said, at that time, that there's two things that you
need to do to make sure that these average time per case
figures are good, so that you can then use them in a
subsequent study to really tell you what your caseload
should be. Number one is to make sure all of the lawyers
are on the same page. In other words, retrain them. Make
76
7 Tennessee Journal of Law & Policy (Special Edition) 77
sure everybody is tracking everything in the same way and
is tracking all of the time that they should be tracking. You
should look at your averages on a periodic basis---every six
months or every 12 months-to make sure that you're
updating it for changes that might have occurred. For
example, if prosecutors come in and change their plea
bargaining practices or courts change their procedures,
you're going to need to show what impact that has on the
average time per case. Spangenberg said that if you do
that, a subsequent caseload study will give you the
information that you need in order to come up with
accurate caseload figures.
So we took his recommendations very seriously,
and we followed up exactly with what he suggested,
including the training, making sure we were all on the same
page and periodically reviewing our average times per case.
We did not have the money at that time to do a follow-up
study, but we internally developed from the information
that he told us we could use, a pending caseload figure
based upon a workload factor. And we used that in our
office successfully for a number of years and actually
withdrew from cases in a ten-year period, from 1995 to
2005, on a couple of occasions because we were exceeding
the workload factor that we had ourselves internally
developed based upon those average lives of case and
average times of case.
Recently, in the past few years, there were several
things that were changing that made it imperative that we
carry out Spangenberg's recommendation of a follow-up
study on the average times and the average life per case and
have someone independently review what we had to
determine whether the data was statistically reliable and
could be used to build workload standards. There were
several factors that made this important. My county board
had changed a number of times, and I did not have any
lawyers on the board. I did not have people who you
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would consider to be extremely sympathetic to public
defender issues and that was a problem. The budget was
getting tighter-all budgets were getting tighter-and
adding staff to offices was becoming more and more
difficult. I persuaded the county board that having
someone outside of our office come in and look at our
figures that we had been collecting for almost thirty years
in designing caseload standards would help us determine
what the proper caseload and workload should be. But, it
would help them so they didn't have to guess whether I was
trying to pull a fast one on them and trying to get some
more lawyers that I didn't really deserve. Although, I don't
know why they would think that. But, it benefited them
because they had a science-based report to tell them. Yes,
here we are with these figures, and this is a legitimate
request. And they did. They funded a study and Elizabeth
Neeley and the University of Nebraska, Public Policy
Center did the study.
There were a number of things that they did, but the
one that I was most interested in was to tell us whether or
not the figures that we had been collecting were validated.
And we were assured that the average times were validated
and that they, across years and across attorneys, were
consistent. The only exceptions were brand-new attorneys,
which you would expect. They're spending considerably
more time per case than others.
One of the things that we did, I think that was very
important as part of this workload study, was that I asked
the county board, when they funded it, to appoint an
advisory committee consisting of judges, someone from
their staff, and whomever else they wanted to appoint,
including private attorneys in the community. We had a
really good advisory committee that reviewed the
researcher's work and eventually came up with
recommendations, basically, for me to adopt the caseload
standards that the report recommended. We did that as an
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office; we adopted it, and we have been using it now for
almost two years. And it has had a positive impact both in
terms of morale within the office. We have not withdrawn
from as many cases as I projected that we would, only
because the crime rate is down, the filings were down, our
appointments were down. But we did, in the first year,
withdraw from-I believe the numbers were 29 felonies,
almost 400 - 275 misdemeanors and 46 juvenile cases, and
that's with the caseload being down.
Just to show you how the advisory committee
helped us-when we went to the judges to ask and talk to
them about the caseload standards, once we'd adopted
them, I had one of their brethren who served on the
advisory committee, arguing with me as to why these
standards were reasonable. And my question to the judges
was: "How do you want us to handle the technical part of
this." I said, "Well, what we've done in the past is, I filed
an affidavit saying that, based upon our caseload standards
and ethical standards, we can't represent this client. We ask
you to appoint counsel other than our office, under a statute
that says that the courts can appoint anybody other than the
public defender for conflicts or other good cause. This is
other good cause." The judges said to me, "You file the
affidavit, or have one of your supervisors file the affidavit,
and we'll appoint another attorney." So, it ended up being a
very easy process and has ended up being a very easy
process for us in the last almost two years that we've been
doing it to this point.
I know people say it's not in the culture of public
defenders to track time or keep time. Maybe we're unique,
maybe this is really different. I don't think it's as big a deal
as people think it is. And if they see that the ultimate
benefit is some type of caseload limit that is going to
benefit their clients and them, they'll buy into it. In other
words, they need to be educated about the purpose and the
reason for it. I think that the caseload study that we just did
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recently answers the question about people who suspect
that lawyers won't keep accurate time. Again, across years
and across attorneys, it was consistent. There are several
other arguments with regard to attorneys not keeping time
accurately. My experience has been that, if they're trained
properly and they're educated about the reasons for it, it's
not a problem or a burden. It has, in my example, helped
us immensely.
I'm not saying this is for everybody. I'm just telling
you what our experience is. Some people have told me,
"Oh, time-based standards aren't really needed because we
have the NAC Standards." I think the answer is that, if the
NAC Standards worked to keep caseloads reasonable, by
all means use them.
I had a few problems in my jurisdiction using
national standards, especially in tight budget times, because
they want to know how that applies to us. Some of the
criticisms of the NAC Standards is that I'm not sure that
they can all be justified jurisdiction by jurisdiction. I don't
think a felony in Lincoln, Nebraska is the same as a felony
in New York City or Eagle River, Alaska. I don't believe
they're the same. I'm not even sure those three jurisdictions
would call the same thing a case. That's one issue.
The other issue is with regard to juvenile cases. I'm
not disparaging the NAC Standards, because I think they
have benefited the people in the past. So, if they work, use
them. But the [NAC] standard for juvenile cases is 200
juvenile cases a year. Well, my informal observations,
which is backed up by the caseload study is, 200 would be
way too many if you're talking about representing children
as guardian ad litem in abuse cases. It would be way too
few if you're talking about other cases like law violations.
So, my point is, if the NAC Standards, or any other method
of setting caseload standards works, then use them.
The final issue, which is more problematic, involves
time studies. There are a number of professional
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organizations around the country that track attorney time.
But, if all it is doing is telling you how much time an
attorney is spending in an overworked situation, then you're
really just defining bad practice. That is a danger, and the
professional researchers try to handle it by making
adjustments to the numbers after the fact by talking with
the attorneys and focus groups to see what it is that they
should have been doing that they weren't doing and adding
an appropriate amount of time. This is not a perfect
solution, but there is no perfect answer.
In our situation, whether we were overloaded or not
overloaded-and we've never gotten to some of the
horrible scenarios that I've heard in other offices-across
the years and across attorneys, this time was consistent.
What was happening was that the attorneys were taking
their work days into the evening hours on a consistent
basis, and into the weekends on a consistent basis. This
was hurting morale, and that is where we cut. We cut the
time based upon the averages that attorneys shouldn't have
to spend on case-related work. And we came up with
numbers. We can argue about the numbers, but the average
attorney in my office is assigned to around nine new
felonies per month. The misdemeanor cases, depending
upon what type of case it is, would be assigned to
approximately forty new cases per month. As for juvenile
attorneys, if they're brand-new, we have one number, if
they're not, we have another. It would average at about
thirty to thirty-five new cases per month.
I have a happier staff than I had two years ago, so I
have to say that this has been a very positive thing for us.
I'm not saying that time recording is the only way to do it,
or even the best way to do it for everybody, but it has
worked successfully for us.
NORMAN LEFSTEIN: Two very quick comments I want
to make. One is that there is a write-up of the time work: a
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time study that Lincoln, Nebraska does. It's in Chapter
Seven of the draft that's on the flash drive if you want to
read about it. Dennis has seen it and has essentially said it's
accurate.
Secondly, I think it's worth mentioning that the
research arm of the National District Attorneys' Association
a few years ago spent several years trying to determine if
you could come up with any kind of national standards for
prosecutors throughout the United States. After working
on that subject for several years, they threw up their arms
and said it simply can't be done. My own view is that it
can't be done in public defense either; but in public defense
the mistake that was made dates back to 1973 when it was
suggested that there should be maximum caseload numbers
in public defense. The problem is that once you start
talking about maximum numbers, they're translated into the
norm. That doesn't mean that you still can't use them when
you're way above them, but I do think that calling them
national caseload standards is a disservice and a mistake to
the public defense community.
Jim Neuhard will give our final remarks and then
we'll have time to hear from all of you with your questions,
comments and suggestions. I asked Jim to do this because
I've known him for many years, and I've never been in a
situation where he's been at a loss of words about what to
say-even when I'm asking him to comment on three prior
disparate presentations. Jim?
JAMES NEUHARD: This is simply a way of Norm
controlling how long I can talk.
NORMAN LEFSTEIN: Somebody has to.
JAMES NEUHARD: It worked effectively. At first, I
thought this was going to be very difficult to do. I didn't
know what I'd have to say. But, I read through the write-
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ups that all of them did beforehand, and as Bob said it, I
reviewed thirty years of his life rather than a write-up, but I
did that. What began to emerge was something that I found
quite interesting. There was a pattern to it. And since I
was the principal author of the ABA Ten Principles in the
Public Defense System, my mind tends to gravitate to pull
out bullet points and simplify and see the relationships
between things. That's just the way my mind works.
What I'd like to do is to go through what they said
and perhaps, based on their writings and my knowledge of
their offices and what they said today, just sort of pull out
of it things that I see that are common to all of this. I'm
going to start with an observation.
Between Norm and the remainder of us on the
panel, you've got well over 125 years of management
experience sitting here. But that's not so much the
interesting part; it's that you've got represented up here
public and private defenders, you've got appointed and
elected defenders, you've got trial and appellate attorneys,
you've got local and statewide offices providing their
services.
The second interesting thing is, most programs that
you go to that talk about how you should run your office
better, frequently they're talking about theory. The
difference is, all of us have done it. We've all declared not
available, we've all refused cases, and we were employed-
and still are employed-for over 125 years as chief
defenders. And I've heard many times saying you can't do
this. It can't be done. These are living testimonies, and
we're starting the program with people who have done it
and are doing it as we're speaking. That's the number one
point I wanted to make.
The second thing, I want to give a brief background
of my office. I'm not going to talk about my office except
these points that are going to come out later, and my office
is representative of this.
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We have statutory controls over our caseload, we
have standards, we have time studies, we have differential
case management, we have weighted caseloads, and we
now have a computer program that literally moderates our
intake based on our capacity. So we don't have to declare
an unavailable anymore. It literally is moderated by my
putting in what our capacity is at the start of each quarter.
So that's how far we've evolved.
And I want you to understand the concept of
evolution. That is what you've seen up here in all of these:
you've heard it from Dennis and you heard some of it in all
the other presentations. It's not been a static process, and I
don't know how it started. I doubt any of us started doing
the things that we did that we later drew on to control our
caseloads. We were out to just manage our offices. We
were all young and learning how to run a program and
create a program in many cases. And case management
became part of that-the wars among our lawyers who
wanted the fair distribution of cases. With all kinds of
reasons we began to develop a system to run our offices
better. Then the crisis came and we had to literally go in
and either commit to quality or not commit to quality.
These are some of the things that I want to talk about
before I go through each of the individual presentations.
First thing is, as I mentioned previously, there's a
process that you've heard here of evolution. That is what
people have been talking about for a long period of time,
and it's ongoing.
The second is each of these programs has a
commitment to quality and a perception of being quality
offices. And I cannot underestimate how important that is.
Because, at the end of the day, is 150 cases appropriate?
You heard Dennis refer to it. In one sense, what is the
appropriate number of cases? It means, in some respects,
what I ought to be doing in a case. What does a "quality
representation" mean? And if I'm doing quality, how many
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of these qualities can I do in a given time period? So
you've got to have some basic commitment at all levels in
your office to the idea that we're going to do a good job.
Now, an external person might not think we're doing as
good a job as we could be doing, but that's not the same as
saying we've committed to doing a quality job. And when
that's imperiled, we're going to take steps to control
workload. So that's what's common across this spectrum:
that there was literally a commitment to quality and the
offices are perceived both internally, externally, and
perhaps nationally as being high-quality programs. That's a
great part of it.
I would hazard a guess that it is good data if you
went into all of these offices, as we heard explicitly from
Dennis. And I can say the same in the other cases as well.
Now, it doesn't have to be perfect data. I'm not a believer
that the perfect should be the enemy of the good. But, their
data is better than anybody else's to describe what we're
talking about. They have good data records, whether
they're automated or manual or a hybrid of it. They've got
the ability to talk about quantity. So those are common
factors that we've looked at.
Now I'm going to look at each individual program
and see what I took out of it. There are three different ways
in which you can approach this. Obviously, all of us have
done a hybrid of the things I'm going to talk about. But I'm
going to look at some of the essentials that each of them
have that I think differentiates them from the others.
First, let's look at Avis' program. In her enabling
legislation, it says that they shouldn't do more than 60
percent of the work. Now, 60 percent is an interesting
number. I mean, you can look at it in a lot of different
ways. Most people perceive that the conflict number is
around 80 percent, plus or minus. 60 percent is a clear
statement that you're not going to do all the cases. Said
differently, there is going to be a significant presence of the
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private bar in the system.
Now, this is important for the following reason,
aside from making it a healthier system for reasons we
won't talk about here. The question always comes up: if
you declare unavailable, who is going to do the work?
Secondarily, who is going to be paid? And third, are they
going to get a quality lawyer? And you'll hear this even on
your own programs. If we say, "No," my lawyers will say,
"Who are you going to get to do this work?"
So, reasons that I indicated for committing to
having a quality-assigned counsel program are there. But
also, as an alternate place they can go, you struggle over
the question of how do these lawyers get paid? But if
you're committing, you're going to have a mixed system,
and a substantially enriched mixed system. The ingredients
are there for literally moving cases to another place from
the public defender office. So I think while it may not have
been the reason why it was put in initially to deal with case
conflicts, it has that residual impact.
The second thing is-even if you have in your
legislation, like I did, language that says I shouldn't take
more work than I get appropriations to perform, or in Avis'
case the language is in there-there's the moment at which
you've got to take the next big step. You've got to do it.
And all of these programs did it. That is, you took that
moment, wherever it came from, in which you either
moved to withdraw or declared unavailable, whichever way
it went. There's that moment that they took that particular
step.
In Avis' case, they did that back in the 1970's. They
had the commitment to quality in place, and they literally
did it. And from that point on, once they won that battle,
there was a respect and an acceptance that grew greater and
greater over time. Somewhere in here was the issue of
there's too much work for this office to handle, and they
have a right to say no. That's not to say that when you do
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it, there is going to be no disputes about it or it may not
create consternation. But, there's an acceptance of the fact
that you have that right. That is a huge issue to recognize.
You have that right.
Internally what you've got to do-again, to deal
with the issue of what is an appropriate amount of work to
do on one case-is to learn about ethics. You heard Avis
talk about their training program, in which they train about
what's quality representation. They train about ethics.
One of the ethics is: you can't do a case unless you
can perform quality work. You can't take it individually.
Once you get that commitment on the part of your staff
lawyers you've now got the secondary support of the staff
lawyers being involved in a canary in the cave, if you will,
or some commitment to the idea that there's too much work
in a moment at which that staff is going to start to rumble.
And if you've got a management that's committed to it, you
now have the two ingredients that Norm has been talking
about. It is not necessarily pretty when your staff comes in
and starts arguing about it, but you've got management and
you've got staff and at some point you've got this history
with the ability to take action. So training your staff,
understanding what quality representation is, and being
able to articulate that well to outsiders about what is a
quality job is absolutely critical.
And the final one is a commitment to monitoring.
That is literally having what you call supervision-where
you're watching the numbers, where you pay attention to
how much work is coming in and the fact that your
attorneys are on a bell curve. There are some lawyers who
are handling workloads out here, doing it quite well, and
there are others on your staff who are going to be the first
ones imperiled when the work gets to be too great. But,
you've got to have a system that distributes the work
appropriately and at some point says, "The office can't
distribute the work anymore. We're out of the case." And
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you heard all of that coming out of Avis' commitments.
In Bob's case you've got a different approach. He's
a private contractor's office where he's managed as a
private contract office. He had an enabling ability to
negotiate contracts on what the workload would be for his
office, which presents a slightly different situation for the
public defender. But, he's actively engaged in going in and
negotiating a particular contract. Secondary to what you
heard, they've done exceptionally well in Washington,
which is what I called external controls and support. That
is to look at enforcing the ethical rules and requiring them
to be enforced. Also, it looks at getting the ACLU and
other lawyers involved in terms of litigation-to bring
litigation against systems that are not performing. They get
that external statement coming in and saying this is an
office that's not performing.
This reverberates across and gives strength to the
other programs to say, "See, we can't get to there, we've got
to have either more funding or we can't take this kind of
work." But, you seek legislation that puts through and
requires standards, and the standards are passed. You have
something to point to, external to your office that says,
"These are the reasons why that I can't do this work."
Something that's real and local and been adopted by the
court, the legislature, the state , and others in terms of why
it's important for me to control my caseload. But, it's to
work in the legal community or legal culture you're in, to
create, as best you can, standards against which you can
point that aren't national in nature, but that are local. And
so that's really a critical process to be involved with-as
well as having a data system inside to document what
you're doing-to negotiate or to get your budgeting from
the local funding unit as to what my appropriate funding
should be for the kind of work that I am doing.
In Dennis' case, what you found was that he didn't
have around him the enabling legislation language about
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caseload, or the external support from the State of
Nebraska. But, he began a process internally of
determining locally, through his own time studies, "How
many cases can my lawyers do and still do a quality job?"
He has decades of data backing him up on that particular
issue.
But again, it doesn't matter unless you're committed
to providing quality in that local culture. So he had a third
approach to it, which is to use time studies, which I think
ultimately everyone has to do. I mean, you have to have
those to look at where your time is going in a case, to better
manage, and to do so many other things. Ultimately it is
the backbone when you articulate to someone else that my
office has too much work to do, and we can't do a quality
job.
One point I want to make, which Dennis talked
about-and Norm and I have talked about this a lot-is the
conflict that exists in overload. The conflict is that you're
forced to choose which of your clients is going to get the
quality time. You've got to choose and that is an inherent
conflict. It's not just two clients pointing at each other
saying the other one did it. But, when you have to choose
if this client gets my time and this one doesn't need it, that's
a conflict. And I can't tell you the number of times I've
done an evaluation when a program person, particularly the
staff lawyer or even the director tells me, "Well, that's true,
we're dealing with 600 felonies a year, but I know which
cases really need the work." The courts are only open, by
the way, 238 days a year. And you hear that coming from
them, which mean that they've decided this client is going
to get the work and these other ones don't need it. They're
not going to do the investigation, they're not going to do the
things that lawyers are paid to do, which is do exactly
what-let me ask you a question out there, by the way, as
an aside. All of you when you download those updates to
your programs from Microsoft, you all read every word of
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those agreements before you say I agree, right? If someone
paid you to read that, would you read it? Of course you
would. That's what lawyers do. We do boring, boring
things. We read everything. That's if you're doing it right.
And if you aren't doing that, that's the first indicator you're
not doing it right, because we're boring people. That's the
best example I've ever had of explaining to a funder why he
had to read all this stuff and do all that basic work in every
case. That's what you're paid to do. So what you see in
Dennis' case is an internal approach that worked. He got
the data that he could go to his funders and say, "I'm,
declaring unavailable and they've accepted it."
Now, what you see that's universal in this process is
longevity. We've been at it for a long time. But you also
see this continuing effort on improving our offices. That is,
we take great pride as managers in doing lots of things that
are improving our offices. There's been an evolution in the
process. And I think the best example of it is Dennis's,
because he talked about going from the manual system to a
mainframe system and now this existing system. But, each
of those is an evolutionary step that provided greater
capacity for him to manage his office. There's an effort to
garner support at all levels. That part I can't emphasize too
much. That is, you do it within your office, the locality in
which your local legal culture exists. You do it on a state
level, and you do it on a national level. But, it's getting
plugged into that and constantly using all those resources
and trying to get them to adopt positions that support the
ability to control your caseload.
And as Dennis said, the final end of this is, the
value of this isn't just controlling your caseload-although
that is a crucial reason for doing it. The value of
developing a system that can control the workload coming
into your office-you heard it coming out of here before-
is that it's an essential part of a commitment to a quality
office. It's an essential part of a staff esprit de corps that
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you're fairly distributing the work and that you're
conscientiously trying to do differential management and
match the amount of hours you expect a case to have-such
as giving additional time when a case goes and becomes a
US Supreme Court case, which in my case happens
regularly. You have to have the ability to adjust and
provide time for people to do a quality job. And to do that,
you have to have a structure in place. And that kind of a
commitment pays off with your staff in ways that you just
can't even begin to imagine. So it pays off on so many
levels beyond, for example, simply going to a funder and
saying I need X amount of dollars to do Y amount of cases.
It is a commitment, and its basis to just a commitment to
quality. And it's why we should be doing this work. Thank
you.
NORMAN LEFSTEIN: Well, you've been a very patient
audience and you've been exposed to an awfully lot of
ideas since about 2:30 this afternoon, and I want to throw it
open for comments, suggestions, questions. You can
address it to anyone you'd like, but we'd be real interested
to hear from you. And I suspect some of you, once we get
the ball rolling, would be interested in commenting.
[Long pause]
Well I have seen some law school classes that are less
reticent than all of you.
ROBERT BORUCHOWITZ: There's a hand. There's
three hands.
NORMAN LEFSTEIN: All right. Let's start with Laura
Sager, and then we'll go up, up in back. You're going to
take the microphone around; right?
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JESSICA VAN DYKE: Sure. Where are we starting?
NORMAN LEFSTEIN: We're starting with this lady right
here, Laura Sager. You can state your name and where
you're from and what you do for identification. We are
taking this down with the court reporter. We will edit this
in the end, but we're interested in publishing the full
proceedings of this conference, unless you say something
really obscene.
LAURA SAGER: I don't know who this should go to, and
obviously I'm in a different position from most of you. I
don't have an office. I'm with the Campaign for Justice,
and we're struggling to get a state-
NORMAN LEFSTEIN: In the State of Michigan.
LAURA SAGER: -in the State of Michigan-a state
public defense system. In the meantime, I'm hearing from
public defenders and attorneys and various whistle blowers.
And I just got a call from a public defender that heads a
small office in the north part of the state who said, "My
partner and I have 1,100 cases. There's one legal secretary.
The county commission doesn't believe we need even the
help we have, or to hire anyone else." When I asked her
what she has tried to do with it, she said, "Well, my county
commissioner's been saying to me, 'so you're saying you're
providing ineffective counsel."' And she said, "I can't do
that." The other thing I hear is from judges, "Well, the
better attorneys can handle very large caseloads. They're
very efficient."
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: [Unintelligible]
LAURA SAGER: Yes, thank you very much. Some of the
attorneys say the same thing. So, I'm in a position of trying
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to talk and to encourage some of these people to come up
and stand up with some of this stuff. Fear is just rampant.
So, if people want to talk about how they've combated that
just plain terror of "I'll never work in this county again,"--
which sometimes is true-or of having to declare myself as
doing a bad job-which I just can't bring myself to do--
how you can use these cases to generate some sort of
higher profile of "yes, you can stand up to this?" Who
would be most helpful?
NORMAN LEFSTEIN: Obviously, a function of a lack of
independence, but, Jim, you're from Michigan, so why
don't you answer that question?
JAMES NEUHARD: I think Laura has hit it. I don't think
it's unique to the small lawyer in a small county in Northern
Michigan. I think that's at the core whether it's an office
that has 500 lawyers in it, or an office that has 2 lawyers in
it. That's the fundamental question, "Are you willing to
give up your job?" I mean, it gets down to that level.
Now there are strategies that you can do to lessen
the possibility of that. NACDL has a strike force that will
come in and work with you on those kind of questions-
coming out of the Peart3 1 case out of Louisiana where a
lawyer did just that- stood up and said no. But, I think
you've got to find the support that I talked about outside of
your office. You've got to be committed to trying to find
people outside, across a broad spectrum, but willing to
commit and stand beside you at the end of the day. The
biggest threat isn't just what the lawyer implied about their
job. We've heard this any number of times. Well if the
public defender can't do it, we'll go back to assigned
counsel, or we'll go to a low-bid contract, or if the low-bid
contract wants more money, we'll go to a public defender.
They have one pitted against another. And the only answer
31 State v. Peart, 621 So.2d 780 (La. 1993).
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to that, of course, is the standards you have for all three of
those entities within it, so that they can't play that kind of
game with you. But, that's what they're involved with-
bidding aside-the ability to get those standards in place.
You've got to find safety in numbers. So, the only thing
you can do is begin to bring in more and more people to
validate what's going on here or you simply can't-
NORMAN LEFSTEIN: Is that a public defender office in
Michigan?
LAURA SAGER: Yes, it's a county.
NORMAN LEFSTEIN: It's a county office, hired by the
county board?
LAURA SAGER: Yes.
NORMAN LEFSTEIN: And obviously, in that
circumstance, you don't have the requisite independence.
But, I think Jim is exactly right. And we've seen
illustrations, wonderful illustrations, of private lawyers
serving pro bono. NACDL, for example, became involved
in the case from Ohio, which incidentally is cited in a
footnote in the Excessive Workload Guidelines 32 that we've
talked about here this afternoon. The lawyer in that case
where the trial court judge in Ohio, as I recall, wanted to
hold him in contempt because he wouldn't proceed with the
trial, was he not, Bob-
ROBERT BORUCHOWITZ: Yes.
NORMAN LEFSTEIN: And NACDL came in with its
lawyers and had the thing set aside, resulting in a very good
opinion of the Court of Appeals, which is what's cited in a
32 ABA EIGHT GUIDELINES, supra note 3.
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footnote in the ABA's Excessive Workload Guidelines.
Apparently it's cited in one of the 100 slides that Bob
Boruchowitz exposed you to.
ROBERT BORUCHOWITZ: Three of the hundred slides.
NORMAN LEFSTEIN: But, you know, at base, it requires
a certain amount of courage. There's no doubt that in a
system where you don't have the kind of independence that
the DC Public Defender Service has, it's much more
difficult.
ROBERT BORUCHOWITZ: Let me add this, Norm. I
think it's not practical to say to that lawyer that tomorrow
you have to go in and say you're ineffective. But, I do
think that anybody in that situation should do what Jim is
talking about in terms of garnering support. And in our
state, what I tell people is, call the Washington Defenders
Association, call the Washington Association for Criminal
Defense lawyers, call me because I have my fantastically
huge Defender Initiative Program at Seattle University
School of Law. And there are things that we can do,
whether it's come in as Amicus, represent you in a hearing,
or make motions for you. But, the other thing is there is
real risk to public defenders of losing their license, not just
their job, if they don't pay attention to RPC 1.. 33 And it's
true that we look around, we don't see very many public
defenders who've been disciplined, but it is happening. It's
happening more and more, and it's going to happen more
and more. And Bob Spangenberg-in a meeting that I was
at with him a few weeks ago with a couple other people
that are here today were at-said that he thinks the next
step is to start bringing ethics complaints against judges
and lawyers. And that's beginning to happen in our state,
and I think it's going to spread.
33 MODEL RULES OF PROF' L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2008).
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And so, one of things you can say to the person who
called you up is, you may be afraid of losing your job, but
you also should be afraid of losing your license. And if
you're not providing competent representation, there's a
good chance you will.
NORMAN LEFSTEIN: And in Chapter Three of the draft
that is on your flash drive brings together all the authority
that I could find on the issue, of potential liability for
discipline, and there is some. This includes some public
defenders with Missouri's statewide program, who were
called before the state's disciplinary body. They didn't
ultimately wind up being adjudicated, but they were
investigated, and I think initially charged. But it never
became a matter of public record. But, it was solely a
caseload issue. The Missouri program has been overloaded
with cases for a long time. And there is a very good
opinion by the Missouri Supreme Court in December of
last year dealing with it. Cara?
CARA DRINAN: I'm Cara Drinan from the Catholic
University of America. Bob, I actually wanted to ask you
to follow up on a point you made. As a law professor, I
think about how to involve students in this. And you
mentioned in passing, you'd like to see law schools be more
involved in this reform area. Can you say a little bit more
about that? What that would look like?
ROBERT BORUCHOWITZ: Yeah, I think there's lots of
things. At a minimum, students can be trained to go watch
courts. They do have to be trained because they don't have
any idea of what they're looking at. I've had students go
watch really bad things and come back and say, "Looks
okay to me." This is because they've never seen it before,
and they don't know what they're looking at. But, even
when they're not a lot trained, they can still go and get basic
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information.
One of the things that is really useful to me in my
misdemeanor work is a lot of courts have recordings. So, if
you have a student go watch something and you get the
recording and then you talk to the student, you can get a
pretty good sense, even if you're not able to go yourself.
You can also have students doing all kinds of other leg
work in research. I think having students on independent
study is a way of expanding the reach of a professor. I'd
like to see more professors getting involved. And I think
independent study is a way to do it in addition to clinic,
because I recognize that it's hard to start a new clinic right
up off the bat. It incurs a lot of money. But, if, let's say,
three professors in every law school were to take on one
independent study project relating to public defense a year.
You would talk locally to folks about what's most
important, whether it's a caseload issue, resources, expert
witnesses, investigation, independence, flat-fee contracts,
or moving to set aside guilty pleas of people that weren't
adequately represented or represented at all. And if
professors were to let it be known to the local bar, I'm
willing to take one case a year that has a systemic impact, it
would be fantastic.
I think if we could develop some sort of coordinated
effort to do that-where maybe we talk to each other in
professor land. You know, it's no secret to any of you that
went to law school that most professors didn't practice very
long before they started teaching. It's a very bizarre thing
where we're teaching people how to be lawyers when the
people doing the teaching don't really know how to be
lawyers. And so, it's difficult in that situation because
maybe a lot of professors who want to engage don't really
know, for example, how to file a writ of habeas corpus.
But for the ones who are willing to learn, I think it's a good
system. So, for me, I've taken some projects on
independent study and, and I have my little project as well,
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which I've been able to get some fumding for. At a
minimum, I think that's something you can do. More
broadly, even in places where you don't have access to the
folks in this panel, if there are professors who'd be willing
to spend five to ten hours a week consulting with local
defenders, being expert witnesses on motions to
withdraw-whether they are experts or they could make
themselves experts-those local professors who can get up
to speed can provide that kind of assistance. There was a
question over here and Jean has her hand up too.
NORMAN LEFSTEIN: Yes, the lady in the back row
known as Jean Faria.
JEAN FARIA: (Inaudible). You can probably hear me,
can't you?
NORMAN LEFSTEIN: No, use the mic, Jean.
JEAN FARIA: Cara, one of the things that we've done in
Louisiana, is we developed an internship/externship on the
state level. We're interested not only in getting young help,
but it's available to 2Ls and 3Ls to go into offices or work
with us on the policy level in the state office and we pay.
It's competitive. We go to each law school and take two
people from each law school. The first year we paid them
$2,000 a piece, and we are continuing that. The first year
we had to scrape together to get people, and this year we
have 110 applicants for eight places. So, we subsidize that
because we want to have them see what the offices are like,
but we control that. They go into the offices, but they're
trained by us before they go. Then we resource them while
they're in those offices. They meet with us beforehand and
at the end of their experience-just another way to do it.
JAMES NEUHARD: Let me add one thing to what
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happened in Michigan. As you all know, I think one of the
biggest impacts on moving the ability of the public defense
issue to gain a much higher profile has been the actual
indigence cases. They have proven to people that bad
defense has horrific consequences. And Barry Scheck
should get all the medals in the world for what he's been
able to do there and making real the fact that innocent
people have ended up in prison. Now, that was a fluke-
and I use word not even guardedly-of DNA, that he alone
and was able to do so convincingly.
One of the things that began in Michigan is a non-
DNA Innocence Project. David Moran is running it out of
the University of Michigan. I think, they have passed five
cases, to show that there are people who are going in and
are actually innocent. They're doing it using students in a
clinical approach very similar to what DNA cases have
done, but it's taking it to another level. And that one looks
at, again, how did this happen? How did these people get
convicted? Almost invariably, it goes back to the quality,
or lack thereof, of defense representation they had. So
that's a fairly unique clinic that will not take a case if there's
DNA involved. It's looking at the cases differently.
NORMAN LEFSTEIN: I think Barry Scheck deserves
enormous credit, but I think as well his very close partner,
Peter Neufeld, deserves great recognition as well. And as I
say that, his wife who is sitting back in the room-
ADELE BERNHARD: Thank you.
NORMAN LEFSTEIN: Adele Bernhard, smiles broadly.
Adele is on the program tomorrow.
JAMES NEUHARD: I apologize, Adele.
NORMAN LEFSTEIN: While I'm thinking of it, until we
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see another hand, let me tell you that the ticket for dinner
tonight is on the back of your name tag. So please bring
your name tag along with your ticket to dinner tonight so
we can make sure that you get something to eat. Now, who
else would like to be heard from? It's been a long
afternoon. Anyone? Yes, Jerry Black, a professor here at
Tennessee. She'll bring the mic over.
JERRY BLACK: I think when the question was raised
about what do you tell the lawyers, that's only part of the
problem. If the county commission is willing to recognize
that quality of representation, then they just find another
lowest bidder. And how do you deal with that? I think that
part of the problem is-something we don't take very
seriously-the Sixth Amendment right to counse134--that
we're willing to accept second rate representation.
NORMAN LEFSTEIN: Well, there really are no easy
answers obviously, but one of the reasons why I take some
time in Chapter Three of what I have drafted is to talk
about the liability of communities under Section 1983. 35
Bob Boruchowitz mentioned the most prominent 1983
action involving public defense, which is Miranda v. Clark
County.36 Here, they had prioritized cases, as many of you
know, based upon polygraph examinations in deciding
upon the cases to which they were devote their resources
and energies. The rest of the cases they didn't do much
work on at all. But, those are not the only 1983 recoveries.
And when you're running a program- especially in a
county which doesn't have any defense to a 1983 action-
when you're running a program like that, you are exposing
yourself over and over again with the potential of being
34 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
3' 42 U.S.C. 1983 (2006).
36 Miranda v. Clark Co., Nevada 319 F.3d 465 (9th Cir. 2002).
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sued. One of my goals in putting all of this together is to
give lawyers the ammunition to drive the case home as to
what all the reasons are for why excessive caseloads ought
not to be tolerated.
I worry more, or just as much, about assigned
counsel programs, where you pay the smallest number of
dollars and you attract the least experienced lawyers who
then take maximum numbers of cases in order to generate
income. And it's an enormous problem. And that's why I
stressed in my remarks earlier, that, while I believe strongly
that you need the substantial participation of the private
bar, it cannot be solely an ad hoc system where the
compensation is totally inadequate. Otherwise, you'll wind
up with defenders saying, "Look, I've got all of these cases,
but if I don't take these cases, look who the lawyers are to
whom the cases will be assigned." And that becomes the
excuse for defenders piling on still more cases. But, in the
end, it is not a defensible position. It frankly is not.
Because the first obligation, as the ethics opinion of the
ABA drives home, is to your existing clients, to your
current clients. By simply taking more and more cases
because you worry about what may happen to these clients
jeopardizes your own representation and jeopardizes your
standing as a member of the bar and the quality of
representation that you can provide to your clients.
ROBERT BORUCHOWITZ: I want to expand on my
answer to Laura in light of the professor's question. Dennis
and I were talking with Mark Stephens this morning about
the impact that one or two people can have, whether it's a
judge or somebody else in the system. And there are two
thoughts that I wanted to share.
One is that almost everywhere you can find one
person who is in a position of power or in the media or
maybe both, who does care and for whom these arguments
resonate. And so you've got to figure out how to work with
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that one person to develop some other people. For
example, years ago in the city, before David Hocraffer,
who is now in the job, somebody else was in the job in the
county. This person was really trying to mess with us in
the city and trying to have our funding cut and caseload
increased. But, there was one person on the city council
staff who was an aid to a council member, who's a former
fire chief, who never in a million years would we have
predicted would be in favor of public defense. But he had a
staff person who was a former city prosecutor in another
town who totally cared about this. And there was one
person in the mayor's office, who was his counsel, who had
come from a total noncriminal background. And those two
people were able to get it to the point where the city
basically said to the county, "You go away. We're going to
hold to our standards, and we're going to pay these people
what we want to pay them." You can always find
somebody who does care, who these arguments resonate-
somebody in a bar association, someone in a faith-based
organization. You can find somebody who is willing to
stand up and help you.
The other thing I want to say is in response to a
question from Upper Michigan. Get somebody else
involved to help you. Don't do this by yourself. Whether
that's the local ACLU or it's some group of volunteer
lawyers, you go see the head of the local bar association.
Tell them you have 1,100 cases that you pick up off the
floor because he can't even imagine that any lawyer would
ever do that. Get those people to start helping you, and you
go talk to community groups. It's possible to do it. You
can sometimes get an editorial writer in the local paper or
somebody on TV news that cares about this and sees it as a
story, as well as something to care about. I know Jim
wants to talk before Barbara.
ADELE BERNHARD: Oh, but I have the mic.
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ROBERT BORUCHOWITZ: How'd you get it?
ADELE BERNHARD: I was just going to ask also-
NORMAN LEFSTEIN: Do you want to identify yourself?
ADELE BERNHARD: I'm Adele Bernhard, and I just
wanted to also respond to the professor saying that people
don't really care that much about the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel37, which I think is true. I think one of the
themes that we're all here discussing is, "How is it that
we're going to change that?" And it's not going to change
quickly, and it's not going to change overnight. But there
are strategies which folks here and folks in this room have
used, which I think will sort of slowly, over time, make a
difference.
One thing, of course, is the use of the media, which
they've used very effectively in Michigan. It is something
which Laura has used and has been used in New York to
build around bringing of litigation. There was a huge story
about, who is it that's affected by these bad lawyers? Who
are those people? What are their cases like? What does
happen as a result of someone not having enough time or
not being willing to stand up, or not bad lawyers, but
overburdened lawyers?
So there's media issues, and then also in terms of
the school, students going and watching court or students
going and working in the public defender offices. You
know, you're getting out there. You're getting people to
care because they haven't seen this. Once they see it, once
they're involved with it, it makes a difference. Those are
lessons that they're not going to learn. So you can have the
students also start thinking about writing letters, editorials,
doing documentary movies. Our clinic students this year
37 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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went out into the community and did a "Know Your Rights
Symposium." After spending a year in criminal court, they
learned about who got stopped, why people get stopped.
They went and did a community lawyering, a session for
kids in this public housing project talking to them about
how they should respond to the police. So, that all builds
on itself.
JAMES NEUHARD: Just to put a sort of an end on this
thing. It's been referred to, and I don't want to
underestimate the role litigation plays in this. We are at a
moment where you can look at it and say the failures we
know about, if you're in Knoxville. But for those who
haven't been following it, in the last couple of weeks, two
big cases came down. My supreme court in Michigan ruled
that a 1983 action to go against a systemic challenge to the
entire system. It's the first one that ever did that. And then
New York, right after that, ruled the same way. And there's
two major systemic challenges happening in two of the
biggest states in the union. At the core of the failure in
almost all of those cases, what they're looking at, are
systems that are grossly, grossly underrepresenting their
clients-gross case overload, across the board going on.
Secondarily, federal courts, in fact one of the
federal courts in my eastern district, we won a case where
they actually cited the Ten Principles. And they're finding
structural denial of counsel for lawyers who do not talk to
their clients in a confidential setting. They just started
listing off the number of principles that were violated, and
they said it's a structural denial of counsel. I'm sure you
studied it in court, the difference between a post-conviction
denial of counsel and a structural denial of counsel, where
it's lawyer not present. It's appearance reversal-there's no
need to show harm. And they've done it now in three
habeas cases that we've won pretrial. These are-if you
look at the bad systems-what they're not able to do. They
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can't visit their clients, they're not doing any
investigation-on and on it goes. And those things are
literally structural denial of counsel. And as that body of
case law builds up, as these systemic challenges come
forward, they tend to have a domino effect in other
jurisdictions as time goes on. So I would not underestimate
the role that litigation plays. And what we do better than
lobbying is we're lawyers. I mean, that's what we do for a
living.
NORMAN LEFSTEIN: I think tomorrow Cara Drinan is
on the panel on litigation. We'll probably talk about the
New York and Michigan cases. Yes? You have a
comment or question?
BARBARA HURST: Yeah, well, I want to follow up on
what Jim said maybe and-
NORMAN LEFSTEIN: Can you identify yourself?
BARBARA HURST: Yeah, I'm Barbara Hurst from Rhode
Island. Practical consideration may be as an appeals
lawyer. I'd been thinking about that statement from earlier,
that rather than mass systemic litigation we ought to be
focusing on motions to withdraw. It strikes me that
motions to withdraw look a lot like motions for
continuance. And if they're denied, you really are talking
about Strickland's38 second prong. You have to have a
record that shows what you would have done if you had
that continuance. There's a real focus on prejudice in the
individual case. And the appellate court-at least the court
I'm used to practicing in front of-will issue opinion after
opinion saying, "Boy, it looked pretty good to us."
Because, once that motion to withdraw is denied-if you
can't get interlocutory relief, which in at least my
38 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
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jurisdiction, you can't, or not often-then you've got a full
trial. And then, you've got a lawyer who has now gone to
heroic, trying to do the best job he or she could. So, when
you're saying I have to withdraw because I've got so many
cases that I can't canvas the neighborhood for witnesses, I
can't go out and speak to the defendant's second cousin who
has now moved to Nebraska, okay? If you're dealing on an
individual basis now, you've got to start talking about what
would that second cousin have told you. Whereas, when
you're dealing on a systemic litigation basis, the weight of
not being able to do that in 600 cases speaks for itself. It's
a whole different kind of focus to me and a different kind
of litigation. It's hard to sit here and think of systemic
litigation not being a better route for that record.
NORMAN LEFSTEIN: Well, I saw you shaking your head
when I talked about motions to withdraw being filed much
more frequently. I understand exactly what you're saying.
I did not have a chance to develop that fully in the time that
I had available, and I do plan to spell it out in some detail
in what I'm writing. Obviously, I have in mind requesting a
hearing on what it is that the lawyer is confronting in terms
of current caseload and how it inhibits performance, the
discharge of professional obligations to clients. Now, I
have no illusions that judges would not like such motions.
Some might even try to bar them in some fashion. I don't
quite know how they can prevent you from filing things of
that nature. In the New Orleans litigation, which I
mentioned earlier, the lawyer was given a hearing on a
motion to withdraw. I don't remember how many cases in
which they asked to withdraw, but it was a very large
number. He had-on that day that I was in court, and I
testified in the New Orleans case-185 pending felony
cases, with many of his clients facing life imprisonment.
And the head of the New Orleans' office said, "Let's go
through the cases that you're in which you're seeking to
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withdraw," and they then proceeded to make a record of all
the things that were not being done in the lawyer's cases.
Once that record was made, the trial court judge wrote an
absolutely scathing opinion about defense representation in
New Orleans in general and about this particular lawyer's
caseload.
So, obviously, there is a way to do this, and I didn't
fully spell it out. But, I think that it becomes difficult for
courts just to ignore repeated motions to withdraw. If the
hearing is granted, there is that capacity to make a
powerful record. What I was really getting at was that the
cases that have been brought here in Knoxville and in Dade
County, Florida, have really soured me on this effort. And
I just think of the world of Mark Stephens and Max Bahner
and his law firm because they meticulously prepared their
case. Mark is going to talk about this tomorrow, so I don't
want to go into great detail about it, except that initially,
after the case had been heard and there was an extremely
strong record prepared, he couldn't even get the trial court
to render any decision at all for a very long time. And then
when it was reviewed, the case again waited a very long
time for a decision. The delays are tremendous. And
meanwhile Mark's got a group of lawyers who are faced
with incredible caseload problems.
One other point I want to make, and I don't want to
monopolize this, although-
ROBERT BORUCHOWITZ: Yes, you do.
NORMAN LEFSTEIN: Now that I'm at the podium it's not
that hard to do. But, there is a line in ABA guideline eight
on this appeal of the denial of a motion to withdraw, and I
agree with it. I've looked at statutes on this. The right of
interlocutory appeal, it simply is unavailable. If it exists at
all, it's a discretionary. But, there is a line in the
commentary that says: "If you have a denial of a motion to
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withdraw-and it's guideline eight, second sentence of the
commentary-an appeal or an application for a writ of
mandamus or prohibition should properly be regarded as a
requirement of diligence under Professional Conduct
Rules." So we had in mind the notion that, if these motions
to withdraw are denied, then maybe you need to think
about an extraordinary writ.
I want to do one other thing, by the way, before we
see if there's another question or comment. I'm going to
embarrass somebody, but I think she can take it. There is a
public defender here from Spokane, Washington who
actually took a red-eye to get here from San Francisco last
night because she was on a program on Wednesday in San
Francisco. And she and I have been e-mailing back and
forth over the last couple of weeks because she publishes a
blog, and it's called PD Revolution.39  It's all about
caseloads, and that's why we've struck up this friendship
through e-mail. And I was delighted that she was willing to
come out here, at some personal sacrifice, to attend this
meeting. And I want to-Carol, why don't you stand up
and introduce yourself.
CAROL HUNEKE: Hi, everybody. I'm Carol Huneke
from Spokane, Washington. Oh. Do I have to say it again?
NORMAN LEFSTEIN: Sure.
CAROL HUNEKE: All right. Carol Huneke from
Spokane, Washington. And if you want to look at my
blog-it was really weird yesterday when somebody
introduced me as a blogger, which I had never thought of
myself as-
NORMAN LEFSTEIN: You always thought you were a
public defender.
39 Public Defender Revolution, http://pdrevolution.blogspot.com/.
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CAROL HUNEKE: Yeah, or something like that. But you
can just Google "Public Defender Revolution." I would
warn you, there's some profanity on there because it's
geared towards an audience of public defenders, but...
NORMAN LEFSTEIN: She was really worried that I was
offended by the profanity. She told me that, and I told her I
read it anyway. Carol, it's nice to have you with us. I don't
know if you have a comment or question or observation.
CAROL HUNEKE: Oh, not right now.
NORMAN LEFSTEIN: Okay. Okay.
JESSICA VAN DYKE: Actually, we've got somebody
over here.
NORMAN LEFSTEIN: Okay.
JESSICA VAN DYKE: So I'm going to go over here.
NORMAN LEFSTEIN: Okay.
MAUREEN DIMINO: Maureen Dimino from NACDL. I
just have a question. I know all of my work has been in
Florida when I was a public defender, and Florida has this
different system of having elected public defenders and-
NORMAN LEFSTEIN: Dennis is also elected by the way,
Dennis Keefe. And here in Tennessee, as you may know,
they're all elected.
MAUREEN DIMINO: Well, then, that's helpful. What I
would love to know is, in light of what's going on in Miami
with the caseload litigation being held up, is this a waiting
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game to wait for another election to occur, to see what
happens in that election; if new public defenders are being
stayed? And I just want to know how does one support the
public defenders that are doing right and doing what they
should be doing as public defenders in any system that's
elected?
NORMAN LEFSTEIN: I don't know maybe-do you want
to cover that tomorrow morning, Rory? Rory Stein is the
general counsel of the Dade County Public Defender
Program.
RORY STEIN: Yes, two separate public defenders, both
elected, have continued the workload litigation. Bennett
Brummer was the public defender who began. He was the
PD in Miami for 32 years. And then his successor Carlos
Martinez, who was elected when Bennett retired, continued
the litigation. So, if the legislature was waiting around to
see if there was going to be a change of heart based upon a
different elected official, that didn't work. And by the way,
we're not stuck; the Florida Supreme Court took cert today
in the first workload case. So we're moving forward again
after a ten-month delay.
NORMAN LEFSTEIN: In a six-to-one decision I
understand. Yes, somebody else? Bob Weeks?
BOB WEEKS: Good afternoon, I'm Bob Weeks from
Santa Clara County, California. San Jose is our main city.
I was a public defender there for 30 years, and I'm now on
SCLAID. I just want to make one point on the two-person
office in Michigan and a point raised by Professor
Boruchowitz on that. We recently had an issue in San Jose
that demonstrates the power of one person and the power of
the press. The office had been going there for about forty-
five years, and it was a news article of front page about six
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months ago. It was about not having public defenders at
arraignments-this is a county of about two million
people-and what was happening to people. They quoted
both Professor Lefstein and Professor Boruchowitz as to
the affect of that, etc. That got the ball rolling. Our public
defender was quoted in the article as saying, "Well, we'd
like to do it, but we don't have the staff, yada, yada." A
long-time friend of mine, Mary Greenwood-as a result
within a coup-struck a chord with one of the members of
the board of supervisors. This kind of shook up the local
judicial establishment, and legal establishment and the bar
association started rumbling about having volunteers. I
was on vacation, yada, yada, we came back and said, "Gee,
I know all these people." So, I started talking to people and
said we ought to do this.
To make a long story short, the public defender
went in with a supplementary budget request, got an extra
million dollars to staff-mainly the domestic violence
arraignments and the felony and misdemeanor DV
arraignments were combined to do that. And the board of
supervisors stepped up to the plate to give them the money,
and at a time when they're facing about a twenty million
dollar budget deficit. The DA wanted more, but she hadn't
submitted her request. But they're doing it in the DV court
now, and the PD and the DA showed up. The DA has got a
request in for next year to get three to five attorneys, and
the public defender's going to staff the general
misdemeanor calendar. So, everybody will be covered with
three experienced attorneys and a paralegal.
So, that shows the power of the press and what one
interest-in this case, a member of the board of supervisors
and some other people working together--can do. It's
possible even in these tight times.
NORMAN LEFSTEIN: In the very back.
111
7 Tennessee Journal of Law & Policy (Special Edition) 112
ANDY ROSKIND: Hi, my name is Andy Roskind, and I
practice here in Knoxville. I heard Jerry Black say maybe
people just don't care about the Sixth Amendment40 . And I
thought: "Well, I wonder if more people would care about
the Sixth Amendment if there's funding to care about the
Sixth Amendment." So, I guess my question to the panel,
where it's applicable, is what-of everything you've talked
about, about the issue of not having a staff and having too
many clients-what similarities do you guys have as far as
to reach out to your states or communities to increase
funding to help alleviate that? Could you guys talk about
that a little bit so we might get a better idea of what role
you play within your local government and your state
governments?
NORMAN LEFSTEIN: Bob, go ahead.
ROBERT BORUCHOWITZ: All these things work
together. And by the way, I don't agree that people don't
care about the Sixth Amendment.4' The NLADA did a
focus group-ten years ago? Ed, do you know how long
ago it was?
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: About eleven years ago.
ROBERT BORUCHOWITZ: And these focus groups went
around the country. They went around the country and
interviewed people. And guess what? People care about
fairness. I really think, and I wave the flag about this, I
think Americans care about fairness. And when you
explain what's really going on, people don't like it. And,
you know, there may be exceptions like the State of
Arizona-but Kingman is in Arizona and they prevailed-
but I think all these things work together. So, what I do
40 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
4l1'id.
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when I go around saying you should provide lawyers at
arraignment, is I make all the arguments about why it's
constitutionally required and why the court rules require
it-why it's good efficient management and so forth. But,
then I also talk about two things. One is, if you have
lawyers at arraignment and first appearance, there's a good
chance you're going to get more people out of jail. In
Baltimore they did a study of that. Professor Calder wrote
at least one article about how in fact they saved a lot of
money by getting people out of jail by having lawyers at
the first appearance.
But the other thing I say is, look at the cases you
have in your court. And if you go to almost any
misdemeanor court in this country, you're going to find
suspended driver's license, minor possession of alcohol,
possession of marijuana, obstructing the police and
criminal trespass. That's going to be the bulk of the cases.
There's also DUI and domestic violence, but the great bulk
of it is all those other things. They don't need to be there.
And if you go to juvenile court, you're going to find
all kinds of dumb cases there that can be diverted out of the
system, that when many of us were growing up, nobody
went to court for those things. Now they do and they get
criminal records for it. And there is no reason for that. In
some situations there are felonies that can be diverted as
well, particularly low-level property offenses. So, it's
possible to talk about all of those ways to reduce the
expenditures, and then shift some of that money into public
defense.
One of the things we did in our county was, our
office and the prosecutor's office got together, talked to the
other defenders, talked to the judges, talked to the county
counsel, and eventually put together a re-licensing program
to get the suspended driver's license cases out. You can go
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to the website of the King County District Court42 and read
all about how the prosecutor offers pre-filing diversions, so
the cases never get filed if people to go to a re-licensing
program. The first year we saved $300,000 in public
defender cost.
We also put together a program with Anne Daly
from SCRAP, one of the other offices that's here. We put
together a program where, in contempt of court cases for
parental support, we set up a two-track system. I don't
know if it's still functioning very well, but the idea was that
we would agree that people would not have counsel at the
first hearing if the only thing that happened there was an
effort to change administratively what their payments were.
And that the prosecutor's office would promise not to use
anything they learned in that ever again-later against the
defendant. In that program, I think we saved $300,000 in
the first year. So, that was a situation where defenders and
prosecutors got together, came up with ideas on how to
save money, make it more efficient, and help the clients in
the process. Parents who want to make their payments but
have lost their job or they have been downsized in their job
or they've got health issues or whatever, they shouldn't be
going to jail for not making their payments. Their
payments should be altered, and they should figure out
another way to do it. So, there's ways of putting all these
things together, so that maybe you can find extra money.
Maybe you can free up money from changing the
prosecution plans. But ultimately, it is a right. If you're
going to prosecute, you have to defend. And I think that
the fairness of that can resonate with a lot of people. So, all
those things are possible. And, of course, you can also find
grants and things that kind of bridge you through until you
can make changes.
42 King County District Court, Relicensing Program,
http://www.kingcounty.gov/courts/DistrictCourt/CitationsOrTickets/Re
licensingProgram.aspx (last visited July 26, 2010).
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AVIS BUCHANAN: Can I follow up on that grant
comment? I don't want to sit here being a salesperson for
the DOJ, but there is one person who claims to care about
the Sixth Amendment43 and that's Eric Holder. He is
making efforts to try to change some of the culture of the
justice department. He has said he wants to make public
defense part of the DNA of the justice department. And the
public defender community has communicated to him that
one of the barriers to more effective work in the public
defender community is that the public defenders don't have
the same kind of access to Bureau of Justice Assistance
Grants that prosecutors and law enforcement do. So, I
think that this is potentially an opportunity to show that, or
to take advantage of this increased access to money. He
said that-and you may hear about more of this from
Laurie Robinson-has said that they have listened to that,
that they want to put public defender representation on
some of these grant award committees to have a more
receptive audience for grant applications. So, in the next
year or two years or three years or however long he or this
program-or Larry Tribe is in place to focus on public
defender issues-this may be a chance, if not to actually
get the money, but to show why the program is either
effective or that it's not effective. That we've made the
effort to get the access to the funds that he says he wants to
make available. So that's another option.
And I didn't say one thing about juvenile caseloads
at PDS. They may sound very low, but we insist that the
juvenile attorneys do their own investigation, and these
cases turnover fast. So there's a context for that number.
NORMAN LEFSTEIN: Our featured speaker at dinner
tonight is Laurie Robinson, the Assistant Attorney General
in charge of the Office of Justice Programs, which includes
43 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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the Bureau of Justice Assistance to which-
AVIS BUCHANAN: Avis.
NORMAN LEFSTE1N: -Avis was referring. I've known
Avis for years so, but every once in a while there's an
unexpected mental lapse. Listen, you've been a terrific
audience here this afternoon, and it's been delightful to
spend the afternoon with you. Please join me in giving a
round of applause to our panel.
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NORMAN LEFSTEIN: I know we're going to be joined
by a few folks in just a minute. When we began the
program yesterday afternoon, the Dean of the College of
Law, Doug Blaze, was unable to be with us because he was
visiting with alumni and raising large amounts of money
for the College of Law, which is what Deans do. He's
taking a break from fundraising this morning, and I'm very
pleased to welcome Dean Doug Blaze to his own law
school to greet all of you this morning. Thank you.
DEAN BLAZE: Thanks, Norm. We are really excited to
have you all here. I am sorry that I wasn't here yesterday. I
heard that it was an excellent day-very productive-and
that you got a chance to see the Baker Center. I was out
meeting with alumni. And just to digress for a second, I
was in Nashville. I just have to say, and there may be some
folks from Nashville here today, it is remarkable how that
city and the surrounding community has responded to what
has been a devastating two-and-a-half weeks. That
community has pulled together. I know as a Tennessean,
I'm extremely proud of what they've done over there to deal
with some incredibly difficult issues and pull together. I
think the whole country can be proud of how disasters like
the one experienced in Nashville have been handled in that
particular locality.
Again, we are very, very proud. I think it's
incredibly appropriate that this conference is being held
here. Hopefully, as you walk in and out of our doors, you
see that it says "Equal Justice Under Law" at one side and
"To Have the Assistance of Counsel" at the other side. We
are very, very proud of the law school, of our long tradition
of connection with the profession and involvement in the
very issues that you all are talking about.
As you may know, we have the oldest, continuously
operating legal clinic program in the country. We're
headed on sixty-three years right now. And we have been
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heavily involved in criminal defense, Sixth Amendment'
issues for a long time and increasingly so lately. Our
clinical program, in fact, was a public defender for quite a
while before we had a full-time public defender program in
the state of Tennessee. It was also the legal services
provider for a four-county area up until 1981. So it has had
a long and rich history of that.
More recently, though, I'm very proud of something
we've done. We now have an Innocence Project Clinic at
the law school, and thanks to the hard work of Penny
White, Steve Bright will be working in that program this
fall. We're really excited about that occurring. We also
have some amazing faculty. Dwight Aarons has done a lot
of work for the ABA Death Penalty Moratorium
Implementation Project, particularly focusing on
Tennessee. Hopefully, you all have met Jerry Black, who
is finishing up as president of TACDL, Tennessee
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. He also just
received an award, the Law & Liberty Award, from the
Knoxville Bar Association for his long-time commitment to
representing citizens accused of crime.
And then there's the incomparable Penny White
and everything she's done to help put this together. You
know, Harvard asks her to write law review articles, she
puts together conferences, she makes sure that there are
flowers spread around our law school, she writes a death
penalty manual for handling cases in Tennessee. She's just
remarkable.
Obviously, I'm very, very proud of our program, our
association. It is wonderful that you all are here. If there is
anything anybody in this building can do to make your visit
more enjoyable and more productive, just let us know. So
welcome and thank you.
NORMAN LEFSTEIN: Thank you very much, Dean
Blaze. I should have also mentioned that the Dean comes
1 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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from a clinical law background and has worked in legal
services and in public defense. And there aren't too many
Deans around the country who can make that claim. It's
my pleasure now to turn the program over to Mark
Stephens.
MARK STEPHENS: Well, good morning. I'm delighted
to be here and to have the opportunity to serve as
moderator of this panel; I look forward to their remarks.
But before we get started, I do want to take just a couple of
minutes. I'm kind of a child of the 1960s, and I am from
time to time reminded of Max Yasgur standing on the stage
screaming, "I'm a farmer," and then addressing the half a
million or so people that were there at Woodstock.
I was thinking yesterday that I am a public
defender. That's who I am-that's who I want to be. I'm so
lucky to have the job that I want to have. I don't want to do
anything else but this work. And yesterday, as I looked
around this room, I was just energized by the wonderful,
talented, and dedicated people who are here.
You know, this work that we do-not that I would
know-but I hear that people that run marathons say that at
some point you kind of hit this wall and you feel like you
can't go forward. And any of us who have done this work
for any length of time, we know there's those points where
you kind of hit a wall, and you think, I just don't know if
I'm going to be able to bring this home. And then you
come to a group like this, and you see giants in our field,
and you guys really are giants in the field. Norm Lefstein
knows more about this topic than probably anybody I
know. And as I was looking around I saw Bob
Boruchowitz. I see that Avis-Avis Buchanan-is here,
the head of PDS. PDS, the mother ship of public defender
offices is here for God's sake. And then there is Ed
Burnette. I don't know if you know Ed's background, but
you should talk to Ed about what happened to him in
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Chicago. And let me tell you, if there's anybody in this
room that has a bigger backbone than Ed Burnette, I want
to-I want to meet you because that guy's got something.
And so I just want to start off the day by saying that
I am proud to be in this room. I am proud to learn from the
folks that are here, the people who have dedicated their
lives and who are truly experts in this field. Before I go
any further, I would like to ask my staff who is here to
stand up. I would please ask the audience to recognize
them for the wonderful work that they do.
Now it's time to get started. We've got a panel here
of real experts. Max Bahner is going to kick things off.
I'm going to introduce Max here in a minute. Max is with
the firm of Chambliss, Bahner & Stophel, a law firm in
Chattanooga, who agreed to take my caseload litigation.
And then I'm going to speak a little bit about the effort in
Knoxville of caseload litigation. Rory Stein is here. Rory
is the Executive Assistant Public Defender and General
Counsel of the Miami Public Defender's Office. And for
those of us who have been in this business for any length of
time, we all know Bennett Brummer and what a leader in
this business Bennett has been. Carlos Martinez was
Bennett's right-hand man forever. Now Carlos has
assumed responsibility for running that office and has
designated Rory as his right-hand person. And so Rory
must be an outstanding individual, and I look forward to his
remarks. Rory is going to talk a little bit about the Miami
experience, which is similar to the Knox County
experience, although Rory has had chapters that are
different from what we've experienced, and I'm interested
to hear what he has to say about that.
Professor Cara Drinan is going to talk to us as well.
She is currently a professor at Catholic University in
Washington, D.C. She's been teaching since 2004; she's
done research that has focused on the death penalty and the
public defense reform. I recommend to you an article, The
122
7 Tennessee Journal of Law & Policy (Special Edition) 123
Third Generation of Indigent Defense Litigation,2 a 2009
article that Jerry Black gave me about eight or nine months
ago. It's a great read. I also understand that there will be
an article coming out this summer called The National
Right to Counsel Act, A Congressional Solution to the
Indigent Defense Crisis.3 And I recommend that to you
when it comes out. Cara is going to be talking a little bit
about her research in the area of public defender litigation
generally. She's going to give us a little more insight into
what's going on in Michigan and New York.
And then we're going to move to Adele Bernhard. I
didn't realize until last night that I actually know Adele.
I've been in her office.
ADELE BERNHARD: That's how old we all are.
MARK STEPHENS: Actually, I was in her husband's,
Peter Neufeld's, office and that other guy that he works
with. I can't remember what his name is. I was with Bob
Spangenberg in New York, and we were doing a site study
focusing on private lawyers who are appointed to do this
kind of work and performance standards and appointment
and all that process. Adele has been very involved in those
sorts of things. She worked with and ultimately chaired the
Indigent Defense Organizational Oversight Committee,
which monitored and evaluated the provision of indigent
defense services by organized providers in the Bronx and in
Manhattan.
What she is going to do is give us her thoughts on
the difficulties and practicality of litigation as a strategy to
control caseloads in the public defender's office. She's also
2 Cara H. Drinan, The Third Generation of Indigent Defense Litigation,
33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 427 (2009).
3 Cara H. Drinan, The National Right to Counsel Act, A Congressional
Solution to the Nation 's Indigent Defense Crisis, 47 HARVARD J. ON
LEGIS. 487 (2010).
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going to talk a little bit about whether there are other
strategies that we should be thinking about. And then any
other things that Adele wants to talk about I'm sure will
benefit us.
Let's get started. To kick off the program I'm going
to talk to you a little bit about Max Bahner. For those of
you who don't know the history, in 1987 Tennessee decided
that we needed to look seriously at the possibility of a
statewide public defender system. We were providing
counsel just through local appointments to private counsel.
Tennessee started a pilot program in 1987, and I don't know
the exact number-Gerald might know-that there were
eight, nine or ten, something like that, pilot programs.
After a couple of years, they decided that it was a cost-
effective way to provide services. In 1989, we went to a
statewide system.
People in Knoxville, being smarter than everybody
else in the rest of the state, decided that we didn't want to
participate in that program. So we really had a statewide
system except for Knox County. We had the law school,
and judges didn't have problems finding lawyers to handle
these cases, so Knox County opted out. A year later, we
decided we wanted to opt in and the Knox County Public
Defender's Office was born in 1990.
I don't know if this is true or not, but I think the
legislature was mad at us, because it staffed us with seven
lawyers in an office. While we're not the same size as
Nashville-Nashville had about thirty public defenders-
we had seven. Memphis, which is considerably larger than
Knoxville-maybe four or five times larger-had an office
of seventy lawyers. So from the very beginning, we've
been chasing caseload issues; from the day we were born,
so to speak. In fact, I was elected, I think, on August 2nd
or 3rd of 1990, and the very next day in court a judge
appointed me to a death penalty case. I wasn't even sworn
in until September 1 st. I didn't have an office. I didn't have
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a phone, and I didn't have a staff. He thought it was funny.
And so, eighteen months in we found ourselves in a
terrible predicament, and we filed a petition to suspend
appointments. I asked for a ninety-day reprieve. That was
going to solve my problem, and I got it. I walked out of
that courtroom thinking my problems were over-my
caseload issues were over-and I won't have to address this
again. But that didn't prove to be the case. And by 2006 I
was in big trouble. I was seeking counsel from some
people that I respect, particularly a gentleman named Bill
Redick, who's a lawyer in Nashville. Bill told me, "What
you need to do is to get a lawyer, and you need to let them
be the lawyer. Don't get you a lawyer and then tell the
lawyer how this lawsuit is going to be handled." And I
said, "Well, that sounds good. Do you have anybody in
mind?" And he said, "Yeah, I'll tell you exactly who you
need to get. You need to get Max Bahner." I said, "Well,
who the hell is Max Bahner?" I didn't know who Max
Bahner was.
I started talking to Bill a little bit about who Max
was, and I wound up getting Max Bahner. Everything Bill
said about him is true. I would like to read just briefly an
e-mail that Bill sent to me the other day when I told Bill I
had an opportunity to introduce Max. There is also a death
penalty twist to this, because Max Bahner did some
incredible work in the case of Michael McCormick, a man
who was convicted of murder in Tennessee and who was
given the death penalty. Max Bahner and his firm then
represented McCormick on post-conviction and won a new
trial for him. Then Mary Ann Green represented
McCormick back at his re-trial and he was acquitted. The
man is innocent, and-thanks to Max Bahner-is no longer
on death row. Bill Redick sent me this e-mail about Max,
and he said,
Because Max was on the Board of Directors of the
Capital Case Resource Center, and a senior partner in a
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major Tennessee firm, he was one of the first that we
looked at in our attempts to recruit major Tennessee firms
to take capital cases in Tennessee. Max responded to the
request as enthusiastically and appropriately as anyone we
recruited. He committed staff and firm resources to the
case as needed and worked on the case as it should be
worked. He had to deal with the fact that McCormick had
already been convicted and sentenced to death in an
innocence case that had never been investigated. And since
the case had never been investigated, Max had no
persuasive reason to know that McCormick was innocent.
Yet he and his staff rolled up their sleeves. They started
from scratch and they did the work. I had several
conversations with him and his staff as they worked the
case and approached this evidentiary hearing. On one
occasion, as they worked the case in anticipation of the
evidentiary hearing. Paul Morrell and I went to
Chattanooga and met with Max and his paralegal. I'm sorry
I can't remember her name but she did incredible work.
She was extremely talented. They approached the case
with a quote, "leave no stone unturned," attitude. If they
had not approached the case this way, Michael McCormick
would still be on death row. In my experience, I can't think
of a more classic example of a case in collateral litigation
in which the attorneys turned around a conviction and death
sentence of an innocent person.
Max Bahner, Jerry, I'll quit this in just a minute. I
don't want to take all of Max's time but-
MAX BAHNER: Take it.
MARK STEPHENS: Jerry Black tells a story-Jerry Black
has the ability to articulate what I felt all my career-I don't
know how he does this-but he tells a story about how
important the process is to people, to poor people who are
in our courts. It is extremely important that they believe
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that they're being represented by a quality lawyer who is
really fighting for them and who has their best interest at
heart, and that the judge is giving them a fair hearing. The
process is important. If they believe that the process is fair,
then they'll buy into the result. Whether they like it or not,
they'll buy it if they believe they were treated fairly.
Well, I have the privilege of experiencing that
because when I walk into court I know I have got a great
lawyer. I know that he's prepared, and I know that he's
going to fight like hell. I hope we win. So far we're okay.
We're still breathing. We don't have an order that I can
walk away with, but I know that the process is being
handled the way a professional lawyer is supposed to
handle this process. So I'm able to experience in a very real
way some of the concerns that we have about our clients.
So, I've already taken too much time, but it's my great
privilege to introduce to you Max Bahner, and I look
forward to his remarks. Max?
MAX BAHNER: Within the world of the law there are
several worlds, and the world of public defenders is a world
of which I was never acquainted really until I learned from
Mark Stephens and from Norm Lefstein, with whom I have
had the great privilege of spending a lot of time. I feel like
I am a pigmy among giants. Because the more I have
gotten to know what you public defenders go through, the
loads that you carry, the walls you climb, the fierce winds
which are in your face constantly, the more I admire what
you do. I salute you because in what you do. You do
something for me and for every other citizen of this great
country of ours because you stand for what constitutional
rights have to be enforced,--case by case in the small
comers of time-and I really do admire you.
My perspective is very different from yours, and I
hope that what I have to say in these few minutes will spark
some interest. I think you will probably disagree severely
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with some of the things I say, but I hope you will think
about them after we are through here. I've practiced now
for a little over fifty years and am just beginning to learn.
People keep asking me when I'm going to retire and I say,
"Well, when I get it all right." And I have not ever gotten it
all right. I hope that sometime, if I reach the age of my
senior partner who is ninety-nine-will be 100 in
October-and still comes to the office five days a week-
although he's in the hospital right now and I'm very worried
about that-but he has stood for what is right. Jack
Chambliss has preached since I have known him, that we
are all priests at the bar of justice. We have a calling far
beyond what we articulate when we take the oath of office
to become a licensed lawyer.
One of the things that we have emphasized in our
firm, as long as I have been there, is that we represent
clients and the cases on which we work. I am trial lawyer.
The case is not my case. It is never my case. It is always
the client's case. I must never forget that, and we don't let
people in the office forget that. If somebody comes back
from court and says, "I won," one of us is going to be in his
face and say, "No, you didn't win. You were a part of a
team that won." You may have tried it by yourself, but you
had an assistant, and you had other people in the office you
could call on for help. It is the client's case, and each client
has to be treated differently.
One of the things that shocked me when I began to
learn about the operation of Mark's office is that if you take
the sheer numbers and divide the numbers by the number of
lawyers he has, each lawyer has roughly thirty minutes to
take care of the interview, the investigation, the thinking,
the studying of the case, and the trial, if a trial is necessary,
for each of those persons assigned to her. That's
impossible. We couldn't do that. We would never do that.
We would be guilty of malpractice if we tried to do that in
our firm.
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In Mark's case, we got some outstanding criminal
defense lawyers to come and testify as witnesses, in
addition to Jerry Black, who is outstanding for many
reasons. But they said they would never take on such a
caseload. And how you all do it is something beyond my
imagining. My perspective on excessive caseloads is
influenced by my experience as a young lawyer in my first
twenty years of practice. Indigent defendants were
assigned to lawyers on a rotating basis, and I kept doing
this until about 1979 or 1980 when I went to the court and
asked to be taken off the list for various reasons. But in
each of those cases, I learned that I had to go to the jail,
interview the person, and investigate the facts, because
sometimes my client knew exactly what she or he was
talking about. Most of them were men because they were
in the jail there, and then I had to do some research-
because I didn't know criminal law, although I had a great
teacher in law school. Then I had to go try the case or
bargain.
One of the things that I learned was that people I
thought were guilty, if put to trial were not always found
guilty whether or not they were guilty. Juries do interesting
things. But if you challenge the prosecution's case,
frequently you can find that there are weaknesses in it
which result in a defendant's verdict. And those people
walk. I have seen people I represented who walked who I
was as sure as I am standing here today were guilty. I've
also had some people who I was appointed to defend who
said they weren't guilty, and I thought they were. But as I
investigated the case, I learned that they were not guilty, in
my mind. And we tried the cases, and mirabile dictu, in a
lot of those cases there was a defendant's verdict. Juries are
pretty savvy, if you get to the jury. If you have done your
homework and try the case well, then those people get to
walk. I think that is very, very important for the system.
Now how you all do it with the caseloads that you have to
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deal with is beyond me. But the point I am trying to make
is that we have got to change the system, as I understand it,
because we're talking about people's lives. When a person
pleads to a felony-or any crime when they're not guilty-
just because they want to get out of jail and want to go
home, they don't realize the implications of what they're
doing and how that is going to hang like a very heavy
necklace around their lives as long as they live. I don't
think we can do that to people. I think that we have to treat
each person as a person. We have to get them to participate
in the cases in which we are representing them, because it's
their case. It's not our case no matter what our caseload is.
One of my doctors was talking to me about some
surgery that he thought I ought to have. And I was grilling
him, he was grilling me back, and we were having one of
those rough exchanges you have sometimes when a doctor
is telling you something that you don't want to hear. And
he said, as we concluded our conversation, that he was glad
I had challenged him. So many times, my doctor said in
fact, most of his patients would say to him, "Whatever you
say, doc, whatever you think." And he said that's not the
way it's supposed to be. He said it's your body and your
life. I think in the case of each of these people we're
appointed to represent, it's their lives and we have to bring
them into the process.
One of my perspectives on excessive caseloads is
influenced by my having been fortunate to be a member of
the ABA Ethics Committee which wrote the opinion with
which you are all familiar. I pulled out-in preparing these
remarks today-some of the correspondence I got from the
public defender in Los Angeles and some other large cities.
Norm and Mark have seen some of that correspondence.
There were several pages devoted to why in the world we
should not do this, but we did. I think, as things have
played out, that every one of us on the ethics committee
was proud of that opinion, and thought it might make a
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difference. But I have decided that the heads of public
defender offices decided that they were going to ignore that
opinion until they were forced to acknowledge what is said
in that opinion. I would like to encourage some of you to
do what Mark has done and take this on. I realize that there
are limited resources. The world is made up of limited
resources. We're learning that even air quality and water
quality are limited resources. There is a tension between
funding and not funding the defense of indigent criminals
and for the whole judicial system. But I think that we have
to learn to do things differently, and we may need to go
back to involving more of the private bar in defending
indigent criminals even without paying them.
The place I went to law school had inscribed over
the door a phrase which is indelibly a part of my soul,
"That those alone may be servants of the law who labor
with learning, courage and devotion to preserve liberty and
promote justice." I think all lawyers, public defenders,
prosecutors, and private practitioners have that duty. I
think you will find-if you look-that there are resources
yet to be tapped to help deal with the situation. As a
lawyer-except when I have those lights going on in front
of me, a yellow light and an orange light and a red light-
sometimes I talk too long, and I'm going to skip a lot of
what I would otherwise have said.
In closing, I want to say something that I hope may
be helpful to you, in which I read for the first time just two
or three weeks ago-some remarks Robert Kennedy made
when he was talking to a law school class in Cape Town,
South Africa. These are his words, "Each time a man
stands for an ideal or acts to improve the lot of others, or
strikes out against injustice, he sends forth a tiny ripple of
hope, and crossing each other from a million different
centers of energy and daring, these ripples build a current
which can sweep down the mightiest walls of oppression
and resistance." That is what I think all of you are involved
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in, and my hat is off to you. Thank you.
MARK STEPHENS: Thank you, Max. I want to start off
now telling you just a little bit about the Knoxville
experience, and then we'll move to Rory who will take it
from there with the Miami experience. In 2006, we had
caseloads that were completely out of control in my office.
And I decided, at that point, that I was going to approach
the judges and tell them that I couldn't continue to take
appointments. I started gathering data, because I knew that
the judges were going to be asking questions, and I needed
to be able to provide them with the material. I discovered
in June 2006 that our data were not in the shape that they
needed to be in. There is a state statute that defines what a
case is in Tennessee. Our data processing capability didn't
match the State's definition of a case. I don't count by their
definition the work that we have in the office. That's
because, in my view, I think that the statute is structured in
such a way as to save the State the most amount of money
when it comes to paying private lawyers. For instance, if a
client walks into a Wal-Mart parking lot and breaks into
cars and is charged with fifty different offenses-that's one
case as far as the Supreme Court is concerned. As we
know, in terms of workload, that's a heck of a lot more
work than one case. Traditionally, what we had always
done is that we would count charges instead of cases, and
so I knew that there would be a problem there. So we had
to start reassessing our ability to count our cases.
Unfortunately, I wound up spending almost a full
calendar year converting our data into something that I felt
was reliable, and I thought would be able to answer all the
questions that they had. Then I went through the process of
listening to Bill Redick and going to Max Bahner. I still
remember that first day I walked into Max's office, and he
came into the conference room. I introduced myself to
him, and told him that I needed a lawyer to represent me in
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caseload litigation that I want to file-and that I don't have
any money. I thought that would be the end of the meeting.
Two and a half hours later-I think Max was on his
twenty-fifth page of notes that he was taking-and he said,
"There are some associates that I want to talk to and get
their counsel and we'll probably be calling you back for
another session because I'm sure there are things that I've
missed." And that happened. I later met Hugh Moore and
Aaron Love, two of his lawyers that work with him. And
then a month later he called me and said that he had taken
this matter before his partners and they had agreed to
represent us. We were off and running.
One of the first things we did was to contact the
judges and ask them if they would sit down and talk with
us. I think that was important. I think it's important to
begin the process with a dialogue with the judges. But I
think there are some things you need to know, and you
probably already do know. That is that the judges-well,
hope I don't offend too many people-but judges don't care
about anything other than if you don't do the work who is,
and who the hell is going to pay them, and how much
trouble am I going to get in when I give you the relief that
you ask for and I start authorizing private lawyers to handle
these cases, and the AOC has to pay the bill. I don't think
it is true that what the courts are really concerned about is
the quality of representation we afford our clients. I'm not
taking pot shots at them. If they were sitting in this room I
would tell them this, and I probably already have told them
this a time or two. I just don't think what matters to them
matters to us. And I think that in some of these discussions
we had with the judges I was just off because I assumed
they had a context that was similar to mine about the
discussion that they don't have.
Now, one of the things I've heard judges say at one
point is if one lawyer has ten then that can be handled a lot
quicker than ten lawyers handling ten cases. When I start
133
7 Tennessee Journal of Law & Policy (Special Edition) 134
talking about how I can't do this work and we need to get
private lawyers involved, their concerns are how much
extra time is it going to mean that I'm going to have to sit
on the bench and who is going pay for all of this. And so,
the conversations that we had didn't go exactly how I had
hoped they would go. Then, in the course of that
conversation, they play so many games with you. They
say, "Mark, you're a really good lawyer. In your office,
you've got a great staff, and they are doing fantastic work.
The results that they're getting are"--I don't necessarily
believe that they think it's true, but that's a tactic that they
start to use with you to try to get you to back off. They
give you this false sense that you are providing quality
representation. The other thing that I think is important to
understand is judges don't know what quality representation
is. At least in our jurisdiction, if you're not a prosecutor,
you're not a judge. They've never been defense lawyers
before; they don't understand what you do or what you
believe you have to do or why you would have to do it for
that matter. It's just not something that they comprehend or
appreciate. They think that defense lawyers do the same
things that prosecutors do. So, as hopeful as I was that we
would be able to have a meaningful discussion about
delivering quality services to clients just didn't happen.
I still would recommend to you that you have that
discussion. If nothing else, it's an educational process that
you could go through. In those discussions, the attorney
general asked to participate, because there were grave
financial consequences to what I was proposing, and so he
wanted to come in as counsel for the Administrative Office
of the Courts, or AOC. It is the arm of the judiciary that
winds up handling a fairly large indigent defense fund that
pays private lawyers to do this work. If I were given the
relief that I asked for, private lawyers would be appointed,
and it would cost the AOC more money. And so, the
attorney general decided that gave him standing to appear
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and take an adversarial position to what it is we were trying
to do.
If you do this, you need to consider what your
position is going to be relative to the attorney general,
because I guarantee you, they're going to want to get
involved. Ed is here and maybe he can correct me if I'm
wrong. I think in Kentucky they decided to let the attorney
general in. I think in Miami you guys decided to let the
attorney general in, I think. Initially, we were able to
dodge that bullet, Max. Our sessions court judges decided
that this was not an adversarial proceeding, and so there
was no question as to whether the attorney general was
going to be deemed a party or not. And then the court
really helped us. I guarantee you that it was accidental.
They hadn't thought about actually helping us. What they
told the attorney general is that you can do whatever you
want to do. You can participate in the hearing, offer proof,
cross-examine witnesses, argue, and do whatever you want
but not as a party. If you have information that you want
the court to know about, we want to hear it, but I'm not
going to deem that you're a party. The attorney general
was uncomfortable with that position, because he/she didn't
know that if they got an unfavorable ruling what he/she
would be able to do in terms of appealing an unfavorable
ruling. When the meetings with the judges got us
absolutely nowhere, we decided to go ahead, file our
petition, and move forward with the hearing.
Some things that I think you'll have to do if you
have a hearing is you're going to have to have good data. I
mean, you have to be able to answer every single question
they might present to you in terms of what your lawyers'
caseloads are and how you're counting things. Each
jurisdiction, I suspect, is going to have its own little unique
things.
Here in Knox County, Tennessee, we have
something called general sessions courts, which hear both
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felony and misdemeanor cases. The judges only have
misdemeanor jurisdiction, but the felony cases go through
there as well. It's a little complicated. But every single
case that starts by the issuance of an arrest warrant goes
through sessions court. A good bit of things get filtered out
of sessions court and only a small percentage of the cases
actually go to criminal court. But because of our staffing
we practiced horizontal representation. I had lawyers
assigned to the felony division of sessions court. And
when that case passed through and went to criminal court, I
had new lawyers picking it upstairs- because we didn't
have enough staff to do vertical representation-which is
obviously the preferred method. There was a question
about how I was counting my case. Was I counting a case
in felony sessions court as one and then when that case
went to criminal court was I counting it again? Was I
double-dipping so to speak, in the counting process? So
you have to be ready to handle that. There were issues
about conflict cases. When I "conflicted off' a case did I
count that as a case or did I discount it? There's going to be
those things that you're going to have to think about in the
process of assembling your data, so that you can make sure
that you are able to answer all the questions that they'll
have for you.
I think the other thing you have to do on these cases
is to talk about the national caseload standards. I don't
disagree with Norm when he says they don't mean
anything, but judges don't know what you're talking about
when you talk about caseload standards. You have to
provide some context. If you think that the context is going
to all be subjective, I just think you're making a mistake.
The judge is not going to let me define for them what a
public defender is in my office-they're just not going to
do that. What is a reasonable caseload and what's not? I
cannot give them any sort of external support for where I
came up with these numbers. Consequently, I just don't
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think you can avoid a conversation about national caseload
standards. I agree that these standards don't mean anything
to me. They don't mean anything to the judges. However
it was helpful to hear that the national standards say you
can handle X and my lawyers are handling four times X.
That was helpful.
I think if you're going to do this, you have to have
complete buy-in from your staff. I think sort of like a
borderline personality disorder will do. Judges want to
divide and conquer. So they'll be in the back halls grabbing
their favorite public defender and trying to get them to
admit that we really don't have the problem that Stephens
says we're having, or he's trying to create some office that
we don't really need to create. They're going to try to do
that, so I think you need to make sure that your entire staff
is on board with what it is you're doing. I don't mean just
telling everybody that they're on board. I mean, you've to
do a good bit of educating, I think, to make sure that they
understand why you're doing it, and they have to buy in.
Then, when you get ready to file the pleadings, I
think you have to offer individual concrete examples of
what your lawyers can't do. Don't assume that the judges
understand any of it. In our hearing, we painstakingly had
to explain to them what a defense lawyer does and what
they don't do in my office because of the caseload problems
that are imposed on them. And so I think it's very
important in my case. By the way, pdknox.org4 is a
website that will allow you to go and see all of our
pleadings. We attached affidavits to our pleadings from
every lawyer in our office that explained what their
situation is.
I think you have to rely on national experts. Norm
came in, and I still have a judge who every time he sees me
kids me about Norm's credentials. They were so blown
away when we went through all of things that Norm had
4 Public Defender 6th Judicial District, Http://pdknox.org.
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accomplished in his career and his expertise that they still
kid me about "why don't you get your expert to go do"
because he can do everything else. They still give me that
little smart-ass remark of theirs. Then I think what was
most important is that we went to the private bar, and Jerry
was our expert from the law school. And I think it's really
important to get that sort of-those two made a great pair
in terms of the experts that we had. Then, finally, we had
private lawyers to go and look at our caseload. We picked
five of the more prominent lawyers here in Knoxville who
reviewed our pleadings, reviewed the affidavits of the
lawyers, and then gave their opinion about whether or not
they could provide effective assistance of counsel with our
caseload.
We had an absolutely fantastic hearing, and we
waited about six years, it seems like, and received a three-
page order. Actually, it's two and a half pages. It is so
poorly written and thought out that I wanted to share with
you just a couple of the highlights of this opinion. This
opinion actually says, "The public defender constitutes
professional standards require that attorneys representing
those accused of crimes to meet certain performance
measures." That's one of their great lines. And then they
said, "We find that attorneys in the public defender's office
carry caseloads that exceed national criminal justice
standards and goals. The Court does not conclude,
however, that the caseload is such a level as to violate the
accused the right to have competent counsel under either
the United States Constitution or the Constitution of the
State of Tennessee." And here's why, "Because the
courts-the actual caseload of the public defender's
office-has been declining for the last two years, and the
public defender has sought and received relief in the form
of the suspension of appointments in two other courts."
And then they say, "But now they're taking those cases
again," so they don't explain why that is still a basis for
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finding that we don't have a problem. And then they
conclude their opinion with, "It is incumbent upon those of
us in the criminal justice system to strive to reach the goals
and standards wherever possible." I really think that's
funny that they would say that. And then they say this, "It
is the mission of this Court to continue to monitor caseload
numbers and review them on a systemic calendar quarter to
see that caseloads are manageable and that effective
representation of all defendants is achieved." You lose.
And so our three-year effort concluded with this piece of
crap.
Then they took it a step further and a step beyond
that. So let me pass it to Rory.
RORY STEIN: Well, I think Florida judges look
amazingly brilliant compared to those judges. Just by way
of background, obviously everyone knows that Gideon
came from Florida. And as a response to the Gideon case,
Florida actually created one of the first statewide public
defender systems. It now has twenty elected public
defenders, and they are all constitutional officers.
However, proper funding of the public defender's office has
been an issue since the creation of the system. I think one
of the first workload related cases is thirty-two years old.
So that gives you an idea about how long this battle has
been going on in Florida.
During the four years leading up to 2008, we found
that our caseload had increased about twenty-nine percent.
And in the two years leading up to 2008, our budget was
cut by 14 percent. Those two trends created a significant
crisis in our office. Since 96 percent of our budget goes to
salaries, we realized that the only way we were going to
keep pace, at least from a budgetary perspective, was not to
replace the people who were leaving the office. That just
made the caseloads even worse.
For the six months leading up to June 2008, we did
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what Mark had done. We got together with the judges and
asked them for help. We realized that there were limited
things that they could do. We spoke with our prosecutor
and talked with them a lot about the things that Bob
Boruchowitz mentioned yesterday about perhaps not
prosecuting cases concerning driving with a suspended
license and things of that nature. None of that worked. I
mean the judges offered to conduct plea blitzes, which I
don't know how that would be helpful to the clients we
represented. It would just essentially give away the
courthouse and have everyone plead guilty. So we knew
we had a problem on our hands. That's when we
approached the lawyers at Hogan & Hartson. I think this
came up yesterday. We realized that while we probably
knew more about our workload than anyone else did-and
that we felt comfortable with our ability to advocate in
court-we also realized that if we went in, there might be
some people who would brand this as just more public
defender whining.
So we approached Hogan & Hartson and Parker
Thompson, who is the senior partner down in Miami.
When you think of liberty's last champion or the defenders
of liberty, these people have been amazing. We couldn't be
where we are-which is still right now without any relief-
without them. I just want to mention them quickly. Parker
Thompson, Julie Nivens, Al Lindsey, and Matt Bray have
given us hundreds and hundreds of hours of labor. In fact,
we had a lengthy conference call last night talking more
strategy.
In June of 2008, we went ahead and filed a motion
to decline appointments in noncapital cases. We had the
chief judge consolidate these cases. At the time, we were
concerned about a Florida statute, which Norm mentioned
yesterday, that the legislature has enacted that essentially
says that excessive workload can never be a basis for a
conflict. There we were saying that our workload was too
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high, but the statute provides terms under which you can't
withdraw from a case. We figured that the statute didn't
apply to us, because we were not withdrawing from
anything. We were keeping the cases we had. We just
wanted to decline future appointments in those cases.
We had the hearing, and we actually won. The
judge ruled in our favor, finding that our caseloads violated
any standard that was known. Unfortunately, that order
was stayed immediately, and it went up to the 3rd District
Court of Appeals.5 I know that a lot of people in this room
have read that opinion. Essentially, it paved some new
ground in a number of different areas. The first thing was
that, at the time of the hearing, the judge had ruled that the
state was not a party, meaning that the state attorney's
office was not a party to this litigation. However, the judge
allowed the state attorney to participate as a kind of friend
of the court, and the participation really was on the same
level as a party. We were all cross-examined. There was
lots of discovery in the case. They were allowed to submit
all the papers they wanted. The 3rd District essentially
confirmed that the state attorney did actually have standing
to litigate these workload issues, which I think presents an
interesting question as to whether the prosecutor should
have a hand in deciding the lawyer for the person that
they're prosecuting. Nevertheless, the 3rd District ruled
that they did have standing.
The 3rd District said that bar rules apply only to
individual attorneys and not to the office as a whole. Even
though we had litigated, the ABA opinion-which said that
Bennett Brummer, who was the public defender at that
time, had an obligation to do what he was doing-the 3rd
District didn't say a word about it. They also said that there
was no difference between withdrawal and declining
appointments. I thought that was kind of interesting. It
5 State v. Pub. Defender, Eleventh Judicial District, 12 So.3d 798 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
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made me think that it's pretty tough to get divorced without
ever getting married first, but they didn't see that
distinction.
Lastly, the court said that there really was no magic
number above which lawyers could not be effective and
below which they could be effective. They said essentially
that if you were going to utilize numbers, you certainly
couldn't utilize them in the aggregate. At the time that we
filed the motion, we basically divided all of our noncapital
felony cases by all the lawyers who ever actually touched
or looked at the case, and the caseloads were somewhere
between 400 and 500. By a couple of months after the
litigation, it hit 500 and went over 500. The court basically
said you can't do it as an office. You have to do it on an
individual case-by-case basis, which frankly was of
significant concern to us. One of the things that we
realized going into this litigation-and it continues to this
day-is that the amount of work that's necessary to put on
workload litigation-particularly when the state attorney is
a party in the case-is absolutely enormous. Since we had
so many lawyers who had excessive caseloads handling
these kinds of cases, we knew right then that when the 3rd
District decided that there was just no way that we would
have the ability to prosecute all of those workload litigation
cases on a case-by-case basis.
So what we did was to pick one. We essentially
found a felony lawyer who had one of the worst caseloads
in the office, and I chose him because he was a lawyer with
thirty-seven years of experience. I thought that if a lawyer
of thirty-seven years couldn't handle this caseload, then
nobody could. So, we went ahead and did a thorough
analysis of his caseload. We found out a couple of things
that were actually pretty startling. He was assigned to 778
new felony cases that year. He had 590 felonies and 180
new probation violation cases. So when those cases were
coupled with the cases he had going into the year, he was
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required to handle about 970 felony cases. These felony
cases did have penalties that were as high as life
imprisonment. I thought Bob's presentation yesterday was
pretty helpful and significant when you think about what
that work actually means.
When you're talking about the number of days
people actually work, subtract weekends, holidays and
things like that, that meant that he was responsible for four
felony cases every day. He had 164 pending cases at the
time we filed the motion. So what we did was to file the
motion to withdraw in about fifty cases. The judge asked
us if we would just proceed on one case, because he knew
that if we had to demonstrate a prejudice-and we were
planning on demonstrating prejudice-that this would be a
very lengthy hearing if we had to do it in fifty cases. So he
asked us to do it in one case. The state attorney again
participated.
One of the things that became quite apparent was all
of the negative connotations and experiences that come out
of having a high caseload. In our justice system, it is
completely common for judges to make plea offers at the
time of arraignment. They do that, because the caseload is
so high, and it's their caseload control mechanism. We
found out that the lawyer involved pled 210 cases at
arraignment, which was particularly dismaying for us. We
have an office policy that says that you shouldn't plead
cases at arraignment, but we have an ethical obligation to
convey the plea to the client. At the time that those pleas
are conveyed, the only thing that the lawyer knows about
that case is an arrest warrant. And we all know that no one
has ever seen an arrest warrant that says that I illegally
searched the defendant and got some drugs, or here are all
the witnesses who say that the defendant didn't do it. And
so 210 cases were pled without any investigation being
done whatsoever and without any ability by this lawyer to
actually counsel this client.
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Florida is rare also in that we have criminal
depositions. We're one of the few states in the country that
have criminal depositions, although they restrict the
number of witnesses that you can depose. The lawyer
involved deposed more than 400 witnesses during the
year-which was a lot of depositions-but he was not able
to depose almost 1,500 witnesses because of the caseload
that he had.
The bottom line is that we focused in on the three
ethical requirements that we thought were obviously key:
competence, diligence, and communication. And in the
case that we were dealing with-which was the sale of
drugs within 1,000 feet of a school which bears a penalty of
life imprisonment in Florida, or thirty years I should say-
the record reflected that the lawyer was able to do
essentially nothing for that client. He had not been able to
talk to any of the witnesses or to interview the client. He
filed no pre-trial motions. There was a confidential
informant involved. He wasn't able to move to disclose the
confidential informant. There was essentially nothing that
he could do.
One of the battles in the hearing-which had
occurred in the first case also-was exactly what level of
prejudice did we have to prove. The state had taken the
position-even though they don't nominally call it that-
they didn't say they were saying that the Strickland6
prejudice was required-but that's all they argued was that
Strickland prejudice was required-in order to demonstrate
that a conflict should be granted. We took the position that,
because Strickland's prejudice stand is there to protect the
finality of convictions, it was something less: a substantial
risk of future harm.
The long and short of it is that we actually won
again. The judge granted our motion and decided that
because of this particular lawyer's workload, he was not
6 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
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able to provide competent assistance to this particular
client. The judge found that the statute-the one that said
that excessive workload could not be the basis for a
conflict-was constitutional, because he said that it could
be a factor but not the sole reason. We had demonstrated
prejudice, because the workload was such that he could not
adequately represent that client. Now that case is up on
appeal, too.
I think I mentioned yesterday, the first case-after it
was sitting in the Supreme Court for ten months-the
Supreme Court yesterday granted certiorari in the case. So
we'll be litigating some of the issues that were in the first
case. Going forward, I think there are a few things that are
absolutely important to know if you're considering
workload litigation.
I agree with Mark. Data integrity is probably the
most important thing going forward. If you don't have a
computer system that can help you analyze a person's
caseload when you're thinking about whether the workload
is excessive, you can't win these cases. We have our own
database. We did a comparison of our database with the
court's database in terms of the accuracy of the statistics.
We found that there were hundreds of cases in the court's
database which reflected that there was no counsel or
record when in fact we were the lawyer on the case.
Through this litigation, we established that our database
was more accurate, and that helped us win.
The second thing is if you have a liberal public
records law in your state, you are going to get lots of public
records requests if you're going to be talking about
workload. That takes a lot of time to respond to. In our
case, we had to provide the state attorney's office with more
than a million records in response to their public records
request. It takes a lot of time; you've got to respond to it.
There are going to be questions about your management.
In Florida, there are some great cases that say that it's not
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the job of the courts to interfere with the management of a
public defender's office, yet Bennett in the first case and
Carlos Martinez had to answer questions about how we use
our resources. For example, why do we have lawyers in a
particular place? Why do we have lawyers doing training
instead of handling a larger caseload?
You're going to run across some resistance from
staff. The lawyers who are working in your offices are
underpaid, altruistic, public-spirited, motivated people who
are trying to do the best they can for their clients. To
suggest to them that despite all of those good efforts,
they're not really doing what the Sixth Amendment 7 talks
about is a pretty tough sell. We had some issues with a
lawyer that we were going forward with. He was
completely cooperative with us, but he had been a lawyer
for thirty-seven years, and he had a lot of success in the
courts and people respected him. For him to say that
notwithstanding his best efforts he wasn't able to do the job
that the Sixth Amendment 8 anticipates is a pretty tough
thing for a lawyer to accept.
You also get some staff indifference, and it's very
difficult to get them to buy in. We have been at this for
two years, and we haven't had a drop of relief yet. Both
orders were stayed by the appellate court. The lawyers in
your office tend to think that this isn't about them; it's about
the administration. And they may think that you're just
grandstanding. The truth is, it reminds me of when I was in
undergraduate school, and they raised our activity fee
because they were going to build some building that wasn't
going to be finished until after I graduated. Okay? And
this is pretty much the same thing it's turning out. That you
may not actually help the clients that the motions are
directed at-or the lawyers who are representing those
clients-but at some point in time you're working towards
7 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
8id.
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the creation of more livable standards for the lawyers and
the clients.
Finally, depending upon what your system is, you
can expect some payback, and I mean in a negative way.
We just went through the legislative session in Florida. It
finished at the end of April. There was a proposal up there
that was never actually introduced, but it came about
probably as a direct consequence of the litigation. It said
that because you can't handle these third-degree felony
cases, a private firm attempted-through a political
connection there-to introduce a provision for a low-
bid/no-bid contract, which would have allowed them to
handle these third-degree felony cases at about five times
the cost of what the state was paying us. They insisted that
the money come from our budget as opposed to a private
source. It would have devastated the office. We would
have had to lay off two-thirds of our employees.
Fortunately, that provision did not pass. But this is not an
issue that's going to go away anytime soon, and we expect
next year we're going to have to fight the same battle.
Even though some of these things sound a little bit
grim, I can tell you that most of the team in the office are
pretty darn proud of the fact that we have stood up to fight
for what we think is the most important thing-a client-
centered practice, their Sixth Amendment 9 rights, and an
effort to assure that our lawyers are able to meet their
constitutional, ethical, and professional obligations. Thank
you.
CARA DRINAN: Good morning. My name is Cara
Drinan. I've had the pleasure of meeting many of you. But
for those of you who I have not met, I'm a law professor at
Catholic University in Washington, D.C. I'm really
delighted to be here and to learn from so many folks who
are in practice and others in the academy. Thank you to
9 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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Norm for including me. I have to say that the dialogue at
this conference has been a little bit freer-shall we say,
than most of the conferences that I attend-so that's been a
refreshing change of pace.
I research and write primarily in the field of public
defense reform. My task today is to talk about the use of
systemic litigation to address excessive workloads. So
what I want to do toward that end is three things. First, I'll
talk a little bit about systemic litigation to address public
defense reform generally-just to provide some context.
Second, I'll give an assessment of this type of litigation. If
we're thinking about using it to address excessive
workloads, how effective is it? And I'll do that by talking
about the pending suits in Michigan and New York. Third,
I'll conclude with the notion that excessive workloads are a
necessary but not sufficient condition for a successful
systemic suit. So I'll come back to that idea at the end.
Before I jump into the substance of my topic, I just
want to mention a caveat. In the interest of time today, I'll
be abbreviating some issues that I think are really important
including, for example, the history and trajectory of this
type of litigation-some of the detailed issues that I'll
allude to. Georgia has kindly made available on the flash
drive the law review article that Mark mentioned. So, for
those of you who are contemplating a systemic suit, that's
available and, of course, I'm happy to talk about this
endlessly with those who are interested.
So with that said, let me turn to providing some
general information about public defense systemic
litigation. One scholar has defined this type of litigation as
a sustained pattern of cases against large power structures
invoking the power of the courts to oversee detailed
injunctive relief. Sometimes you hear it called institutional
or public law litigation. As you know, impact attorneys
have relied upon this litigation to address a number of
social concerns: prison conditions, school segregation, and
148
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employment discrimination. It's been effective in that
regard. But historically, systemic challenges to public
defense systems have not been common. A 2000 Harvard
Law Review article estimated that there had been no more
than ten of these suits between 1980 and 2000.10 I actually
think that number is too high if one thinks about what they
truly call systemic litigation-something that's proactive,
that seeks more than individualized relief. So there haven't
been a lot of these suits. That's the first point.
In my scholarship, I talk about these suits. I divide
them into what I call first- and second-generation suits.
What are first-generation suits? Well, they came up
essentially in the context of one suit, one individual
defendant. Either the defendant or defense counsel sought
individual relief on the basis of systemic flaws. For the
most part, these first-generation suits were few in number,
and they were not very effective at generating lasting
reform. As I said, I talk about this in my scholarship. In
the interest of time today, I'm going to focus on what I call
second-generation suits. So what do I call second-
generation suits?
In the last ten to fifteen years, impact attorneys,
defender organizations, private counsel acting in a pro bono
capacity, and many of the organizations that are
represented here today have brought suits challenging state
and county public defense systems across the country.
What do these suits look like? Well, for the most part,
they're state court class actions challenging objective
criteria such as excessive caseloads, a lack of hiring and
training criteria, rates of compensation, and particular
administrative structures. The legal theory of these cases is
that because of these systemic flaws-these structural
factors-the public defense system regularly violates the
10 Note: Gideon's Promise Unfulfilled: The Need for Litigated Reform
ofIndigent Defense, 113 HARV. L. REV. 2062, 2074, n. 93 (2000).
149
7 Tennessee Journal of Law & Policy (Special Edition) 150
constitutional rights of its clients. That's the theory. They
are not aggregated ineffective assistance of counsel claims,
despite what defendants in these suits said.
The most recent suits of this kind, Michigan and
New York included, have argued that the states have
abdicated their constitutional responsibility by delegating
the defense function and its funding, in many instances, to
the counties. So we've seen successful suits of this kind
now in Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Montana,
Massachusetts, Washington, and as I said today, the suits
are ongoing in Michigan and New York. As you know
now, as Jim mentioned yesterday, both of these suits have
recently survived motions to dismiss. I'll say more about
those two suits later in my talk.
These more successful second-generation suits, if
you will, share some common attributes that we can learn
from, and there are five in particular. As I said, I don't
have time today to talk about all five of these attributes, but
I do want to mention them and say a few words about at
least one or two of them.
The first common attribute that is now I think a
familiar theme is the idea that litigation is a last resort.
Right? So successful second-generation suits were brought
in jurisdictions where other efforts had already been made
and litigation truly was a last resort. In Duncan v. State,
11
for example, the plaintiffs complaint demonstrated/alleged
that no less than five commissions and task forces since
1978 had examined and condemned public defense services
across the state, and that defendants in that case knew of
those reports and basically ignored them.
There are two reasons why the litigation as a last
resort dynamic is important. The first one is obvious.
Michigan and New York just survived motions to dismiss,
and they're three years into the litigation process. So these
11 Complaint, Duncan v. State, No. 07-000242-CZ (Mich. Cir. Ct.
Ingham County, Feb. 22, 2007).
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suits are time-consuming and expensive. It obviously
behooves litigants to explore options before bringing a
systemic claim in court. There's a second reason why
litigation as a last resort is important and that is that it's
much easier to ask a court that might be inclined to think of
public defense reform as inherently a legislative task. It's
easier to ask that court for relief if the litigants can show
that the legislature has known about and basically ignored
the public defense problem for a long time. So that's the
first common attribute to these more successful suits.
Litigation is a last resort.
The second common attribute-I won't say much
about because others have alluded to it already-is that
these suits are marked by system wide proof of actual harm
to clients. As Rory was just saying, what you need is to be
able to point to a client whose case actually would have or
might have come out differently had that client had
adequate representation. That sounds basic, but suits of
this kind in Minnesota and Mississippi were rejected for
exactly this reason because of their failure to empirically
demonstrate systemic flaws as opposed to what a court
might be tempted to view as idiosyncratic harms. There's a
lot more we can say about this dynamic of the fact that
proof is key. But I would just mention that one of the
things that we know is that collaboration between the
attorneys who are on the ground handling these cases and
outside organizations who can put together these empirical
data is really vital. So it's the second element idea that
these suits share-this idea of systemic proof.
The third is the notion of strategic procedural
decisions. Again, this could be a talk in its own right, so
I'll be brief. Successful second-generation suits share the
fact that they reflect strategic procedural decisions. What
could I mean by that? Well, for example, they have
carefully and thoughtfully selected the named plaintiffs.
There was mention yesterday of the New York Times
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article 12 on the Hurrell-Harring13 named plaintiffs. The
article was great, but, more importantly, the plaintiffs were
great. They were run-of-the-mill people who were
relatable to the average individual on the street, and it was
obvious that if they had a lawyer they wouldn't have gone
to jail for the crimes that they had committed or not
committed. So careful selection of named plaintiffs is
important. The trend is toward naming the state itself as a
defendant for both symbolic and practical reasons. This
involves a whole host of other procedural complications
that need to be anticipated and thought about in advance.
Most of these cases have faced issues of assertions of
governmental immunity, separation of powers concerns and
just a whole host of justiciability issues, and standing,
ripeness, etc. That's the third attribute-sort of a savvy
approach to handling procedural hurdles.
The fourth attribute is reference to accepted
professional standards. Again, I don't need to say much
about this to this audience, because you know what those
accepted professional standards are. One of the reasons
these more recent suits have been able to gain some traction
is that the ABA and the Eight Principles and Ten
Principles, the Standards of Criminal Justice, NLADA, and
the defense community has begun to flesh out substantively
what that Sixth Amendment 14 right looks like, and it makes
it easier for litigants to argue this in court. The second-
generation suits rely upon those standards to measure the
shortcomings of the system and to craft the remedies they
seek.
The last attribute these suits share is the notion of
12 William Glaberson, The Right to Counsel: Woman Becomes a Test
Case, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2010 available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/21/nyregion/21 lawyer.htm1?_r = 1 &re
f=legalaid for the_poor.
13 Class Action Complaint, Hurrell-Harring v. State, No. 8866-07 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Nov. 8, 2007).
14 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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alliances, and there has been some mention of this
yesterday. Bob talked about finding allies in potentially
unlikely places or just finding one person who can be an
advocate for change in the jurisdiction. It's clear in these
more recent successful suits that extensive networks of
allies and alliances are critical to the success of these suits.
Having said a little bit about what public defense reform
and systemic litigation looks like in general, let me just turn
to the question of where we are now.
As we think about how to use this litigation to
address workloads, I want to focus on the Michigan and
New York suits. 15 I should mention as an aside that I'll
expand my discussion of New York and Michigan in the
article that I'm submitting for the publication of these
proceedings. So if folks are particularly interested in those
suits, I'll say more on paper than I can in person. Both suits
were filed in 2007. As I said, both made the claim that the
states had abdicated their constitutional responsibility under
Gideon16 by delegating the public defense function to the
counties.
They have both survived motions to dismiss and the
cases before their respective state high courts presented
slightly different questions. At bottom, the issues were the
same-whether the systemic suits presented justiciable
questions. Defendants made a whole host of arguments to
support the dismissal of these suits, but chief among the
arguments were two claims. The first was really a ripeness
argument. That is to say that habeas or Strickland17 was the
exclusive avenue for relief. That's a familiar challenge.
The second was a separation of powers argument: That it's
a legislative function to reform public defense and the
courts should stay out of this. As of May 6th both high
15 Complaint, Duncan v. State, supra note 11; Class Action Complaint,
supra note 13.
16 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
17 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 668.
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courts have allowed these cases to move forward. The
Michigan order didn't say much so we don't have a lot to
take from that, but it's still a big win.'
8
In the New York suit, there was actually a very
useful opinion that came down saying that "The complaint
states a claim for constructive denial of the right to counsel
by reason of insufficient compliance with the constitutional
mandate of Gideon."19 So clearly, the New York Court of
Appeals recognized that this is not a Strickland question.
It's an absence of counsel altogether. The court went
further, finding that the allegations of systemic harm were
justiciable. I'm quoting here, "The allegations .
cumulatively may be understood to raise the distinct
possibly that merely nominal attorney-client pairings occur
in subject counties with a fair degree of regularity,
allegedly because of inadequate funding and staffing of
indigent defense providers."
20
Plaintiffs in these cases have a long road ahead of
them, obviously, given that they're three years in and they
just survived a motion to dismiss. The fact that these state
high courts have allowed these cases to move forward
rather than just sending these parties back to a historically
apathetic legislature is in itself a mark of progress. That's
18 At the time of the Symposium, the Michigan Supreme Court had
recently allowed the systemic suit to move forward. Less than three
months later, the same Court reversed itself and put an end to the
systemic suit. Compare Duncan v. State, Nos. 139345, 139346,
139347 (Mich. April 30, 2010), available at
http://coa.courts.mi.gov/documents/sct/public/orders/20100430_si 3934
5 106 139345_2010-04-30_or.pdf, with Duncan v. State, Nos.
139345, 139346, 139347 (Mich. July 16, 2010), available at
http://www.courts.michigan.gov/supremecourt/Clerk/04-
10/139345/139345-7-Order.pdf. Professor Drinan discusses this turn
of events in a separate article published in this volume. See Cam H.
Drinan, Systemic Indigent Defense Litigation: A 2010 Update, 7 TENN.
J. L. & POL'Y (Special Edition) 8 (2010).
19 Hurrell-Harring v. State, 15 N.Y.3d 8, 23 (N.Y. 2010).
20 Id.
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the good news that we can take from these suits. The bad
news, if you will, is obvious. They're very time-consuming
and expensive. Further, we know, from a case like
Quitman County v. Mississippi21 that there are no
guarantees with systemic litigation. Even where
experienced, committed attorneys are involved, failure is a
possibility. Sorry.
So, I think in sum what we can say is that this kind
of litigation, systemic public defense reform litigation,
enjoys increasingly good prospects, but they're an
expensive long-term endeavor. That brings me to my
concluding point that I started with, which is-based on
what I said already-you won't be surprised to hear me say
that the answer to the question of whether systemic public
defense reform litigation is an effective tool to deal with
excessive workloads is maybe. Excessive workloads are
clearly part of what you need to bring a successful systemic
suit, but it's really only a small part of the picture. So I
think I'm out of time, and I will end there. Thank you again
for your time.
ADELE BERNHARD: Well, I took notes on what people
said on my little computer so we'll see whether I can move
it over here and read those notes. I can't tell you how
pleased I am to try to pull together some of the themes from
these wonderful presentations. I really feel that we should
give these guys another round of applause. You guys were
terrific. I learned so much.
My name is Adele Bernhard, and I have a mixed
background. I started off as a public defender in the Bronx,
so I handled all kinds of cases from felonies to
misdemeanors. I, therefore, have some grounding in what
it's like to be a public defender-what it's like to do this
work and what the conditions are like in a big city criminal
courthouse. After doing that for a while, I also had the
21 Quitman County v. Mississippi, 910 So.2d 1032 (Miss. 2005).
155
7 Tennessee Journal of Law & Policy (Special Edition) 156
opportunity to work for an assigned counsel plan in New
York where private firm lawyers are assigned to cases. I
had an opportunity to think about how we could manage an
assigned counsel plan more effectively, how we could train
lawyers, and how we could supervise lawyers who weren't
in a public defender organization. Additionally, I had the
opportunity to work for a court committee whose mission it
was to evaluate public defender offices. In New York in
1994, the Legal Aid Society was the primary public
defender in New York. In 1994, there was a strike. The
lawyers went on strike over working conditions and
caseload grievances.
The City of New York at that time decided that we
don't like the lawyers being able to go on strike. It was a
union office, and it was slowing the courts down. We don't
like to be held hostage to what these public defenders want
to do and what they want to say, so the city decided that it
would create some alternate providers. The next time
people had caseload complaints, they could send some of
the cases someplace else. So the private bar, who is
concerned with criminal issues in New York, was very
worried about this plan. The city put out what they called a
request for proposals. People put in proposals and said,
"We'll take part of that money and set up our own shop."
Now, it turned out that for the most part those new
shops-small boutique offices-have been very successful,
and they've done a very good job. But we didn't know
that's how the story would turn out at the time that the city
was considering contracting for these alternative providers.
So, the private bar said, "What can we do to make sure that
the Legal Aid Society, the primary defender, wasn't
undercut by these new offices?" What we ended up doing
was suggesting to the appellate division, our intermediate
court, that they create some rules which would authorize
the creation of a committee that would take a look at all the
providers. It was a way of monitoring and recording the
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quality of representation provided by the Legal Aid Society
and the new providers. It gave us an opportunity to start
looking at what people are doing and how people are doing
it.
I had the opportunity to think about how offices
ensure that their lawyers have a chance to do a good job.
What do offices do to make sure that their lawyers have
training, supervision, and evaluation so that they can be all
that they can be? How do offices make sure that the
caseload numbers are kept at a manageable level, so that
their lawyers can do what they've been hired to do? So
that's my background in the field.
Then I went into teaching where I've been a clinical
teacher for fifteen years. During that time, of course, I
started thinking about teaching new lawyers, and what I
could bring from my history of working in the public
defender field. I started thinking about systemic litigation.
I also have done some writing about when systemic
litigation would be appropriate, what would make it
appropriate, what would make it work, and how we can win
these cases if we're going to bring them. I don't think that
the article that I wrote on the subject is in the material, but I
know that Cara does cite to it, so if you look and read her
article you can find the cite to mine which is entitled, Take
Courage: What the Courts Can Do to Improve the Delivery
of Criminal Defense Services. I wrote it really as an
advocacy piece.
I wrote it to give the courts a sense of what they
could do, because I took a look at the history of systemic
litigation in different areas. The courts got into the prison
systems. The prison systems were, and they still are, a
mess. A federal court said that this is something we can do.
22. Adele Bernhard, Take Courage: What the Courts Can Do to
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There are violations here of the Thirteenth Amendment
23
and the Eighth Amendment. 24 These prisons are cruel; the
conditions are inhumane. This is unconstitutional; we can
do something about that. So I thought why don't the courts
see indigent criminal defense services in quite the same
way? Why don't they grab the bull by the horns as it were
and kind of wrestle it to the ground? Why haven't we been
able to be as successful in this endeavor as people were in
the past with school litigation, desegregation, and prison
litigation?
Well, of course, there are lots of reasons why. The
times are different. The judges are different. The feeling
in the country is different. There are lots of major
differences, but some of the reasons I think we can deal
with and use to make this litigation more successful. So
here is what I take from some of the themes that I have
heard the panelists talking about concerning individual
caseload litigation and what Cara was talking about in
terms of systemic prospective litigation.
We're all here in this room, not just the panelists,
but all of us are here because we care about these issues
and we want to make a difference. We understand the real
importance of providing decent legal services to people
who are accused of a crime. We understand what a good
lawyer does. I'd like to comment on when Max was
talking about: getting into cases, investigating, finding out
that somebody he thought was guilty wasn't guilty-and he
only knew that because he had the time to interview
them-to go out and talk to the witnesses, and to undercut
the evidence. We all know that that's what's important to
do. We want to do it, and we want to help our young
public defenders who, frankly, are the young idealistic
future of this country who have taken these jobs because
they wanted to. They have choices. We owe it to them to
158
23 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
24 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
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provide them with a better environment in which to
practice law, not just because of the people they're
representing today but because of the people they will be
representing in the future and the difference they will make
for all of us. What do I take from that?
We all know what to do and how to do it, but
providing these services is difficult. Salaries aren't the
greatest. There's not a lot of gratitude from clients, from
judges or from the public who don't understand the
significance of this job. How do we make these cases
work? How do we make the caseload litigation work?
How do we make the systemic litigation work? Well, I see
two major things. We need to make people want to make a
change. So we need to make the courts want to make a
difference. We need to motivate them, and we need to
show them that it's not so hard. They're worried about
these kinds of cases, and they're worried about making a
decision. It's going to make more work for them. It's going
to cost more money, and they don't want to tell the
legislature what to do. Right? They don't want to get
involved in this. This is something new. There isn't
precedent out there that they can rely on. They're out on
their own, and they're going to get into trouble somehow.
This isn't going to be popular-they might not get re-
elected or re-appointed. So we have to motivate people and
show them that this isn't so hard. This is within a legal
framework. It's no different from other kinds of cases that
they have decided or their colleagues have decided across
the country. So, of course, one reason to write a law
review article is to provide a little support for the judges.
So how to make them want to do it.
Another theme that I have heard from today's
speakers is that we tell stories. We talk about the plaintiffs
and why cases are important to decide. Here is what's
really happening to individual people who are not being
adequately represented. They're losing their jobs. They're
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losing their kids. They're losing their licenses. There are
collateral consequences that they didn't understand when
they entered the plea. Let's make it real. How do we tell
those stories? We tell them in court by choosing the
clients, by choosing the lawyers, by being very careful
about which plaintiffs we select to front the litigation. But
we also have to do more.
We have got to build a foundation for these stories.
There are going to be newspaper articles and studies about
what the system is like, e.g., how many people are being
arrested. We have to create the foundation of stories so that
these issues are familiar and motivating to the court and to
the people who care about them. Then the other thing I
think we have to do in terms of helping people understand
that these decisions are not outliers, and that the framework
for deciding these cases is to refer to standards. That's why
standards are so important. If you don't have standards in
your jurisdiction that you can refer to and that the courts
can rely on in rendering these decisions, then they're out
there on their own. What's effective? What's ineffective?
We can't just say that these people had a bad outcome and
that's because the lawyers are ineffective. We've got to be
able to refer to standards that say here's what lawyers are
supposed to do in cases. We've got ABA Standards. We've
enacted them here in Tennessee, in Florida, and in New
York. We use these standards. Our office has standards.
Here's what our office says that lawyers are supposed to do.
In each and every case, they're supposed to communicate,
to counsel, to interview, to investigate, and to file motions.
If they haven't done that then they're not in compliance
with the standards. As a result, there's ineffective
assistance of counsel. Ineffective can't just be defined in
relation to the post-conviction Strickland25 standard. We
have to be able to move away from that analysis into a
front-loaded way of looking at cases. The only way we can
25 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 668.
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do that is by having standards that we refer to. They can be
caseload standards, of course, as well as performance
standards. That gives the court some mechanism for
deciding whether something has gone wrong. Therefore,
this kind of representation is unconstitutional. Those are
the sort of themes I've heard.
Let's make it real. Let's talk about the people. Let's
talk about why it's important. Let's talk about what a
difference your decision could make to all these lives out
there, and let's give the court a framework for making those
decisions. The New York court, which decided this
clarified what was a justiciable issue. We were all worried
that they were going to say that the courts have no business
telling defenders how to run their offices and telling the
states how much money they have to give to the counties-
that we're going to just throw this back to the legislature.
The New York court didn't do that and decided it was a
justiciable issue, that it was within their purview and that it
was something that they cared about. They did not really
use standards in the way that I thought they might, because
what they really said is that there was no representation.
The quality of lawyering given to these plaintiffs in the
upstate counties in New York was so poor that it was really
like having no lawyer at all. There was no conversation, no
investigation. It was like what you were discussing about
your lawyer. He had to plead people guilty at arraignments
just to limit the number of cases so that he could work on
some of them. As a result, it was almost like having no
lawyer at all. But I think having standards out there that
state what lawyers are supposed to do, allowed the court of
appeals to say that they had fallen so far from the standards
that it was like having no lawyer. So I still think-even
though they didn't refer to ABA standards or NLADA
standards to say that there was ineffective assistance of
counsel-that having those things in place and being able
to show how far the deviation was from those standards
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helped them render that decision.
So I think in order to make change through
litigation, we've got to have standards. We've got to have
stories. Obviously, we have to have support-support from
the private bar, from your own lawyers, and from the
public. I had thought that getting support from the public
was almost really impossible, but there are people in this
audience who have been able to achieve that.
We look at the campaign in Michigan, and Laura
Sager over here has been instrumental in organizing the
public to really care in her state about these issues. They
go out and talk to community groups and make the case as
to why having a public defender and being able to represent
people at the best of your ability makes a difference to all
of us. This isn't something that you can just isolate and
say, "Oh, it's over there in criminal court. It has nothing to
do with me. My kid is not getting arrested; I'm not getting
arrested. That's not my issue." Well, that's not true. It's all
of our issues, and we have to make that case to people so
they understand why that is significant. Those are the
things that I heard. Of course, those are the things that I
think about, so maybe that's part of the reason why I heard
that. Let's now open this up for questions and comments
from our wonderful panelists.
BARBARA HURST: I have a procedural question. If you
decide to bring this on a one-example basis-a one-client
basis-isn't the first question really a public relations issue?
I mean if you spend 100 or 200 or 400 hours preparing this
litigation, and then the court or somebody says that you
could have effectively represented 40 clients in that period
with systemic litigation you couldn't have represented 700
clients in that period. Isn't that a PR issue at least?
ADELE BERNHARD: Does somebody want to take that
question?
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RORY STEIN: It definitely is. That's one of the reasons
why we were willing to go along with the judge's
suggestion that just one case would be handled by
individual lawyers, because that was the first thing the
prosecutor said. You mean to tell me that you couldn't take
a deposition in this case and couldn't go interview? The
one case was really, I think, symbolic of a larger problem
that this lawyer had. So that's one reason why I think it's
helpful to be insulated in having lawyers represent you.
And that you're not representing yourself or bringing this
motion yourself. Because, at least, you can say that they're
doing the work. We support the people running the
computers that generate this information-and the public
defender and the executive assistant who aren't assigned to
this court, and aren't doing this work on these cases, but are
handling these kinds of things. But it is an issue that you
have to deal with, and I think it's kind of ironic when the
3rd District told us we had to do it on a case-by-case basis.
We're up there saying we don't have adequate resources to
handle the whole felony division, and now they're telling us
to expend more resources to try to prove this case.
BARBARA HURST: You have to have a buy-in at least in
this--on the court's part that is essentially a mimicking of
systemic litigation. That it is symbolic-that it's system
wide. You have to essentially set that premise.
RORY STEIN: Well, I know that in our situation, the chief
judge initially asked us to consolidate the systemic cases
into one case, and the administrative judge for the criminal
division actually heard the case. When the 3rd District
decided the case, saying we had to do it on a case-by-case
basis, we got a call immediately from the chief judge
saying you're going to be doing this in all twenty-one
courts. It wasn't our goal to wreak havoc in the criminal
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justice system and take the system down. We wanted to do
it in an orderly fashion where the courts could handle it,
and we could handle it and even the prosecutor who was
involved could handle it. And so we went to one judge. Of
course, we had to deal with the fact that we were judge
shopping. But it just so happened that this particular judge
had this lawyer who had one of the worst caseloads in the
system.
DENNIS KEEFE: There is one governmental entity that
seems to know how to run a good public defender system-
i.e., keeping the caseloads under control, adequately
staffing and providing funding, and providing all of the
resources that are needed. That one governmental entity is
the federal government. I was just wondering if in any of
the litigation, anybody has turned to the administrative
office that operates the federal public defender's office to
bring in the expertise and ask why do you limit your
caseload, provide research attorneys, and adequately
compensate. I'm just wondering.
ADELE BERNHARD: I think that's a great question, and I
think Norman wants to respond to it.
NORMAN LEFSTEIN: In none of the litigation has an
effort been made to pull in what the administrative office
and the U.S. courts do as far as the federal courts are
concerned. Let me just give you a figure, which I
discussed with the folks who run the Criminal Justice Act
and federal defenders during a DOJ conference in February
in Washington D.C. I indicated, I think, in a talk in D.C.
that the amount of money-as best as we can determine-
being spent in U.S. state and local courts on indigent
defense is somewhere around $4.2 billion. In the federal
courts, they're spending about $1 billion. That's a
staggering way of putting this whole thing in perspective. I
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have those numbers roughly correct I think. Because they
don't have anything in the federal courts that compares to
the state and local governments.
I mentioned these figures to Steve Aison, who is the
deputy in Washington D.C. involved with the federal public
defenders all over the country, and some of you may know
Steve. Steve was absolutely blown away by those
numbers. He's always known that there's a seat change
between the state and federal courts, but that does really put
it in some perspective. The State of California, I believe, is
up around $800 million, and many of the counties in the
State of California, but not all, are spending large amounts
of money on public defense. So if you take out California
from the $4.2 billion nationwide, then you reduce that
number substantially and split it for the rest of the forty-
nine states.
The other comment I would make as I think about
your question, Barbara, does raise the issue about public
relations when you litigate these kinds of cases. I think
Rory Stein from Dade County is correct. There is a PR
issue-significantly many data when you have pro bono
counsel. Even though I know the management of Dade
County, and in Mark's office they have spent enormous
amounts of time preparing these kinds of cases that the
presence of both pro bono counsel-I thought gave you
some support for the proposition-but the burden was
really on pro bono counsel and much less so on the office.
But it really comes back to something I talked about
yesterday. That is, I think it could be done with far less
preparation. Individual lawyers, if not every lawyer in an
office, some group of lawyers in an office should have
large numbers of cases, filing fairly simple motions and
asking for a hearing. And if necessary, if that evidence is
granted, the hearing is granted, putting on a fairly simple
presentation of what it is they are unable to do on behalf of
their pending clients. As I think I mentioned yesterday, I
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saw it done very effectively in New Orleans. They
developed a terrific record-not to say that terrific records
weren't developed in Dade County and in Mark's case. In
fact, in both of those cases, their records were terrific, and
abated the order of the general sessions court that Mark
read from: a marvelous literary piece. I'm really curious to
see whether or not the journal proceedings of this
conference are edited after what you had to say about that.
But let me just stop at there.
None of you commented on the notion, by the way,
of some lawyers filing individual motions, and I'm going
lay it out in the book I'm writing as to what I think ought to
go into that motion. And I don't think it would take an
enormous amount of work to do it.
ADELE BERNARD: Well, there are some more questions
in the back if you want to pass the mic back to Jim. I do
think that there needs to be preparation even for those
cases, in the sense that you want people to be receptive to
them, and you want to make the most out of those motions.
So you really need to get people ready to listen to them.
NORMAN LEFSTEIN: Well, that's what I meant
yesterday when I talked about changing the culture.
ADELE BERNARD: Exactly. Jim?
JAMES NEUHARD: In my day job, I'm a public defender.
I will make the case here for protecting the record of each
case. That's what you're seeing develop here when you
have lawyers who cannot prepare and are meet and greeting
and pleading with their clients. They're not doing what a
growing body of federal case law is suggesting is
absolutely required pretrial. I have a list of the issues
where they're now finding the use of stand-in counsel who
are not prepared to cover the workload, investigation,
discovery, and research, and fail to timely file motions and
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make an early appearance. These are structural denials of
counsel, who do not have a lawyer. The federal courts are
beginning to grant writs of habeas corpus on this. We're all
thinking systemic, but if you start building in methodically
and professionally, I cannot do these things. I have not
done these and yet I'm prepared to plead for my client. It's
a frightening thing to think that they're running a caseload
through-cases that literally go to federal court and get a
writ granted-that quickly. There's no need to show
prejudice. It is structural denial of counsel; it's absolute
and irreversible.
So all I'm saying is that everybody who is in this
situation should start having their lawyers protect the
record. I mean this is a plea from a public lawyer.
ADELE BERNHARD: Right. To the extent that the judge
will accept a plea when you're putting on the record that
you're taking the plea although you haven't done these
things though.
JAMES NEUHARD: I mean, if you're in that situation-
ADELE BERNHARD: Right.
JAMES NEUHARD: It's the same as a group of lawyers
walking in and filing a motion to withdraw. When that
motion is denied you say, "Well, Your Honor, this is the
next step. My office, structurally, cannot do these things. I
could not do the investigation. I could not have a private
conversation with my client, and on it goes. That's how I'm
here. Let's go forward." The judge orders you go forward
and then-
ADELE BERNHARD: Maybe in the context of forcing
you to trial when you're not ready to make that record.
Right.
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JAMES NEUHARD: Which is protect the record is all I'm
saying.
ADELE BERNHARD: Yeah.
JAMES NEUHARD: Whatever the reality is, indefinite
flow into federal court-
ADELE BERNHARD: And then that's going to be
something that the office as a whole has to discuss, and
everybody has to be on board. We can't be expecting
individual people to be outliers, by themselves, making
those records. We need that to be something that people
agree to do across the boards.
JAMES NEUHARD: Of course, it would be ideal to be
permanently prayed for-
ADELE BERNHARD: Right.
JAMES NEUHARD: But as Norm said, each lawyer who
feels this way and finds themselves in that situation for
whatever reason-could be because of an illness-has a
duty to protect the record of what they've done in a
particular case.
ADELE BERNHARD: Right. Right. I think that's right.
CARA DRINAN: Can I just add, Adele?
ADELE BERNHARD: Sure.
CARA DRINAN: On that point, I think it's important to
not view individual motions that you're talking about and
the systemic litigation option as mutually exclusive.
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NORMAN LEFSTEIN: I don't.
CARA DRINAN: In fact, I mean, it goes to the point of
litigation as the last resort. If you're building that record,
that's great. Not just because you have a duty to do so in
that case, for your client, but because even if you think
you're headed toward systemic litigation, that's precisely
what you need.
ADELE BERNHARD: Exactly. So these things are
mutually beneficial and work towards the same end. Bob?
ROBERT BORUCHOWITZ: I want to make three
comments. One is I don't know that I've heard the full
answer to Dennis's question from Norm. I really think it's a
tremendous idea to use the federal defender model when
we're talking about what's wrong with the state practice.
Secondly, I have all the respect in the world for the people
that are bringing these motions, but it's difficult from the
outside to offer opinions. I wonder what would happen in
Miami or Knoxville if every public defender in every single
case who felt unprepared were to make the kind of record
that Jim was saying, whether they're moving for a
continuance or simply saying, "Judge, I'm not prepared and
can't go forward with this plea. I can't go forward with this
trial." Obviously, there's the individual immediate client
whose needs are at risk, but it may be that in many out-of-
custody cases it would be less of an issue. One way to get
the most action would be for every out-of-custody client to
ask for a continuance-for every out-of-custody client to
say I can't go forward, and I have to have a continuance. In
the State v. Jury26 case that I mentioned, in Washington, is I
think some precedent for that.
26 State v. Jury, 576 P.2d 1302 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978).
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The other benefit of that is that it gets the attention
of the court if you make the kind of record that Jim is
talking about. Certainly, if a lawyer is pleading for 200
people at arraignment without seeing a police report, that's
just not acceptable. And so, the lawyer says, "Your Honor,
my client wants to plead guilty to get out of jail today. And
the prosecutor is making an offer, but I have no idea
whether it's a good offer. I have no idea whether my client
even committed this crime. I have no idea whether they
even got the right guy in jail. I have no idea whether
anything the police did is legal. I have no information at
all. But here I am, and I have 900 cases. And that's all I
can do, and so here it is, judge." If the judge doesn't want
to take the plea then that will put pressure on the system,-
which is going to be backed up-and they're going to want
to help. You talk about motivating the court; that's one
way to motivate the court.
ADELE BERNHARD: I agree. I think there's lots of ways
to motivate the court, and I also think there's lots of ways to
tell those stories. I mean, we were introduced to a public
defender who runs a blog and gets some of those stories out
there. Oh, great, she's got her hand up so good transition.
CARA DRINAN: I'm sorry.
ADELE BERNHARD: Oh.
CARA DRINAN: I didn't want to cut you off, but I think
that Bob is right that we haven't really addressed Dennis's
question.
ADELE BERNHARD: Yes, that's true.
CARA DRINAN: Can I say something on that point?
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ADELE BERNHARD: Well, hold that thought back there
and let's go back to the contrast.
CARA DRINAN: Yeah.
ADELE BERNHARD: The contrast.
CARA DRINAN: I agree with Norm. I haven't seen use of
that federal model in reference to the caseloads control, etc.
I think it's a great idea that certainly merits exploration.
Off the top of my head, I can think of two reasons why the
suits may not have done that. One is that the use of expert
witnesses-or just putting someone on and say this is how
it's done elsewhere and therefore should be done in this
jurisdiction has been less successful. For example, in
Quitman County27 -in the Mississippi litigation-where
the county sued the state basically saying that we can't
provide public defense and it's your job under Gideon.
28
There was the use of expert witnesses. That was not as
effective as putting on the faces of clients of the system.
Not to say that those two things are mutually exclusive, but
that may be one reason.
The other, and I think the more pressing issue is
there seems-in my conversations with attorneys who are
litigating these kinds of systemic suits-to be a real sense
that because the court said nothing in Gideon about the
method of delivering public defender services. States have
a sense of, well, it's our right to figure out what we think is
the best method for the delivery of public defense services.
While we may agree that that's simply pretext for not
delivering public defense services, I do think that there's a
sense that, well, the federal government may do it that way,
but that's the beauty of federalism. Right? We can each
pick our own method and-
27 Quitman County v. Mississippi, 910 So.2d 1032 (Miss. 2005).
28 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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DENNIS KEEFE: Well, we can pick our own method, but
the federal government has the federal public defender's
office. And they have panel attorneys that are supervised
by the public defenders in many instances. I mean they
don't have anything that the states don't have.
CARA DRINAN: Right.
NORMAN LEFSTEIN: Yeah, but different caseloads.
CARA DRINAN: Yeah.
ADELE BERNHARD: Right, and his point. And I think
Rory wants to speak to it as well-that we have an
example.
CARA DRINAN: Yeah.
ADELE BERNHARD: If we feel like spending more
money on it, we have an example of somebody who does it
right, and there's nobody complaining in the federal system
of their caseloads, or their salaries for that matter or the
quality of representation provided to the clients. Of course,
they get to limit the cases that they pick to prosecute, and
the states would say, "We are not in a position to do that."
That would at least open up the discussion about why we
don't all talk together about how many people are
prosecuted and what categories or crimes are going to the
prosecutors. There are ways to solve these problems. You
don't have to haul everybody into criminal court,
overloading our lawyers. That's what the feds do. They
decide which are the most important cases and why, and
they go from there.
I'm sorry, Rory. You wanted to speak.
172
7 Tennessee Journal of Law & Policy (Special Edition) 173
RORY STEIN: Yeah, actually, I guess two things. One of
the things I can tell you, since we're a state-funded agency,
we've gone to the legislature numerous times and addressed
with them certain ideas about a more careful control of
workload and looking at funding models. We got nowhere.
That's why we thought it was kind of interesting in the first
case when one of the prosecutors was actually a lobbyist
for the legislature and said, "Well, why don't you just go
with the legislature and talk to us about this problem." I
mean, we've been talking for thirty years. We wouldn't
have filed a motion if we were able to get anywhere with
that.
The second thing is-I think Bob's point raises an
interesting question which we've discussed for a day and a
half now about culture. We filed notices for uncounseled
plea in every one of those pleas at arraignment--every
single one. Some judges won't accept the pleas, if we file
the notice.
ADELE BERNHARD: Right.
RORY STEIN: Unfortunately, what happens is you've got
a guy sitting in the box who's saying, "I'm offered credit for
time served."
ADELE BERNHARD: And you're not going to-
RORY STEIN: You're not going to stand in the way of me
getting out of jail.
ADELE BERNHARD: Right.
RORY STEIN: Frequently, those judges find a way to get
around that. The more interesting cultural thing that we
found was, we asked our lawyers. Actually we didn't ask
them. We told our lawyers that they needed to file a notice
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of inadequate resources in the court, because they needed to
get the clients advised that they weren't going to be able to
handle their cases in the same diligent fashion that we were
able to do in the past. There was some blow back from our
lawyers-"You're setting me up for bar complaints."
That's what we heard. "You're putting out there that I'm
not doing my job." We thought it was appropriate to let the
clients know that they weren't going to get the same service
that they typically got from the public defender's office,
because we didn't have the ability to do that.
Of course, one of the things that the state did in the
litigation was that we invited the clients to ask the judge for
another lawyer, because I don't want wait that long. I think
one or two clients did that. That's what the state did with
us. How many bar complaints have you guys received as
an example that you're actually really doing a very good
job? Of course, our clients don't know what we're not
doing for them. In fact, the state doesn't know what we're
not doing for them. That's one of the reasons why we had
this hearing, to explore all of those things that have been
mentioned already-that we are doing them. We're
cognizant of it, and we litigated it in the motion saying this
is what a real lawyer does, and this is what we're able to do
with the resources that you gave us. They're frequently two
different things.
ADELE BERNHARD: Yes?
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: There's a gentleman with a
hand up here.
ADELE BERNHARD: Okay. Thank you for alerting me.
I'm sorry. I've forgotten your name already.
CAROL HUNEKE: Carol Huneke.
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ADELE BERNHARD: Carol, right.
CAROL HUNEKE: I first wanted to comment on Dennis's
comment about the federal system because-
ADELE BERNHARD: Does she need to speak up? Closer
to the microphone.
CAROL HUNEKE: I'm sorry. I'm married to the federal
defender in my district, and so it's been interesting to be
able to see some of the ways that the federal defenders do
things while I'm in state practice. I noticed that some of my
friends that work in the office have different cases like
illegal re-entry, but there are also cases that are very
similar, like drug and gun cases. I noticed that some of the
things that they were able to do on their drug cases, for
example, that I had not been able to do or not thought of,
and I thought I want to do that, too. I also know through
seeing things that my husband has done-they do have
timekeeper records on those cases, and there is some
review by the office of the courts. Whatever you call it,
there are in control of their cases and they can take into
account what type of cases. So I think there are some
statistics that could be usable for state courts. Not every
statistic is useful, but the ones on cases that are similar I
think could be used to our advantage.
ADELE BERNHARD: I think that's a great idea.
CAROL HUNEKE: The other-
ADELE BERNHARD: And we have to keep the records
too, then, in order to be able to show that what we do on
our cases and how many fewer hours we have in the state
courts. I mean, because they do the hours and they can
back it up.
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NORMAN LEFSTEIN: Very sketchy data.
ADELE BERNHARD: Okay.
CAROL HUNEKE: I admire you, Mr. Stein and Mr.
Stephens, so much for challenging the caseloads in court. I
get messages from public defenders all over the country,
though, and it seems that not every defender works in an
office where the director has that courage. I don't know
what all the causes are, but what my question is, what can
individual lawyers who are overburdened in the system do
as to a systemic challenge, if anything? Are there any
resources that the ABA or another organization can offer to
support that?
ADELE BERNHARD: I'm sure that Norman wants to
respond to that, because really that's been the motivation
for a lot of his work over the last few years in writing this
book on excessive caseloads. What can the individual
lawyer who finds him or herself in this situation do? But
before he gets the microphone again, I know there was
another question over here somewhere.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: This almost follows up in
respect to that last question. It's directed to Rory Stein and
Mark Stephens. I heard both of you talk about both the
importance and difficulty of getting buy-in from the
members of your office, both the attorneys and the staff. I
know as a post-conviction attorney I often bring claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel and have noticed-much
to my dismay over the years-how defense lawyers don't
often have the concept of what it means to effectively
represent a client. I remember having a conversation with
the public defender in Davidson County, Tennessee, who
said that a lot of lawyers in this office don't realize the full
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situation. It's like a frog in a pot when the water
temperature is gradually raised, and they don't realize that
it's gotten too hot.
I'd like to ask you how do you deal with that issue?
I think it is a question of culture within your office and
within the defense bar. But how in your litigation did you
deal with it, and what suggestions do you have to offer on
how to deal with that position there?
MARK STEPHENS: We've spent a lot of time in our
office talking about caseloads and what we were going to
do about it. I do think part of the problem-particularly in
an office where the caseloads are just out of control-is
that lawyers, in order to survive, get so focused on the
individual clients and the pressures that they're having to
respond to that it's difficult for them to even start to give
any consideration to the bigger picture. So when the
manager comes and says, "What I'd really like for you to
slow down a minute and come spend some time with me to
talk about your caseloads and what's going on," then that's
the last thing in the world the lawyer can afford to do at
that moment. The lawyer needs to ratchet up his or her
commitments to their client. And so, there's real tension.
What you are saying to the lawyer is you're not doing a
good job. I don't care how you phrase it or how many
times you qualify it. What you're essentially telling a
lawyer is that you're not fighting a very good fight. Here's
all the things that you're not doing, or here's all the things
that you should be doing. The mentality of a public
defender lawyer-that's going to get you hit in lots of
discussions. And so, it's a very difficult thing. You just
need to meet with them on a regular basis through staff
meetings and try to hold those staff meetings to the smallest
possible amount of time to explain to them why you're
doing it and how important it is, and why it's important and
why they need to buy in. I don't have 100 percent buy-in in
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my office on this issue. I think I have some lawyers who
tolerate it, but I don't know that they're really committed to
it. So it's a hard thing to do.
ADELE BERNHARD: Max?
MAX BAHNER: I think one of things, from my standpoint
looking in, that you're not able to do in a public defender
office is something we do routinely in our practice, and that
is we have critiques all through the process. The lawyers
know before they try a case, or before they do a contract,
how we think they're doing, and they know afterwards how
we thought they had done. We all learn from this.
Apparently, I don't wonder why you can't do that in a
public defender office, but I think that if that were done,
this problem would not be so significant.
ADELE BERNHARD: So we've got a couple of ideas on
the table. One is how can management motivate their
lawyers to do a good job, some of which could be done by
talking about cases, critiquing, training, supervision, and
evaluation. If that's all part of the office, it will help
motivate the lawyers. We also have the question of the
motivated lawyer and the less-than-motivated management.
How does the lawyer handle that? There's a question there
I think.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Yeah, I'm curious to hear
about the situation in which-
ADELE BERNHARD: Speak into that mic.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: -the situation in which you
have the lawyers, and you have management aligned.
We've heard over the past two days about motions to
withdraw, motions to recuse, and systemic litigation. And
178
7 Tennessee Journal of Law & Policy (Special Edition) 179
for those of you who are either providers or litigators on
behalf of providers, if you were at time zero in deciding
how to litigate this case-just about excessive caseloads-
what would you do?
ADELE BERNHARD: Why don't you give two seconds
about who you are and where you come into this whole
thing.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I work for Davis, Polk &
Waldwell, which is a law firm based in New York City,
and over time we have been representing the Legal Aid
Society, who has been struggling with excessive caseloads
and has in the past year had successful legislation. They've
been helped in that way, but we're in a situation where their
funding is being pulled out by the city and (inaudible
response from audience) how to move forward.
ADELE BERNHARD: Does somebody want to take that
before Norman makes us stop?
CARA DRINAN: Can I just ask for a clarification? Are
you asking if they had it to do over again what would they
have done differently?
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Yes.
CARA DRINAN: What you were asking?
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Essentially lessons learned.
So we've seen, for instance, where individuals have moved
to withdraw, where individuals have or the office has
moved to refuse cases, wholesale, or where strategic
systemic litigation has been employed. And presumably
certain things out there that appear to be more difficult to
others, and just-I wonder which way would you have
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chosen if you had that-the actual ability to go back in time
and start at time zero?
RORY STEIN: Well, I think it's a mixed bag, because it's
easier to prove one lawyer's caseload problems for
prejudice purposes. But generally speaking that problem
recurs all across your office, so that's not going to solve the
problem. I don't really know too many public defenders'
offices that have the resources, time, or ability to litigate it
everywhere-particularly if you're in a large urban
jurisdiction like we are. So it almost forces you-if you're
going to try to get the relief that your office really needs-
to do it in an office-wide systemic way. I think that is one
of the big issues that is going to be resolved by the
Supreme Court in the first case.
ADELE BERNHARD: Well, Norm has pulled the clock
on me and said that we've got to keep on schedule. I said
we're doing great here. Everybody's involved in
conversation, so let's keep talking. Barbara, we'll get
talking.
BARBARA HURST: Just to put something else out to
you.
ADELE BERNHARD: Okay.
BARBARA HURST: Rory has been the only one really
that's talked about client perception.
ADELE BERNHARD: Un-huh (affirmative).
BARBARA HURST: I'm really going to be stuck on this
individual motion versus systemic issue. I'm just picturing
the clients in the next courtroom. Somebody is putting on
the record what they can't do in that case, and the next
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lawyer has got to plead that client. May be the only answer
is what Jim was talking about. Some other people have
said you have to do it in every case, because what in the
world do you say to those other forty-two clients who are
about to plead that day, who know their situations are no
different from the lawyer on whose behalf you are bringing
this example motion. How do you deal with the
perception? You want to-
ADELE BERNHARD: All right. So we'll keep talking
about those things, and we'll keep talking about your book
and caseload issues, but hold on. Ed, did you have an
announcement that you wanted to make?
EDWIN BURNETTE: Yeah, I just got off the phone about
half an hour ago with Dan Swanson from Senator Durbin's
office, and they're expecting that the solicitation for John R.
Justice is going to come by the end of next week. There
could be some play in that. They're really expecting that
that's going to happen.
ADELE BERNHARD: Do we all know what that means
because I don't?
EDWIN BURNETTE: John R. Justice is a loan repayment
forgiveness for prosecutors and defense counsel. We-
NACDL, NLADA, MDAA, which is the prosecutors, and
the ABA-have been in a working group for the last six
months or so to try to work with the DOJ for this
solicitation. It's a mandated 50/50 split between
prosecutors and defense counsel. The fear is that there are
only seven states involved. The letters have gone out to the
Governor's Reform Agencies to handle these requests
through solicitation. Letters went out about a month ago.
Up until now only seven states have responded. So if you
know anyone in the governor's office or a liaison that you
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can talk to and get them to form these agencies, please do
so. The DOJ has stated that it's staying away from the
SAAs, because most of them aren't set up to doing this type
of thing, which is a positive, because we don't have positive
experience from our SAA's in the (inaudible response from
audience.) So if you know anyone in your state-and the
state having committed to this point-please do what you
can to try to get them to form that agency, because this
money has to be committed by the end of September.
We're a little worried that the longer that it takes to form
these agencies, the less chance we will have all this money
committed.
ADELE BERNHARD: If you have more questions, please
talk to Ed outside.
ED BURNETTE: One other thing, NLADA's director of
research, David Carroll, has been publishing over the last
several months blurbs that he calls Gideon Alerts.29 Some
of you may already receive those. They are blurbs, bites
that discuss, highlight reform efforts, concerns and
invariably link you to a site that will give you an article or
something like that. If you want to receive those, please
see me. Give me your business card or sign up, and you
can use those however you see fit. You can put them on
your blog-whatever you want to do-but if you're
interested in that, please see me at the break.
NORMAN LEFSTEIN: Thank you very much, Ed. We're
going to take a break till about two minutes after eleven.
Before we leave, join me in giving a round of applause to
our excellent panel.
29 David Carroll, NATIONAL LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER ASSOCIATION,
NATIONAL DEFENDER LEADERSHIP INSTITUTE, Gideon Alerts,
http://www.nlada.net/ndli/view6.
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PENNY WHITE: All right. I hope you're enjoying our
lunch, and I will tell you that we regret that Professor
David Dow from the Houston Law Center was unable to be
with us today, but we're delighted to give you the
opportunity to have more interaction with one of the
College of Law's brightest stars. And you've heard him
throughout the last two days as he's spoken up on some of
the topics, and that's Professor Jerry Black.
To many of the UT alumnus, including me, Jerry
Black is the College of Law. This is because he's been a
part of the UT legal community since I think the early
1900's; I'm not quite sure of the date. He was my clinic
supervisor in 1980, and he is Jason Bobo's clinic supervisor
in 2010. So that tells you something. For me and hundreds
of others who had the benefit of his tutelage, the practice of
law is defined by the demanding standards set by Jerry
Black.
Recently a student who was with us throughout the
last two days-I don't see her right at this moment, but
she-in an application for the Summers-Wyatt Scholarship,
which she received, she wrote this about Jerry Black, "My
law school experience has been filled with the opportunity
to work with unbelievable lawyers who have devoted
themselves to raising the bar of representation for the
criminally accused. It is truly a gift that I have been able to
get to know and learn from Jerry Black, TACDL's current
president, and someone I have personally heard speak from
the heart about his commitment to indigent defense. He is
a force to be reckoned with in the UT Legal Clinic for
decades and daily as he fights the fight when it comes to
upholding Gideon's 30 promise. It is almost unreal to me
that Professor Black taught my father-in-law at the UT
clinic, and it makes me smile to see how things come full
circle." And those are the words of Sarah McGee.
In 2002, Jerry Black received the Richard Jacobson
30 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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Award for excellence in teaching trial advocacy. That's the
highest award in the country given for that endeavor. In
2003, he got the TACDL, Tennessee Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers Award for lifetime contribution.
And just two weeks ago, he received the Law & Liberty
Award, honoring his contributions to the profession of the
Knoxville Bar Association.
I also think it's just worth mentioning that twenty
years before the Carnegie Foundation and their Educating
Lawyers Report said that we needed to re-think the law
school curriculum, Jerry Black and our then dean, Richard
Wirtz, had presented a comprehensive curriculum for
training future advocates that emphasized teaching practical
skills to law students and emphasizing the duties of ethics
and professionalism. And Jerry's vision is what gave birth
to the Center for Advocacy and Dispute Resolution that I
now direct and the curriculum that we have in the
Advocacy and Dispute Resolution in the college.
And while he is obviously a great teacher, a
phenomenal visionary and all-around wonderful person,
which he proved last week when he bought an entire flat-
if you're from the country you know what a flat is-a flat
of strawberries-and shared them with everyone in law
school. He is first and foremost a great lawyer.
I asked Doug Blaze for a funny story about Jerry as
a trial lawyer, and I tried cases with Jerry so I had tried to
think of some funny stories about Jerry as a trial lawyer.
Neither of us could remember any at all. When Doug and I
talked about it, we realized that there are no funny stories
about Jerry as a trial lawyer because Jerry takes the practice
of law seriously. He is committed to his clients. He is
committed to justice. But Dean Blaze did tell me that he
had nicknamed him long ago, "Most Likely to be Held in
Contempt." And we all know that that is indeed a badge of
honor.
This year when TACDL came knocking Jerry
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Black, a lifelong member, stepped up to the plate and said,
"Yes, I will serve as president." And yesterday, when
Professor Dow cancelled, and I came knocking and actually
beckoned Jerry to come to my office so I could ask him a
favor, he agreed to step up to the plate again today. So
thank you, Jerry, very, very much. It is all yours.
JERRY BLACK: I thank you for those kind remarks. As a
prior speaker that Penny introduced said, "If my father had
heard it he would be proud. My mother would have
believed it." So I would say to you, it's an honor to be
here.
I come to you today as the President of the
Tennessee Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.
When I assumed that office in August of 2009, there were
three things that I wanted to see the association address.
One was the low rate of compensation that court-appointed
counsel got in the state, which I think directly affects the
quality of representation that we provide to the poor who
can't or don't otherwise qualify for the public defender.
Secondly, I wanted to address the way counsel is
assigned. This is done by our judiciary, and I don't think
that they always have quality representation foremost in
their mind. They all too often, I think, appoint their
buddies or those who happen to be in court at the time.
And thirdly, I think that it is important that the
Association address the case overloads for the public
defenders. I don't really believe that the public defender's
office, for the most part, can do that for themselves. That's
an unfair burden in Tennessee because we have an elected
public defender's office and what are you going to say? I
can take fewer cases, I can provide higher quality of
representation and, by the way, it will cost you more money
so vote for me. I don't think that works very well.
I was talking to Libby Sykes earlier, who's the
director of the Administrative Office of the Courts, and we
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learned within the last month that I believe there are over
3,000 lawyers who are paid by the Administrative Office of
the Courts for taking court-appointed work. The Tennessee
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers does not
represent the majority of them.
We represent private lawyers that take criminal
indigent defense cases, and we represent public defenders.
We have 800 members. The AOC says that it pays about
2,400 different lawyers for court appointed work. This
leaves about 1,600 lawyers that are taking court
appointments that are not TACDL members. In all
likelihood they do not belong to the TBA. They may
belong to the county bar association. They are getting
many court appointments, and I worry about the quality of
representation they provide. What quality checks are in
place to see that the defendant gets the promised effective
assistance of counsel?
As a part of what we did in this state-at a retreat
that the Tennessee Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers had in January-we set a modeling of what they
started in Nashville, what they have now in Chattanooga,
and what we now have in Knoxville. We ought to have
roundtables once a month, and we ought to talk about basic
criminal procedure issues. And we invite these lawyers to
come for free; you don't have to pay a nickel. It's after
work. Ours meets at a bar, upstairs. And if you want to
have a drink while you learn some basic criminal
procedure, come on. And all the young lawyers out there
taking court-appointed cases-with the exception of the
public defender's office-almost none of them come. None
of them come to this.
I began my career somewhere in the 1900's. But I
began as a legal services lawyer actually in 1968. I wanted
to be a public interest lawyer, and I believed that Gideon
3 1
meant what it said-and as that citizen or person accused
31 id.
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was going to get the effective representation of counsel and
that the welfare mother was not. The person being
hounded by the loan company was not. And so I wanted to
be one of those lawyers that would provide representation
to those people.
I came to UT in 1975-contrary to what Penny
said-and it was here that I worked with or saw the people
in our Criminal Defense Clinic receiving at the time Law
Enforcement Assistance Administration money. And we
had some really good fat lawyers. And we were sort of the
public defender's office for Knox County at that time. But
what I saw when I went down to the courthouse with them,
was judges who resented appointing lawyers for indigents.
And in fact, if you think about the way we
characterize indigency, it seems to me that it's wrong from
the word go. When we talk about somebody-and we look
at something like poverty guidelines-they may be able to
hire the lawyer Mary Ann Green talked about who is going
to take the shoplifting case, or the person slightly over the
guidelines could hire them. But in a first-degree murder
case- where a lawyer in private practice wants a hundred
thousand dollars-there are a great number of people who
couldn't afford that lawyer. And they may not qualify for
the public defender's office. I don't know what they'd do.
I'm reminded of when I started doing this legal
services work, there was an article by a woman named
Carol Silver talking about our welfare system. And she
said, you know, the problem with our welfare system is we
have a hundred people who, let's say, need a pair of shoes.
And we have ten pairs of shoes. Now, how are we going to
divide up those shoes? We can give ten people a pair of
shoes and leave ninety out in the cold. We can give twenty
people one shoe and leave eighty out in the cold or they
could hop or we can divide up the shoes and give a hundred
people a piece of a shoe. And that's the way we do our
welfare system-or did.
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I'm afraid that all too often that's the way we do our
criminal defense system. We give a hundred-we overload
the public defender's office, we underpay private counsel,
and so what we give them instead of the effective
assistance of counsel, is a piece of a lawyer. I was serious
yesterday when I said I don't believe we take the Sixth
Amendment32 very seriously. I don't doubt that if we do a
survey, people are going to say I believe in fairness.
Well, I sort of have two responses. What are they
going to say unless they are a prosecutor or a judge? I
think you would expect them to believe in fairness. Well,
you just have to look at the Brady33 violations. I mean,
why is there a prejudice prong for Brady?34 When the
prosecution cheats, when they hide evidence, why do I
have to show prejudice? When we're talking about
ineffective assistance of counsel, why do I have to show
prejudice? I didn't get what you promised me, what the
Constitution promised me. Why do I have to show
prejudice? If we're really talking about fairness, this
system has a problem that is not new. This is the forty-
seventh year after Gideon.35 And we're here again trying
to figure out what to do to provide and make meaningful
the promise of Gideon.36 I'm glad we're talking about
litigation. It seems like to me that's where we ought to be
focusing our efforts, or something radical. Because in
trying to get people to do the right thing, it doesn't seem to
me works very well.
The 2009 report37, the crisis in indigent defense-I
32 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
33 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
34 Id.
35 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
36 id.
37 NAT'L RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMM., THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT,
JUSTICE DENIED: AMERICA'S CONTINUING NEGLECT OF OUR
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL (2009), available at
http://2009transition.org/justicedenied/.
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mean-it's not new. And even before then, Francis Allen,
author of the report called, The Report of the Attorney
General's Committee on Poverty and the Administration of
Federal Criminal Justice,38 in 1963, before Gideon39 was
decided. And what he said was, "It should be understood
that governmental obligation to deal effectively with
problems of poverty in the administration of criminal
justice does not rest or depend upon some hypothetical
obligation of government to indulge in acts of public
charity." But I think a lot of legislators believe that way.
The obligation of government in criminal cases rests on
wholly different considerations and reflects principles of
much more limited application. The essential point is that
the problems of poverty with which this report is
concerned, arise in the process initiated by the government
for the achievement of a basic government purpose.
It is moreover a process that has one of its
consequences as the imposition of severe disabilities on the
persons proceeded against. Duties arise from action. The
course of conduct, however legitimate, entails the
possibility of serious injury to persons. A duty on the actor
to avoid the reasonably avoidable injuries is ordinarily
recognized. When government chooses to exert its powers
in the criminal area, its obligation is surely to be no less
than that of taking reasonable measures to eliminate those
factors that are irrelevant to the administration of justice.
The essence of the adversary system is challenged.
The survival of our system of criminal justice and the
values which it advances depend upon our constant
searching and creative questioning of official decisions and
assertions of authority at all stages of the process. The
prior performance of the defense function is thus as vital to
38 Poverty and the Administration of Federal Criminal Justice, Report
of the Attorney General's Committee on Poverty and the
Administration of Federal Criminal Justice (1963).
39 Id.
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the health of the system as the performance of the
prosecuting of adjudicatory functions. It follows that
insofar as the financial status of the accused impedes
vigorous and proper challenges. It constitutes a threat to
the vitality of the adversary system. And that seems like to
me what we're about. There is a threat to the vitality of the
adversary system.
Over twenty-five years ago we had a trial college
here at the law school, and one of the lawyers was a very
fine civil trial lawyer. He was talking with the participants
about the difficulty of convincing the jury to award
damages for pain and suffering. And what he said-and I
remember after all these years-is that the easiest thing for
somebody else to endure is somebody else's pain. And I
think in the criminal context, the easiest thing for us to
surrender is somebody else's Constitutional rights. You
see it. You hear it. If they came to me, and I had nothing
to hide I would do it. And why is that? And I was thinking
about this. Why are we willing to-I mean the Sixth
Amendment 4 is pretty clear. Gideon41 is pretty clear.
Why are we doing that?
I think that the basic premises underlying the Fifth
42
and Sixth Amendment43 are contrary to human nature.
When we talk about a presumption of innocence, I ask my
students to think about their experience. My own personal
experience-when I drive by and I see the police pull over
somebody else-my first response is I wonder what he did.
And if that's my first response, that undercuts the
presumption of innocence.
And so I tell them there's nothing wrong with that.
That is a human experience. My first experience, actually
is, I should stop the car and tell the person, "Don't say
40 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
41 Gideon, 372 U.S. at 335.
42 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
43 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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anything, and don't let them search your car." But the
reason I say that is because I think they probably did
something, and they've probably got something in the car.
And I'd really like not to have to say, "Why did you
consent to the search?" "Well, I didn't want the officer to
get mad at me."
So there's nothing wrong with that, but when we
come to talk to a jury, and they give us this little nod,
"Yeah, I believe in the presumption of innocence." That's
not what they really believe. When they come in the
courtroom, and they look at your client, they look at your
client like, "I wonder what you did." Similarly, the Fifth
Amendment right to silenceaa-you know-is that right?
Don't we think that the innocent person would step up and
say something if they were truly innocent?
And what's the evidentiary rule in civil cases? It
constitutes a tacit admission, right? So that's based on
human nature. So I wonder if the legislators and the judges
and the prosecutors don't operate on that assumption. Why
should we really care about this because the person is
probably guilty anyway? And if they are probably guilty,
why do we want to put resources into that? Wouldn't a
piece of the shoe do just as well?
When Mark Stephens talked to you this morning
about the case overload in his office-and when he talked
to you about what happened when the state sought to
intervene-they did not come into court and try to argue
that he could handle that number of cases. They did not try
to come into court and argue that he didn't have an ethical
obligation to provide effective representation to his clients.
What they said is, "It costs too much money." Justice costs
too much money, and that's what we're about. Instead of
providing a hundred pairs of shoes, we've only got ten.
And so you're going to have to make due with what you
44 U.S. CONST. amend. V
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have. And the judges that decided that case-particularly
in the South and in Tennessee-are probably the same
judges who put their left hand on the Bible, raised their
right hand, and swore to uphold the Constitutions of the
State of Tennessee and of the United States of America-
the Sixth Amendment.45 Those are the same judges. Those
of whom we're talking about. The attorney general that
argued that case did the same. So, I don't really think that
we're terribly interested in-well, I suppose-we say we're
interested in fairness, but the real issue is what are you
willing to do about it.
I want to spend a few minutes talking with you
about the Tennessee scheme for appointing counsel. When
the public defender's office under-as Norm talked about
46yesterday-under Rule 13, you have a person that is
deemed to be indigent. Rule 13 mandates that the public
defender be appointed, unless there's a conflict, or unless
the public defender-in a case-by-case basis presumably-
can make a clear and convincing showing that he can't
provide the constitutionally entitled representation.
Otherwise, they've got to take the case.
If they can't take the case, then we send it up to a
court-appointed counsel. And as Mark alluded to, this
wasn't new. This was created in roughly 1987-1988--our
public defender system. Before that, we paid court-
appointed counsel $20 for out-of-court work and $30
dollars for in-court work.
Now, the fact that you would pay more for out-of-
court work tells you something about our view of out-of-
court. It tells you something about our view of what the
quality of representation is. I've never talked to a lawyer
who didn't say "the work I do out of the office is more
important than the work I do in the courtroom, because I
have to be ready." But at any rate, the Tennessee Bar
45 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
46 TENN. S. CT. R. 13 (2010).
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Association said that this system was deplorable.
"Woefully inadequate" were their words.
And as a result, we created the public defender's
system. Then the Bar Association, in coalition with other
bar groups like the Tennessee Association of Criminal
Defense Lawyers and other legal entities like the Capital
Case Resource Center, filed a petition with the Tennessee
Supreme Court in 1994 seeking to do something about the
appointment representation in indigent cases. And the
courts did that. The court created a commission to look at
this.
This was their charge: They were charged in 1994
with developing and recommending a comprehensive plan
for the delivery of legal services of indigent defendants in
the state court system. They were charged with collecting
information regarding cases in which an indigent defendant
was represented by a public defender or a private attorney.
They were charged with determining a reasonable caseload
for each public defender. They were charged with creating
a statement of standards for criminal defense attorneys
appointed to represent indigent defendants, including
standards for complex and capital cases. They were
charged with developing a schedule of reasonable
compensation. And they were charged with developing a
system to audit claims for compensation.
So what happened? That was sixteen years ago.
Why are we here today? Why are you in Tennessee today?
Why is Mark Stephens filing this lawsuit that's now
bogged down for two or three years in the courts? Well,
part of the reason is that the public defenders are part of the
problem, as opposed to part of the solution. The public
defenders resisted having caseload standards, right? The
public defenders resisted having anybody providing any
oversight for their cases.
I think as an elected public defender they view their
constituency as the elector as opposed to their client.
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That's wrong. What did come out of this is that we have
raised our princely sum of $20 and $30 to $40 and $50. I
suppose that's a 100 percent increase-at least in the out-
of-court work.
There was testimony, though, and proof presented
that the overhead for the average criminal defense lawyer
in 1994 was $46.72, as I recall. So for out-of-court work,
you're only losing six dollars and seventy-two cents. Now,
I could be cynical-and I quite frankly am-and could
suggest to you that there's a method to this madness. You
don't have many lawyers, many experienced criminal
defense lawyers, clamoring to get on the court-appointed
list when you're losing $6.72 for every hour you work.
So the private bar is not there saying, "Wait a
minute, you need to be controlling the caseload of the
public defenders, so that they only provide-so that they
provide effective representation of counsel. You in effect
are taking money that we could otherwise have and should
have because the Constitution demands that we provide
effective assistance of counsel."
And the lawyers that we have, at least in Knoxville,
who often take court-appointed work are young
inexperienced lawyers for whom $40 an hour is probably
the best they can do. There are lawyers who are on the
court-appointed list who would rather turn-as the ad
says- "a wreck into a check, ''4 7 than they would to do
criminal defense work, but $40 is better than no check for
the wreck.
We have filed a petition-the Tennessee
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers-to increase the
fees with the Tennessee Supreme Court. I have
reservations about that. I'm afraid that we might get
something. I think that we have to file the petition because,
as it was alluded to this morning, you have to use non-
47 Ogle, Elrod, & Baril, PLLC,
http://www.knoxvilleinjuryquestion.com/.
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litigation before you can use litigation.
Now, suppose they get a $20 increase to $60 an
hour, which probably doesn't meet overhead now either.
Well, that's a 50 percent increase. That looks good doesn't
it? Who wouldn't like a 50 percent increase? Well, if $40
is inadequate and $60 is still inadequate, you still don't
have lawyers with quality experience providing mentoring
and models to the young lawyers coming up. I don't have
anything against young lawyers accepting court-appointed
work. Everybody's got to get a start somewhere. But we
ought to have standards at to what kinds of cases they can
handle. And we ought to have standards that require the
more complex and difficult cases to be with the
appointment and representation by competent, experienced
lawyers. Those lawyers in turn provide modeling for the
young lawyers. And you could say, "What about the public
defender's office?" I heard about the wonderful lawyers
that are out there in the public defender's office, who-in
Mark's office-who wonder why can't they provide the
model. I think the answer is because they're not the gold
standard.
Mark requires his lawyers to investigate a case
before they accept a plea. And one of the judges told him,
"You require your lawyers to do things that the private
lawyers don't do, and their cases are handled just fine. So
the people that are getting the court-appointed cases are the
people that aren't doing the investigation. The court's
accepting that, and saying "That's okay, we don't need it."
And you're requiring something that some of judges
believe the Constitution doesn't require. I don't know
where they get that. Well, since they are all former
prosecutors-that may be where-but one of them was in
your public defender's office before she became a
prosecutor, and before she got on the bench. So I don't
know. I think they believe, "Well, this person's probably
guilty, and so it's okay."
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The other thing that we do is that they try to divert
as many cases as they can from the system. And we have
what we call, I guess, an arraignment court. There are no
public defenders in an arraignment court. The people are
brought in, they're booked, and then sent to arraignment
court. And the first question they're asked is would you
like a lawyer, or would you like to see if you can resolve
this case today. And most of them would like not to come
back, nor would I want to come back. And they say, "I
think I'd like to resolve it today." And based on a
conversation with the prosecutor-and some brief colloquy
with the court-they plead out many, many cases. I don't
remember. What, 60 or 70 percent, did you say?
MARK STEPHENS: Seventy percent.
JERRY BLACK: Seventy percent of the cases that come in
are diverted, basically, from any court. This rate of
compensation hasn't changed in sixteen years-as I said.
But that's only part of the problem. I could make out a
case that there is a scheme in Tennessee designed to
provide minimum representation and designed to hide
ineffective assistance of counsel. Because your question
ought to be, "Why aren't ineffective assistance of counsel
claims filed in these non-capital cases?"
Well, the first thing is, we have a $1,000 cap. Now,
given the princely sum of $40 out of court, that would be
twenty-five hours. So you're going to spend three days
investigating this case-or three eight-hour days. You've
got to get the file from the lawyer. You've got to read the
file or the transcript of the record, and you've got to get the
transcript of the record. You somehow might talk to the
client, and then you've got to meet the Strickland
48
standard. You've got to provide first a deficient
performance, and then, second, you've got to prove
48 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
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prejudice.
Well, that wouldn't be so bad, why don't you ask
for resources? Why don't you get an investigator? Why
don't you get experts? Well,-because as Mary Ann told
you-in non-capital cases you don't have any right to
resources. You don't have any right to an investigator.
They're not going to pay for one. They're not going to pay
for an expert. And when you think about it-with the
National Academy of Science report-the work in criminal
cases is not getting less complex. It's getting more
complex. And the science is not getting better, it's getting
more suspect.
So without these experts what are you going to do?
How are you ever going to meet the prejudice standard?
Unless you want to do it out of pocket or, what'd you say?
Beg and plead and whatever to get resources? So I could
make a case that we're really trying to hide ineffective
assistance of counsel.
That's why, obviously, you do not have a
Constitutional right to post-conviction counsel. And in
Tennessee, not only do you not have a Constitutional right
to post-conviction counsel, but there's a statutory right to
post-conviction counsel. That lawyer-even though he
may be ineffective-can waive a client's rights to a full and
fair hearing. I know that because I argued it in the
Tennessee Supreme Court in a successor post-conviction
petition, House v. State.4 9 Paul Gregory House was later
found by the U.S. Supreme Court to have a viable
innocence claim. This was only after they went to federal
court and only after they had an evidentiary hearing. His
lawyer waived in state court and the evidentiary hearing.
And the court said, "That's okay." You only get one bite
out of the apple.
My question is in an ineffective assistance claims,
how do you ever know you got a bite out of the apple?
49 House v. State, 911 S.W.2d 705 (Tenn. 1995).
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How do you know you got an apple? The courts will tell
you-the Tennessee Supreme Court will tell you the only
effective way to raise an ineffective assistance claim is on
post-conviction relief. You got to have an evidentiary
hearing; you got to put on proof. Oh, but by the way, we
aren't giving you a good lawyer to do that. And we assume
we had a good apple and a bite out of it.
I realize there are real problems with the capital
system, and I'm not here to tell you that in Tennessee it's
good. I believe it's deplorable. But nonetheless, I do
believe it's probably better than the non-capital system. At
least there are some quality standards-some standards, I
don't know about quality. There are quantity standards as
opposed to quality standards. There are at least two
lawyers. There are at least resources on post-convictions.
And with the post-conviction defender's office, you've
probably got a good lawyer. I promise you, you got a good
lawyer.
It seems to me, the bottom line is-at least under
the Tennessee scheme-we hid ineffective assistance of
counsel. I think that what I come away with is several
conclusions, and I'll leave it with you. I believe that we
should focus on more radical solutions. I think that the
suggestion that we litigate ought to be the focus in this. We
ought to be talking about how to do it. We ought to be
talking about how to file these motions to withdraw.
The other thing that occurred to me-as I listened to
the gentlemen from Michigan and the State of
Washington-I think you place a real difficult burden on
public defenders to step up and say, "I'm ineffective in this
case." What if you changed the requirements under
Boykin, 50 and under, I think, Criminal Procedure Rule 1151
in Tennessee-to require-as Mary Ann said-this five-
page plea agreement? And in that you would have to say,
50 Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
51 TENN. R. CRIM. P. 11.
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"I investigated the case as a part of that. I spoke with the
client." And the lawyer has to certify that in every case
where there's a plea entered. Then that lawyer is not out
there on his own. He just has to-that lawyer or he or
she-has to at least be honest. But instead of worrying
about the affidavit-just that's part of the plea form. And
you can't get a plea unless you do that. It seems like to me
that would be an easy solution to simply say, modify
Boykin52 and require that as part of the proceedings.
I think that one of the things TACDL needs to work
on-but perhaps with the Tennessee Bar Association my
problem is they represent the greatest number of lawyers,
an overwhelming majority of which, are civil lawyers who,
unlike Max Bahner, may not be terribly interested in
criminal defense-is that we should work on standards and
try to get the court to adopt standards for indigent defense.
That's what we ought to be focusing on now. We need
those standards, so that you've got something that they
can't duck or dodge. The Tennessee Supreme Court
basically has said that they don't accept as gospel the
revisions for the ABA Guidelines on the provision of
counsel in death cases.
If litigation is not the answer, then it seems like to
me that we have to force education on the Bar. And I
would suggest that we think about dismantling the public
defender system and instead go to a straight court-
appointed system. And we require all lawyers, every
lawyer in the state, to sign up to take court-appointed cases.
And that lawyer has to personally do so. He can't pass it
off to an associate or a young lawyer. That's his or her
case. We could mandate three, six hours of criminal CLE
in criminal law and criminal procedures, so they get up to
speed.
But what Max Bahner told you is that when he did
those cases-what he found and what he learned and how it
200
52 Boykin, 395 U.S. at 238.
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impacted him-and so now he's a champion for indigent
defense. The majority of the lawyers who do not do this
and do not have any court experience look the other way.
We don't take criminal cases. We don't do that work.
I think that then you have to have some kind of
quality control system. I understand that the fear is that
these lawyers won't like their clients. Well, what about the
people that are doing it now, and they don't have time to
meet with their client. Seems like to me that we've got
injustice on one hand and injustice on the other and
hopefully we can overcome some of that. We will also
have a bigger voice in the legislature and in the courts
because somebody will want to do something, so that they
get the hell out of doing criminal defense work.
But the other thing is you have to have a quality
control system, and you have to have experienced lawyers
who do criminal defense that are familiar with the
requirements, that are familiar with the standards, and who
will enforce the standards. And if lawyers don't provide
quality representation, the penalty is you're disbarred.
Now, if I run the risk of being disbarred because I didn't
really want this case but I got it, I'm probably going to
provide you a quality representation.
When Mark talked about his ninety-day hiatus, all
lawyers in Knoxville were subject to court appointment.
The dean of the law school, who I don't believe is licensed
in Tennessee, was appointed to a case. The Mayor was
appointed to a case. And some really good civil lawyers
were appointed to a case. And I remember talking to one
of them. First-rate trial lawyer-handles complex medical
malpractice cases, handles complex products liability cases,
and he's smart enough to figure out criminal defense work
too. And he did.
He said, "I'm going down here. I think I'm going
to have a preliminary hearing. I'm putting my client on the
stand. I believe I can win this attempted first-degree
201
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murder case." By God, he did. And they didn't take it to
the criminal court, the grand jury, even though they won
the preliminary hearing. It had two effects. One, there
were a lot of different things being done by lawyers who
weren't familiar with that's how we do business. It
wouldn't have been long before we stopped having trial by
ambush because these lawyers would have said, "This isn't
how we do civil cases. We have discovery. We know
what's going to happen before we go to trial. This isn't the
right way to have a lawsuit. This isn't the right way to do
something." They would do something different.
The other people that didn't like it were the
prosecutors. Because they sort of know what we're going
to do. But when these guys came in there, they weren't
sure what they were going to do. It kind of created chaos in
the system; this is probably good for the defense.
And as a result, we got more funding. Not enough,
but we got more funding. Because all of a sudden the
private bar said, one, "We don't like doing this," and, two,
"The prosecution said we don't like the way they're doing
this," and, three, "We need to do something to get them
back out of here and where they belong. We need to get
back to business as usual."
I thank you for your time, and I am honored to be a
part of it. I hope we all can continue in the struggle to
improve indigent defense. Many of you are my heroes. I
admire the work you do. Please keep it up.
PENNY WHITE: I forgot to say about Jerry, golly, that
he's been director of our Legal Clinic four times. The man
can't say no. Thank you very much, Jerry. It was better
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PENNY WHITE: The previous sessions have focused on
the effects of insufficient resources on the Sixth
Amendment'sl promise. This session is somewhat different
as it will focus on other impediments to the delivery of
effective assistance of counsel, specifically, impediments to
counsel in capital cases that raise not only legal issues but
ethical issues.
The panel format will also be different. The panel
will discuss hypothetical cases that are strikingly similar to
cases that happen every day. These hypotheticals will be
posed first to a panel of experienced criminal defense and
capital lawyers, and then hopefully we'll have time to open
it up for discussion.
Each panelist will speak primarily to one
hypothetical, which I will introduce to you, and then we'll
have some interaction between the panelists before moving
on to the next hypothetical. At the end, we will engage in
your discussion, comments or questions.
Let me describe the materials for this session. On
the flash drive are three articles that our panelists thought
would be helpful to you as you look at these issues in
greater depth. They include Larry Fox's article in the
Hofstra Law Review on capital guidelines;2 Sean O'Brien's
article in the same, volume 36, of the Hofstra Law Review
on supplemental guidelines for the mitigation function;
3
and Brad MacLean, Bill Redick and Shane Truett's article
Pretend Justice on death penalty representation in
Tennessee, which is in volume 38 of the Memphis Law
1 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
2 Lawrence Fox, Capital Guidelines and Ethical Duties: Mutually
Reinforcing Responsibilities, 36 HOFSTRA L. REv. 775, (2008).
3 Sean D. O'Brien, When Life Depends on It: Supplementary
Guidelines for the Mitigation Function of Defense Teams in Death
Penalty Cases, 36 HOFSTRA L. REv. 693 (2008).
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Review.
4
All three of those articles are on your flash drive.
But to make it a little easier to follow along and participate
in this particular session, we also have a handout. The
handout includes a copy of the hypotheticals, the
PowerPoint slides and then some additional resources that
are listed on the slides that are pertinent to the individual
hypotheticals. So that's what you will have in front of you.
Also, we have copied in total some of the most pertinent
provisions from the ABA Guidelines5 and two ethics
opinions from Tennessee.
So as we begin the discussion, we'll hear a lot of our
panelists undoubtedly referring to the ABA Guidelines6 and
on the slide, which is in front of you and also in your
handout, is the link to those guidelines. The ones that we
will be most frequently referring to, 10.5, 10.7, 10.11 and
10.13, 7 are in your handout, either completely or partially,
the relevant parts. And as I mentioned, there are two
Tennessee ethics opinions that may be helpful to Tennessee
lawyers in your handouts.
Let me then begin by introducing our panelists very
briefly because you have the bios of three of our panelists
in your biographical material. Our panelists will draw upon
their own personal experiences, but also upon excellent,
excellent resources that they will make you familiar with
and that will be on the slides.
First, we are honored to have with us, in
alphabetical order, Mary Ann Green, who is Assistant
Public Defender from Hamilton County, which for those of
4 William P. Redick, Jr., Bradley A. MacLeanm & M. Shane Truett,
Pretend Justice: Defense Representation in Tennessee Death Penalty
Cases, 38 U. MEM. L. REv. 303 (2008).
5 A.B.A. GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF
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you who aren't Tennesseans, is Chattanooga. Second,
Bradley A. MacLean, who is with the Office of the Post-
Conviction Defender in Nashville, Tennessee. Then we
have Sean O'Brien, who is a Professor of Law at the
University of Missouri-Kansas City in Kansas City,
Missouri. And I have to give special thanks to Ann Short-
Bowers, who is a lawyer in Knoxville with the Bosch Law
Firm. She is neither Larry Fox, who had an emergency, nor
David Dow who had an emergency, but she has graciously
agreed to come on less than 24 hours notice and help us
out. So please first join me in thanking our panelists.
Our first hypothetical is about formulating trial
strategy. The situation is this: The client is charged with
capital murder. You, as counsel, discuss with the client
your plan to interview the client's mother. The client says,
"Absolutely not, you are not to bother my mother about any
of this. She has suffered enough. I am directing you not to
contact her under any circumstances." The client is
competent and does not change his or her mind even after
extensive explanation.
And we pose the question to Professor O'Brien,
"How do you proceed?"
SEAN O'BRIEN: Thank you. This is the familiar "don't
be talking to my momma" hypothetical. It involves ethical
rules pertaining lawyer-client relationships and making
weighty decisions about life and death. I had a client on
death row tell me this story. It is in bad taste, I'll tell you
in advance. That's never stopped me before from telling a
story. But there were these two guys on death row in
Texas, both scheduled to be executed on the same night,
and the warden is giving them their final requests.
And so the warden says to the first guy, "I'll give
you one request before we execute you." And he says,
207
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"You know, I'd like to hear 'ACHY BREAKY HEART ' 8 one
more time." And the warden says, "You got it." He turns
to the second guy and says, "Do you have any last
requests?" And the guy says, "Yeah, I want to go first."
The hypothetical makes me think of the second Star
Trek movie, the WRATH OF KAHN, 9 in which you learn that
Captain Kirk cheated on the Kobayashi Maru scenario
l °
because he doesn't believe in the no-win scenario. So in
order to pass the test, he re-writes the question. And the
part of the question here that I would rewrite is the
assumption of competence because, in my view, a
defendant facing a capital charge is very, very unlikely to
be in a position to make a competent decision to forego
mitigating evidence or to forego an appeal. So let me talk
about that from this point of view.
First of all, we have to talk about theory, right?
Because there are so many law professors in the crowd, I
feel like we at least need to give some lip service to this.
But trust me-those of us who have been doing this for a
long time-we've got this down in practice. We'll just
never work it out in theory. The standard that the ethical
code gives us is that we're supposed to let the client decide
what plea to enter, whether to waive the jury trial, whether
to testify, and that sort of thing.
The ethical standards also tell us as lawyers that we
have the right to decide what witnesses to call and whether
8 BILLY RAY CYRUS, ACHY BREAKY HEART (PolyGram/iMercury
1992).
9 STAR TREK Il: THE WRATH OF KHAN (Paramount Pictures 1982).
10 The Kobyashi Maru scenario was a test at Starfleet Academy
involving a simulation in which the cadet, acting as a starship captain,
was surrounded by hostile ships while responding to a distress call
from the Kobyashi Maru, a stranded freighter. There was no way out;
the purpose of the exercise was to determine how the cadet would
respond to the no-win scenario. James T. Kirk does not believe in the
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and how to cross-examine those witnesses and what
motions to make. All tactical and strategic decisions are
the exclusive province of the lawyer after consultation with
the client. And so that's the premise from which I begin to
work this out in practice.
The other premise though, comes from the
Constitution. And the standard in death penalty cases is
fully-informed decision making in matters of life and
death.' And that goes not just for the decision of the
judge, the decision of the jury, and the decision of the
prosecutor about whether to seek the death penalty, but it's
also the client's role to make fully-informed decisions
about what evidence to present. How can the client know
what evidence you might present in mitigation if we have
been barred from talking to his or her mother prior to even
getting to this stage? So that's the second point.
The other thing the ABA Guidelines give us in
Guideline 10.7,12 the commentary is particularly important:
That we have an obligation not only under the Constitution
but under the ethical guidelines, to conduct a thorough and
independent investigation as to both guilt and penalty. And
that obligation exists regardless of any statement by the
client that evidence bearing on penalty is not to be collected
or presented. 13 That's an important provision of the Ethical
Guidelines.
The other critically important aspect of the Ethical
i "[W]here sentencing discretion is granted, it generally has been
agreed that the [sentencer's] 'possession of the fullest information
possible concerning the defendant's life and characteristics' is '[h]ighly
relevant-if not essential-[to the] selection of an appropriate
sentence."' Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 602-03 (1977) (quoting
Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949)) (alterations in
original).
12 A.B.A. GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF
DEF. COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES 10.7 (2003).
13 A.B.A. GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF
DEF. COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES 10.7(A) (2003).
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Guidelines is our duty as lawyers to make every
appropriate effort to establish a relationship of trust. The
client telling you that you're not to talk to his or her mother
is a sign of distrust. There's a problem in the attorney-
client relationship. There's an absence of rapport and
likely even a lack of understanding on the client's part
about your need to be communicating with members of the
client's family. The Guideline recommends very strongly
that you see your client within twenty-four hours of
appointment and that you engage in a continuing and
interactive dialogue with the client.'
4
This is very important in the context of today's
discussion because the defender system is in financial
crisis; attorney-client communication is the first casualty of
an overloaded public defender's office. You don't see your
client as often as you should. You don't talk to your client
as often as you should. And when you finally do get there
to talk to your client, what do you talk about? Why haven't
you been here to talk to me? And that creates a barrier in
that relationship. And so this is incredibly important that
we keep that thought in mind.
Ethical Consideration, 7-8.15 A lawyer should exert
his best efforts to ensure decisions of the client are made
only after the client has been informed of relevant
considerations. Again, how can you fulfill your ethical
obligation to your client if you haven't interviewed the
client's entire family?
The other aspect of our obligation as lawyers
regarding mitigation and guilt/innocence investigation is
that we have to understand, the client is not the only person
who has a stake in the outcome. Generally, as a society we
have things in place to stop people from committing
14 A.B.A. GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF
DEF. COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES 10.5 (2003).
15 A.B.A. GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF
DEF. COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES 7-8 (2003).
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suicide. If you're the guy standing there on the ledge next
to the fellow who's thinking about jumping, only in a bad
Mel Gibson movie do you say "Go ahead." And if you do,
you only do it as a strategy to get him to stop.
The other aspect of this decision has to do with the
context of capital litigation. We must understand as capital
litigators that these decisions are made in the context of
extreme trauma. Not just trauma from the capital crime,
the arrest, the incarceration, but also the trauma of the
child's past. And quite often when the client tells me that
he or she does not want me to talk to certain witnesses or
interview momma, that tells me that momma knows
something that I need to know. That heightens my desire to
go talk to that witness because it is likely that this person is
trying to hide trauma from me. 
16
What's one of the classic symptoms of trauma?
Avoidance. Avoidance of triggers that cause you to re-
experience the trauma. 17 And yet, we all know from death
penalty litigation, that it is the trauma that the client has
suffered that is most likely to evoke sympathy and
understanding on the part of the capital decision-maker that
will save his or her life.
So we have to proceed from the understanding that
there are barriers between us and the mitigation case. And
some of those barriers include the shame and
embarrassment and humiliation of having been raised in an
impoverished, abusive household. They're not proud of
that. And they don't want that paraded in front of the jury
or a court, especially not if it's a high publicity, high-
16 A competent mitigation investigation will invade dark, shameful
family secrets; it "exposes raw nerves, re-traumatizes, scratches at the
scars nearest the client's heart." Russell Stetler, Mitigation Evidence in
Death Penalty Cases, THE CHAMPION, Jan.-Feb. 1999, at 35-36.
17 For an excellent discussion of trauma issues in capital cases, see
Kathy Wayland, The Importance of Recognizing Trauma Througout
Capital Mitigation Invesigations and Presentations, 36 HOFSTRA L.
REv. 923 (2008).
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profile case.'8
There may be concerns about the consequences.
Are my other children going to be taken away from me?
Maybe they don't understand why it is you want to know
this. They don't understand why this is a critical part of his
or her life history. There may be some race and class and
social barriers. Most of us in the capital defense
community who are doing this are white while many of our
clients are people of color. And so we have a lot of other
kinds of barriers to get over.
But the most significant barrier I have found in
these cases is the desire of the client to one day have a
normal relationship with the parent, with the abuser-the
idealizing of the abuser. There's a really cruel experiment
that they did with monkeys sometime ago where they put
needles under the fur of a surrogate mother figure and then
an artificial breast from which the baby monkey would
seek nourishment. And in spite of the fact that it was
physically painful for those baby monkeys to snuggle up to
their mother while they were eating, they never stopped
trying.19 And those are our clients. Those are our clients in
these cases.
And so we have to proceed with the understanding
that the things that we're going to investigate will expose
these raw nerves and re-traumatize and as Russ Stetler says,
"Scratch at the scars that are nearest to the client's heart."
20
And the answer is not to avoid it and not to cave in to the
client's natural tendency to stay away from those things,
but to counsel the client through it by this process of
18 See John H. Blume & Pamela Blume Leonard, Capital Cases:
Principles of Developing and Presenting Mental Health Evidence in
Criminal Cases, THE CHAMPION, Nov. 2000, at 63-65.
19 See The Adoption History Project, Harry Harlow: Monkey Love
Experiments,
http://www.uoregon.edu/-adoption/studies/fHarlowMLE.htm.
20 Russell Stetler, Mitigation Evidence in Death Penalty Cases, THE
CHAMPION, Feb. 23, 1999, at 5.
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constant engagement.
This is the American Medical Association's model
of suicide prevention and interventions. 21 And you could
not do a better job of diagramming the stresses that a death
penalty defendant is under when facing a capital charge.
You look at suicidal behavior, and there are two things that
start it.
The first is stressful life event, and I think being a
defendant in capital case qualifies. Does anybody disagree
with that? The second is a mood or psychiatric disorder.
How many of you have ever had a capital client who didn't
have that going on? So in the beginning, you have the
formula, and then you get the perfect storm here-the
suicidal ideation, the thinking about life or death-and
we're forced to engage our clients about that thought
process. They're going to try to kill you. Huh, let me think
about that.
Then we get to the specific factors that feed into
suicidal behavior. Impulsivity. Gee, I've never had an
impulsive client, how about you? Hopelessness and/or
pessimism. How often do you see that as your client is
starting to absorb the weight of the state's case and the
massive resources that are being devoted to seek to end his
or her life? If that doesn't make a normal person hopeless,
I don't know what will.
Access to lethal means. Well, these are your tax
dollars at work. The whole idea behind capital litigation is
to provide the lethal means. And then imitation. Imitation.
Who are they imitating? Governors, senators,
congressmen, prosecutors, maybe even other people on
death row. And then all of those add up to a suicidal act.
Then you look in the blue section on the right, the
21 A graphic depiction of the Suicide Risk Assessment Model discussed
here is available online at Mark A. Zamorski, Report of the Canadian
Forces Expert Panel on Suicide Prevention,
http://www.forces.gc.ca/health-sante/ps/dh-sd/spr-rps-eng.asp.
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prevention. Interventions and education awareness
programs. Do you have any of those in your county jails?
Screening individuals for high risk. How good is the
county jail at that? Pharmacological therapy, medication.
Most of our clients are not getting the medication they
need. Psychotherapy. That never happens in jails, not on a
meaningful level-follow-up care for suicide attempts.
None of the treatments intended to ameliorate suicidal
impulses or behaviors exist on a meaningful level in our
client's lives.
One thing I learned about investigating suicide is
that if there is one suicide attempt in a person's life, one in
ten of those people who have had one suicide attempt
eventually will succeed in committing suicide. And so how
many of our clients have suicide attempts in their past?
Virtually all. I reject the basic premise that this is a
voluntary, competent decision. This is my definition that I
found in the Youth Suicide Prevention Program website:
"Suicide is not chosen. It happens when pain exceeds the
resources for coping with pain."22  I think that's a
significant factor in dealing with all of these decisions.
Pain exceeds the resources for coping with pain. And it is
our public defender systems in this context that provide the
resources for coping with pain. It is our job as capital
defense attorneys to keep the client on board and moving
forward.
I actually have John McCain on my side. You
know, he's an angry guy, and I have discovered it's not just
because he's a Republican. I realized this when I read
some comments that he made on the Anti-torture
legislation. "Solitary confinement is an awful thing. It
crushes your spirit, weakens your resistance, more
effectively than any other form of mistreatment." This is a
22 Youth Suicide Prevention Program, Resources, YSPP Suicide
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guy who had an arm broken twice and a broken leg during
interrogation, and he says the worst was solitary. And that
is all of our clients on death row, all of our clients in pre-
trial detention. I don't have to tell you we have more
people in jail getting mental health treatment than we do in
our hospitals getting mental health treatment right now. I
won't dwell on it because of the materials on your thumb
drive-but the Hofstra Law Review has some amazing
articles about this very subject and about the mitigation
function.
And finally, this is my argument that I'm right
about this. This is Joe Amrine. I have had the "don't talk
to my momma" discussion with him. In the last year of his
appeals, he had no stay of execution along with ten other
guys who are backed up behind a particular legal issue.
The first Tuesday of every month he watched an inmate
parade by his cell in the company of guards taken off to the
death watch cell and executed at midnight that night. And
there were ten guys waiting a year for their turn.
And after eight, he called me up and said, "I want to
go next." It had nothing to do with ACHY BREAKY
23HEART, trust me. But he was so damaged emotionally
and so ready to get out of there that he would do anything.
We eventually succeeded. Rather than getting an execution
warrant, he got a briefing schedule. We proved his
innocence and this is the day of his release from prison.24
So don't assume guilt from the fact that your client wants
to volunteer to be executed, or to avoid mitigating evidence
in the penalty stage of the capital trial. So this is my
Exhibit One, Joe Amrine. Thank you.
23 CYRUS, supra note 7.
24 See Amrine v. Roper, 102 S.W.2d 541 (Mo. 2003) (en bane)
(granting Joe Amrine habeas corpus relief and ordering his release from
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PENNY WHITE: All right. Facilitator's prerogative,
Sean. We all know that the courts won't agree with our
evaluation of our client's competence. So I'm taking you
back to the question. There's been a competency
determination and your client is declared competent. Your
client says, "Don't talk to momma." Is your short answer
"talk to momma" and competency?
SEAN O'BRIEN: My short answer is "talk to momma,"
because competency doesn't resolve it. There's also
knowing and voluntary and intelligent decision-making on
the part of the client. And you can be competent but not be
making a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent decision. So
client engagement is my answer to that.
PENNY WHITE: The caption under this next question is
one law professor tries to take on another. Your client
knowingly, voluntarily and freely says, "Don't talk to
momma." Do you tell the public defenders in the audience
"talk to momma?"
SEAN O'BRIEN: You know, it's sort of like-[Telephone
rings.]
PENNY WHITE: Momma's calling.
SEAN O'BRIEN: There's momma. There's momma.
PENNY WHITE: She called me. I didn't call her.
SEAN O'BRIEN: You know, hopefully, and-and I'm
going to sidestep your question again-
PENNY WHITE: I know that.
SEAN O'BRIEN: Because that's my prerogative, right?
216
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And so, you know, if this happens on day one of your
representation, you've got a problem. You've got a barrier
to work over, and you'd better work through it with your
client. And you're going to have the time to do that. So
you've got something to work on.
There is a wonderful book by Xavier Amador
25
called, I AM NOT SICK. He advocates engagement with
somebody who has mental illness or emotional stressors in
his life, and he uses the acronym LEAP, which is Listen,
Empathize, Agree and Plan. You have to hear out the
client. You have to listen to what's going on. You have to
show that you empathize with the client's situation. You
have to agree on an approach. And you have to develop a
plan. And you have to do that together. Because the reality
is this: If the client says I don't want you to talk to my
mother, and you say, "Screw you, I'm going to see her
tonight," you're going to lose that client.
PENNY WHITE: That's right.
SEAN O'BRIEN: And so, you know, what I'm saying is
that I don't lightly disobey the client, but I will continually
work on the process of engaging the client and engaging
the client's family. So that when that conversation does
happen, I might even plausibly be able to say to the client,
"Hey, I want you to know that I talked to your mother last
night."
PENNY WHITE: So you're going to see fairly quickly that
our next two hypotheticals are related but they are
somewhat different. I'll ask Brad, Mary Ann, and Ann if
they have anything they want to say in response to Sean
before we move ahead.
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BRADLEY MACLEAN: Well, I want to make one
comment. I want to follow-up on a lot of what Sean said.
But the ABA Guidelines are very clear. They impose on
defense counsel the absolute obligation to conduct a
thorough mitigation investigation whatever the client's
wishes may be. So if you are going to comply with the
guidelines, you conduct the investigation.
PENNY WHITE: You see on the overhead the Guideline
that Brad's referring to, 10.7,26 that speaks to that. Mary
Ann?
MARY ANN GREEN: And I would just reinforce Brad's
comments. So as a public defender, who has handled
capital cases, absolutely, you talk to the mother.
PENNY WHITE: Ann, anything on this one?
ANN SHORT-BOWERS: [Shakes no.]
PENNY WHITE: So let's go turn then to our second
scenario, somewhat related but a bit different. Here the
client has been convicted of first-degree murder. The State
has rested its case on penalty. You are preparing to begin
your case. You've done your homework. You've
conducted your investigation. But at the point that you are
about to begin your case, the client instructs you to call no
witnesses and to offer no evidence in mitigation. Mary
Ann, how do you proceed? Not that you've been there and
done that.
MARY ANN GREEN: No. I even have the t-shirt and
scars to show it. Absolutely it is ineffective assistance of
26 A.B.A. GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOITNMENT AND
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counsel at that point to simply agree with your client.
Period. There is no question and there is no footnote. It is
ineffective assistance at that point. What you can do-and
what the Tennessee cases hopefully are teaching us to do
even though the law in Tennessee is that your client has the
right to direct his own destiny and has the right to forego
mitigation, that is the law. However, I would offer some
guidance hopefully for someone caught in that position as I
was and looking around for what do I do now.
First, ask for a continuance. I agree completely
with Sean about the competency issue. Whether the client
has been deemed competent by the State's experts, your
experts, your co-counsel, whoever, there is a competency
issue at that point. And you are asking for the continuance
to discuss the matter with the client. But what you're
actually doing is asking for some time to muster your
resources-to muster your experts to figure out how to
address this issue.
Number one, why is the client doing this? You
have to determine that. You can't determine that unless
you've done all the things that Sean was talking about
earlier in terms of establishing that relationship with the
client. You cannot determine what's driving the train at
that point. And the one thing that you want to know is
whether it's because he thinks he's going to be
embarrassed. Is it because he doesn't want his relatives
involved? Is it because he doesn't want embarrassing facts
about his past to come out or about his relative's past? You
want to know what's driving the train.
Unfortunately, what drives the train for so many of
them seems to be so and so, who has experience because
he's a death row inmate, and he came back to the county
jail on a post-conviction-he told me I had that right and it
seemed like a good idea to me. They have actual
delusional ideas about the criminal justice system. One of
them is, that if they don't let you present mitigating
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evidence then the jury will think that they are more
innocent. Or somehow the jury will find that they made a
mistake in the first place and they'll go back and take away
the guilt finding. That's an actual delusional understanding
of the criminal justice system.
Another one is "if I don't let you put on mitigating
evidence, then I will automatically get the death penalty.
And if I automatically get the death penalty, I'll wind up
with the best attorneys. I'll get the best attorneys. I'll get
two attorneys instead of one attorney on my appeal and on
my post-conviction and on my federal hab. And not only
will I get that, but I'll get services." And in Tennessee,
that's the law. They will get services on a death penalty
post-conviction case. They will not get services on a non-
death post-conviction case. But they think somehow that's
going to give them a second bite at the apple of actual
innocence and of walking out. But they are proceeding
with some very warped ideas about the criminal justice
system. The only thing that I can suggest in terms of
counterbalancing that is again the relationship that you
establish with your client.
Listen more than you talk. Listen to what your
client is telling you. Listen to what the client's significant
others are telling you. Identify very, very early who the
significant others are in your client's life. Is it clergy? Is it
wife? Husband? Children? Nieces? Nephews? Mothers?
Dads? Little old lady next door? Who is the significant
other in your client's life? And establish just as close a
relationship with that significant other as you do with the
client. And again, listen more than you talk. Listen to
what these people are trying to tell you.
When you establish a relationship, a new
relationship with someone, like a friend, you would hope
that you get to know each other. You get to know their
characteristics. You get to know the mutual likes and
dislikes and then you determine, hey, this person could be a
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friend. I'm not saying you have to be the best buddy of
your client, who is accused of a capital offense, but I am
saying that if you listen more than you talk, you will get to
know your client.
When you get to know you client, there will be an
establishment of trust. Trust will be established. And at
that point, you can begin to educate your client, educate
your client about why certain things need to be done that
the client may not have thought of. And if you just went in
at the very first meeting and said we're going to be talking
to your mother, your daddy, your grandmother, your
granddaddy and all your brothers and sisters. And he's
going, "Whoa." Well, if you don't establish that
relationship, if you don't establish that trust, then you're
behind in the game.
The other thing that you want to do is to enlist the
help. In this hypothetical, your client's just been found
guilty. You're getting ready to start sentencing, and the
client says no mitigation. Your experts have evaluated this
client on basically an objective basis. They are not there to
treat the client. They are there to evaluate the client and to
give you assistance in building your case for mitigation.
But your experts are still experts. They're still
psychiatrists, psychologists, social workers. They're still
experts. Bring in your team. Bring in your team of experts
and see if they have ideas about, number one, why he's
doing this? Number two, what we can do to combat it?
Then ask the court for a competency evaluation. At the
very least, it's going to build a record. But don't just go in
and say, "Your Honor, my client says he doesn't want
mitigation, and he's been sitting there during trial acting
like a perfectly nice, good, ordinary citizen. And I'm not
sure why he might be not competent, but we need a
competency evaluation."
You're not going to get a competency evaluation on
that. Go in with your facts and your documents in hand.
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Go in prepared to make an offer of proof if nothing else.
Go in prepared with the medical records, the mental health
records, the mental health reports, and your social history.
One thing that I would suggest is that from your very first
meeting with your client, begin a behavioral time line.
On day one, even if it is just a few descriptive
words, describe your client's demeanor. Describe his
attitude. Describe whether he's getting at that point any
assistance from mental health professionals in the jail in
terms of treatment, medication. Keep up with his treatment
and medication throughout the process. I don't know how
it is with your jail. But the jail in Hamilton County-
unless we have the HIPAA 27 release and a really good
relationship with the jail, our client may be on all kinds of
medication, and we wouldn't know it. So you have to ask
for these records.
And it's an ongoing process because they don't
really recognize that if they change medications, or if the
doctor comes in and changes a diagnosis, that they have to
let us know if we got the records two months ago. But
keep a behavioral time line, so that when you go in front of
the judge and you say we need a competency evaluation,
you can show the judge with that behavioral time line how
your client's behavior has disintegrated over a period of
time.
Also make an offer of proof. Try to present lay
witnesses and expert witnesses on the issue of your request
for a competency hearing. You've got the witnesses there
anyway. They're there to start the mitigation part of this
case. The lay witnesses who have been visiting him,
whether it be clergy or family or friends-visiting him
throughout his incarceration-can testify to those things
that are in your behavioral time line.
It corroborates exactly what you're time line is
27 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, 42
U.S.C. § 201 (2006).
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saying. The expert witnesses can testify as to any
underlying mental illness or mental defect that the client
has. Recognize that the standard for competency in
Tennessee is the Dusky28 Standard as adopted by Macke29
Those both say that the defendant must have a rational as
well as a factual understanding of the proceedings against
him, and that he must be able to understand the nature and
object of the proceedings in order to consult with his
counsel and to assist in preparing his defense.
Understand also, that when someone is sent for a
competency evaluation in Tennessee, the McGarry
Instrument is the one most often used. There are thirteen
points in the McGarry Instrument. And they were
recognized in State v. Benton, 759 S.W.2d 427,30 a 1988
case. And in that case, the McGarry thirteen points were
set out: Ability to appraise and apprise legal defenses
available; level of unmanageable behavior; quality of
relating to attorney; ability to plan strategy-that's a novel
idea-; ability to appraise the role of various participants in
the courtroom proceedings; understanding of courtroom
proceedings; appreciation of the charges; appreciation of
the range and nature of possible penalties; ability to judge
likely outcomes-well, if his idea of the outcome by not
putting on mitigation evidence is that he's going to get
better lawyers and he's going to get services and therefore,
he's going to get off death row, this is not realistic-;
capacity to disclose to attorney available pertinent facts
surrounding the defense; capacity to challenge prosecution
witnesses realistically; capacity to testify relevantly; and
manifestation of self-serving versus self-defeating
behaviors. That's something that should be in your
behavior time line.
If the client continues in his request, and the court
28 Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960).
29 Mackey v. State, 537 S.W.2d 704, 707 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1975).
30 State v. Benton, 759 S.W.2d 427, 430 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988).
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allows the sentencing hearing to proceed without the
competency evaluation, again, go back and request a more
thorough examination, on the record, of the client's
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his right to
present mitigating evidence. Let me repeat that. If the
court proceeds without a competency evaluation, then go
back and request a more thorough examination, on the
record, of his knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver.
In the Kiser31 case, which is cited in your material,
the colloquy between the judge and the defendant takes up
about I think seventeen to eighteen lines.32 That's what it
took for this man to say "I don't want any mitigation. I
want to get the death penalty." If you enter a plea of guilty
on a shoplifting case in Hamilton County, you have to fill
out this form, which is five pages long. You have to read it
to your defendant. You have to not only read it to the
defendant, the defendant has to be able to knowingly
answer the judge's questions during the plea. Ladies and
gentlemen, it's ridiculous to allow the courts to proceed
with a mitigation waiver that takes seventeen or eighteen
lines on a death penalty case, when it takes five pages to
enter a plea on a shoplifting case. I'm getting the bad
looks, so, I'm sorry.
Finally, the last thing that I would suggest-I'm
skipping over some of this-but the last thing that I would
suggest is at any rate, submit under seal your entire
mitigation case. Submit affidavits of your lay witnesses,
reports of your expert witnesses, your exhibits, submit
under seal the entire case into the court record. So that
hopefully-somewhere down the line-someone will be
able to look at it.
The one thing I don't want to leave out with regard
to the questions that the judges ask, at the bottom of the
plea form-this part is all about what the person is charged
31 State v. Kiser, 284 S.W.3d 227, 241 (Tenn. 2009).
32 Id. at 240.
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with. "Do you understand that you're charged with
shoplifting, and it carries one day up to eleven months and
twenty-nine days?" There should be something like this for
the mitigation waiver. The mitigation waiver should say,
"Do you understand what the mitigating facts that your
attorney would present to the court are-and actually spell
out those facts." Thank you.
PENNY WHITE: So the cases that Mary Ann referred to
are State v. Kiser33 and Zagorski v. State.34 Their citations
are on the PowerPoint slides. I handed Sean a copy of
Formal Ethics Opinion 84-F-73,35 which quotes Zagorski
while Mary Ann was speaking. He took one look at me
and said, "This is horrible." But that's the law in the State
of Tennessee. That's the part you can edit out when the
transcript is prepared if you would like.
SEAN O'BRIEN: Okay.
PENNY WHITE: And the guidelines that Mary Ann
referred to include 10.736 you've already looked at. It is
pretty clear. Counsel's duty to investigate and present
mitigating evidence is well established regardless of the
desires of the client-regardless of counsel's belief that the
investigation will prove futile. And finally, even more
specific is guideline 10.11.37 Counsel at every stage has a
continuing duty to investigate the issues bearing upon
penalty and to seek information that supports mitigation or
33 Id.
34 Zagorski v. State, 983 S.W.2d 654 (Tenn. 1998).
35 Tenn. Bd. Of Prof.'l Responsibility, Formal Ethics Op. 84-F-73(a)
(1999).
36 ABA GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT & PERFORMANCE OF DEF.
COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES 10.7 (2003).
37 ABA GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT & PERFORMANCE OF DEF.
COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES 10.11 (2003).
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rebuts the prosecution's case. This includes discussing the
procedures with the client-maintaining a consistent theme
throughout both phases of the case-in determining
whether the client will testify and what evidence will be
used in the defense case.
So our next hypothetical, carrying along with this
same theme, is post-sentencing strategy. Now we're at the
appellate level. The status of this case is the post-
conviction appeal of the state death-sentenced inmate. The
direct appeals have been completed. Counsel is explaining
the next steps with regard to post-conviction appeals to the
client. And the client-maybe based on some of these
conversations Mary Ann so aptly pointed out-says, "This
is just not a life worth living. I don't want to live if I can't
be free. No more lawyers. No more appeals. I'm ready to
die. Don't file anything. If you do, I'll tell the judge you
are doing it against my wishes." So the hard question is
what to do when you are asked to abandon appeals. Brad?
BRADLEY MACLEAN: Let me start off by saying that if
that is the situation that you're confronted with in post-
conviction in Tennessee, you really don't have a serious
ethical dilemma because in order to file a post-conviction
petition in Tennessee the client has got to sign the petition.
It has to be a verified petition. And so the situation that
you run up against is a client who refuses to sign the
petition.
Once the petition is signed, you do have situations
where the client will seek to dismiss or withdraw the
petition. And often they do that by simply writing a letter
to the judge saying that that's what they want to do. And
so once that happens the die is cast, and what you need to
do in those circumstances is very clear. It's not an ethical
dilemma at all. In those cases, you simply raise the issue of
competency and litigate competency. You have no choice
but to do that.
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I'm going to talk about the more general issue. All
of these scenarios fall under the same general rule. In all of
these scenarios, what you have is a volunteer. You have a
client who is willing to volunteer for execution. The client
may not look at it exactly that way. The client at the trial
stage who wants to waive mitigation may not see himself or
herself as a volunteer. But, in fact, that's what he or she is.
If you successfully waive mitigation, and as a
consequence no mitigation evidence is presented at the
trial, then under Tennessee law-and I suspect it's true in
most other jurisdictions-the death penalty is mandated as
long as the prosecution proves its case and produces a
finding of the existence of aggravators that qualify the
defendant for the death penalty consideration.
I want to, first of all, raise one issue. Death is
different and we hear that a lot. And in this context, I want
to focus on two ways in which death is different, which is I
think fairly startling when you think about it. In Tennessee,
life without parole and the death penalty are the only kinds
of cases where the jury makes the sentencing decision. If a
defendant is allowed to waive mitigation, it is the only kind
of case where the defendant is given the choice-the
authority to make the sentencing decision because then the
sentencing decision is death, if the prosecution proves its
case. There is no Constitutional right-there's no right in
the law in any other area of the law-for a defendant to
choose his sentence. That's the job of the sentencer,
typically the judge. But death is different in this respect.
Secondly, in Tennessee, death is different in
particular in the case where the defendant seeks to waive
mitigation because in all other serious criminal cases in
Tennessee, before a judge can sentence a defendant, the
law requires that the judge receive a pre-sentencing report.
And if you look at the statute in Tennessee as to what must
go into a pre-sentencing report, it's basically the same kind
of information that a defense lawyer should present at
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sentencing in a capital case: something about the client's
history, the client's mental status and things of that sort. So
ironically, in a death case where the defendant waives
mitigation and as a consequence no mitigation is
presented-unlike any other serious criminal case in
Tennessee-for the sentencing decision is made without
any information whatsoever of that type. So death is
different in those respects.
I want to talk about the fundamental question. I had
a student who recently asked these very same kinds of
questions. She asked me these questions because she was
writing a paper for her law school class, and I had about
five minutes to e-mail her an answer. And yet I think that
the answer was as concise as I can put it-exactly how I
would respond to all of these hypotheticals. The first
response is: I will do everything I can to present a
mitigation case and in post-conviction to advocate for a life
rather than a death sentence. I will do everything that I can
in my power.
The second thing that I will always do is: I will ask
certain basic questions. And I've listed those questions-
and I'm repeating a lot of what has already been said-but
here are the questions that I would ask. The first question,
which is of paramount importance, is what is the nature of
the relationship between the client and the attorney? And
when I'm the attorney, I have to ask myself, what is the
nature of my relationship with the client because that
relationship will govern the outcome in most cases in my
view. The second question I would try to ask is what is the
nature of the client's understanding of the proceedings and
of his rights and of his position? The third question I
would ask is what is the nature of the client's capacity to
think rationally, to make a rational decision? What are his
thought processes like? The next question I would ask is
what is motivating the client?
And interestingly, the two prior questions that I
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raised-the client's understanding or his appreciation of his
circumstances, of his legal standing and also his capacity to
make a rational choice-those are the two tests that have to
be satisfied for a client to be competent under Rees v.
Peyton38 to waive his post-conviction remedies.
But beyond that, the question of what is motivating
a client is not typically a question that the courts ask. But
fairly recently, within the last couple of years, the
American Bar Association Task Force on Mental Disability
and the Death Penalty made a recommendation that an
inquiry into the motivation of the client should be an
essential element in determining competency in these
situations.39
And the next question after that, that I would ask-
and this requires a lot of probing-what are the client's
beliefs? And by that I mean this: does the client believe
that imposition of the death penalty in his case is fair?
Does he think he deserves the death penalty? Does he
think--does he believe that he was treated fairly in the
process? Does the client believe that life is worth living?
Does he want to live?
Those are questions that you can never fully answer
through a superficial discussion with the client. Those
questions can be answered only after you learn about the
client and learn about the client's background. And
typically, in many of those cases, those questions can be
ascertained only with the help of professionals, mental
health professionals. So you have to get a mental health
professional involved, at the beginning.
John Blume, who is well-known in the death
penalty community as a death penalty litigator and as a
38 Rees v. Peyton, 384 U.S. 312, 314 (1966).
39 Paul M. Igasaki et al., A.B.A. Task Force on Mental Disability and
the Death Penalty, Recommendation and Report on the Death Penalty
and Persons with Mental Disabilities, 30 MENTAL & PHYSICAL
DISABILITY L. REP. 668, 674 (2006).
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scholar has written prolifically in the death penalty area.
He wrote an article about volunteers on death row.40 And
he did a survey, and he found, based on his survey, that 88
percent of those inmates who have volunteered for
execution and have been executed suffer from mental
illness or a drug abuse disorder.4' Some 78 percent suffer
from a mental illness. In my experience, every client that I
have represented on death row suffers from a mental
illness.
There are two basic characteristics of every inmate
on death row. Number one, they're indigent. In Tennessee,
there's not a single inmate on death row who is not
indigent. Everyone is indigent today. Everyone on death
row today was indigent at the time of his trial. The second
characteristic which is common among death row inmates
with very few exceptions is that they are mentally or
psychologically impaired. And that's been my experience.
I want to relate to you a couple of cases that have
influenced my thinking in this area. The first case is the
case of Ron Harries. In 1984, Ron Harries was scheduled
to be executed. He was on death watch. He was scheduled
to be the first inmate to be executed in Tennessee post
Furman.42 He was a volunteer. He volunteered after his
direct appeal before state post-conviction.
Another inmate and a lawyer in Nashville filed a
petition in the federal court, a habeas corpus petition,
seeking to stop the execution. They were successful, and
then litigation ensued concerning his competency. He was
found to be both incompetent and to be acting
involuntarily. The finding of lack of voluntariness was
based upon the inhumane conditions of the prison. The
finding of incompetency was based primarily upon his
40 John H. Blume, Killing the Willing: "Volunteers, " Suicide and
Competency, 103 MICH. L. REv. 939, 962 (2005).
41 Id. at 962.
42 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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diagnosis of bipolar.
Bill Redick has been mentioned already earlier
today. Bill Redick was a partner of mine. Bill Redick
represented Ron Harries at that time. Bill Redick took the
position that if this is what Ron Harries wanted to do, this
is what he should do. Fortunately, other forces prevailed.
The Judge stopped the execution and took Ron Harries off
death row. Bill Redick continued to represent Ron Harries,
and finally got his death sentence set aside. And then two
years ago, settled the case for a life sentence.
In the meantime-over the past many years that this
case has been litigated-Ron Harries changed his mind.
There were times when he wanted to volunteer, other times
when he didn't want to volunteer. I spoke with Bill just the
other day about that case. He said he learned a lesson.
When he took the position back in 1984-that Ron ought to
be allowed to volunteer-he said, "I didn't know about his
background. I didn't know about his mental illness. And I
would never, ever take that position again."
What we found-because I had gotten involved in
his case later on-and what we found was that Ron Harries
did not feel that he was fairly treated at trial. He did not
really feel deep in his heart that he wanted-that he
deserved to die. Although when he was in a state of
depression, he did feel that way. He is very happy today
that he's no longer under a sentence of death.
Another case, the Christa Pike case-Christa Pike
in post-conviction sought to drop her post-conviction case.
She was found to be competent, and having been found
competent, the court dismissed her case. It was appealed.
In the interim, she was diagnosed with bipolar. She was
treated for the first time with the proper medication. Once
she was treated, she began to think differently about her
case. She did not want to volunteer. And fortunately the
Tennessee Supreme Court reversed the lower Court's
decision-based upon what had happened in the interim-
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and allowed her to proceed with her post-conviction case.
I am today representing Paul Reid. Paul Reid is
floridly psychotic. If you ask him the question of why he
wants to volunteer-he's in post-conviction-he would
say, "Because I don't want to live like this on death row
anymore. Because I think I deserve, you know, that the
victims deserve this." But then when you probe more
deeply, he thinks he's innocent. And he thinks that
everything that goes on in his life is scripted by a force,
some kind of delusional force that he refers to as scientific
technology. He doesn't really believe these things, but he
knows how to say these things. And these cases have
formed my view that you should never, ever acquiesce in
your client's desire to volunteer.
I want to make one final point that is from a more
theoretical point of view. The argument for allowing an
inmate or a defendant to waive his or her rights and to
volunteer for execution is based upon an argument
concerning autonomy and dignity. You see, we have to
respect the client's autonomy to make his own decision as
long as he's competent.
Now, leaving aside the issue of whether he's
competent or not, the point that I focus on is that what
makes the death penalty truly unique is that it is the one
punishment that completely strips away a client's dignity.
That is the purpose of the sentence. A death sentence is not
about death. A death sentence is a statement to the
defendant by society that the defendant is not worthy of
membership in the human race.
Dignity is defined as intrinsic worth. So the death
penalty is designed to strip away dignity. It is paradoxical
to argue that a person should be allowed to volunteer to a
process that is designed to strip him of dignity in the name
of dignity. Also correspondingly, the whole idea of
mitigation is to demonstrate to the jury, to the sentencer,
how a defendant's autonomy, capacity of self-
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governance-which is the meaning of autonomy-has been
impaired.
That's the purpose of mitigation. And to allow a
defendant to volunteer for execution in the name of
autonomy and thereby take away the opportunity to
determine what kind of autonomy the defendant has is
contradictory. So as a policy matter, I don't think we can
consistently defend against the death penalty and at any
point in time acquiesce in the client's desire to volunteer.
Thank you.
PENNY WHITE: Brad's words are mirrored in guideline
10.5, 3 saying quite bluntly that it is ineffective assistance
of counsel to acquiesce in the client's wishes to dismiss
appeals.
We're going to change focus. But before we do,
Sean, Mary Ann, any closing brief remarks on the issue of
foregoing mitigation or abandoning appeals?
SEAN O'BRIEN: I just have one comment. I agree with
everything that Brad said. But one thing I would like to see
us as a community to get away from is the use of the word
"volunteer" because "volunteer" implies voluntary. That's
a decision. And these people pure and simple are suicides.
It is suicide. And "volunteer" kind of funnels us down a
path of analyzing the decision and maybe trying to talk the
client out of the decision and counsel him that way. When
you evaluate it as a suicide, and you actually research how
do suicide hotlines function and how do suicide counselors
function, it is totally unlike what lawyers do. And so I
would like us as a community to abandon the word
"volunteer" and start looking at what are the effective
treatment and prevention methods for suicide and bring
43 A.B.A. GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF
DEF. COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES 10.5 (2003).
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those resources and thought processes and strategies to bear
on our client decisions.
BRADLEY MACLEAN: I totally agree. I stand corrected.
And I will never use that term again.
PENNY WHITE: Our next scenario is one that Jerry Black
and I had a little personal experience with. But basically,
the hypothetical is posed in this way: You are the post-
conviction lawyer for the death-sentence inmate, and your
petition will include allegations of ineffective assistance of
counsel. So you contact former counsel, trial counsel, to
arrange to interview trial counsel, to secure the file, and to
do the things that are necessary to prepare the petition or to
amend that petition.
Former counsel tells you, "Wait a minute, I'm now
an adverse party. I turned my file over to the Attorney
General's Office, and I'm going to do everything I can to
rebut your claim that I was ineffective and to clear my good
name." Ann Short, how do you proceed?
ANN SHORT-BOWERS: I encountered that scenario
quite a few years ago, and I told Penny when she was
giving me the hypothetical, I said my short response
internally is how you proceed is to tell the attorney "screw
yOU."
Now, let me step back and let's talk on a slightly
higher level than that. And let me just get an idea here a
minute. How many people in the room have been involved
actually in death penalty work at some level? I hope
everyone who raised their hand-and for those that
didn't-understand that at any level of death penalty work
you may get involved with, you'd better have dang thick
skin. What makes it tricky also is that you still cannot for
one minute lose your compassion or your ability to identify
with your client.
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But don't ever get involved initially in a death
penalty case without understanding on the very front end
that this is going to be a long haul for you and that at some
point in time, unless your client is found not guilty, you are
going to be called ineffective-legally, constitutionally
ineffective. Not incompetent. I hate attorneys who say
you're calling me incompetent. I'm not. I'm calling you
constitutionally ineffective. In any work, in any given
circumstance, a lawyer can be constitutionally ineffective.
To bring it back a little bit to my experience and
where my reference is-many, many years ago my first
experience with death penalty work was actually doing a
post-conviction on a death penalty case, before I was ever
involved many years later in the trial of a case. And back
when I was involved in the post-conviction-back before
any standards-I mean forget about any reasonable hourly
rates, forget about any funds for experts-dignified
begging and even undignified begging was the way you
had to go about soliciting people to help you in these cases.
And I was naive to be sure, but I did not realize that
my involvement was going to last some thirteen years in
that case. A lot of that time was spent in-and I'll
emphasize everything that's been said about the attorney-
client relationship-a lot of that time was spent getting to
know that client and trying to build trust with that client
because I was the second attorney that had stepped in. And
so, whatever reservations the client had about how his case
was handled the first time, I had to overcome some of those
communication barriers to be able to work with the client.
You've got to be careful, and you've always got to
feed that relationship. And you've always got to nurture
that relationship because I'll tell you what happened to me
was-at the end of thirteen years-we had a breakdown in
our attorney-client relationship. And I ultimately had to
move to withdraw in the case, and I did.
In hindsight, that may have been a distinct
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advantage to the client because I was somewhat of an
abrasive lightening rod in the case. I wasn't very polite to
anyone involved in the court system. And shortly after I
got out of the case, the lead assistant prosecutor in the case
had gotten very, very sideways with his boss, and he quit.
He said, "I'm out of here"-not just off this case- "I am
out of this office." And what that left were new faces in
that case. And ultimately, I'm happy to say-and it was
one of the best days of my life-when I picked up the
phone and successor counsel called and said, "We settled
this case, and we settled it for a life sentence." And I was
absolutely delighted. And in fact the client's name is
Kenny Campbell. And as of April of this year, he made
parole.
That was also back many, many years ago when the
statutory criteria for how long you had to serve before you
could make parole was much less than now. But at any
rate, as I said, part of the message is, you're going to be in
this for the long haul, and you'd better have a thick skin.
And I can tell you because I see a lot of people here
from this community, too. I guarantee you-and I know
Mark will agree with me also-this community has just
finished up the fourth of a series of just horribly gruesome
capital defense cases: Channon Christian and Chris
Newsom. And I guarantee you, some of the finest
attorneys you will find anywhere in this country stepped up
to the plate and agreed to represent these people in these
cases. And I also guarantee you, every single one of them
knows-and they knew going into that case-that at some
point along the line, they're going to be sitting in a witness
chair. And they're going to be having allegations of
ineffective assistance of counsel directed at them. And
they all know how they have to respond appropriately
under those circumstances.
When I mentioned the "screw you" remark, it was
because back when I was working on the case-that I
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mentioned took thirteen years-I got to the point where I
had been calling the attorney's office and kept trying to
make an appointment, and the secretary kept blowing me
off. And finally, I just said okay, you know, I've got to get
in the car, go up there, sit in the waiting room if I have to
until somebody agrees to talk to me.
I went up there. I don't know, I guess they kept me
cooling my heels for maybe an hour in the waiting room.
And of course, no one offered me coffee or anything.
That's okay too. When the attorney finally realized that he
didn't have a back door, he was going to have to come out
where I was sitting to actually be able to leave the office. I
stood up, and I introduced myself. And I told him who I
represented. And I explained, "I need some of your time,
please. And if it's not convenient now, can we please
schedule a time to sit down and talk?" And he looked at
me and he said, "Lady, it's just a question of when that
guy's going to fry," and walked out the door.
And that still is totally imprinted in my long-term
memory. That attitude just absolutely blew me away. So
when I say "screw you," that's exactly what I thought to
myself when he walked out the door. And I guarantee you,
we made the post-conviction hearing as miserable for him
as we could. And let me tell you, there was a reason for
that. Not just because of his attitude and getting some
visceral fun out of it, but because-please understand under
Stricklandn-when you're dealing with ineffective
assistance of counsel, Strickland45 tells you, you have the
burden. You're going to have to try to re-create the
circumstances that existed at the time counsel was making
certain decisions. You're going to be confronted with a
presumption that what counsel did was reasonable, unless
you can show other circumstances.
The more difficult trial counsel makes it for you,
"Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
45 Id. at 692.
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and the more you have to push back, gives you -and it
gave us ultimately-some ammunition to be able to argue,
"We were trying our damndest to carry our burden of
proof. But look what happened." I mean these attorneys
fought us every single stage tooth and nail. We ultimately
had to subpoena the file into court. And of course, they
wouldn't cooperate. "May we see your file now?" "Oh,
no." "Oh, no." They just sat and held it in their lap.
Okay. Fine. "What's the first piece of paper in
your file? Would you please take it out and identify it for
the court?" We are only talking about one little accordion
file. I mean, that's a tip off right there. You know, once
we were about a quarter of a way into the file, the judge
kind of looked at the attorney and said, "Why don't we
come back tomorrow. And in the meantime let post-
conviction counsel just photocopy your file please, and
let's see if we can't move it along," which we did.
But the point being, we did have to get into that
level of difficulty because obviously the attorney did not
appreciate the continuing duty that he owed to that client.
Having-and again-we're going to talk about some of
those duties, but let me talk a little bit more practically
about what you could do confronted with former counsel
with that kind of attitude as an initial way to deal with it.
I would suggest, first of all, look around in cases in
your community. Bob Ritchie's no longer with us. I have
asked Bob, and Bob has agreed to do this previously for
me-not in a death penalty case. Identify that one attorney
in the community that seems to have the greatest amount of
respect that you can find. Call that attorney and see if you
can enlist them. Say, "Would you call so and so, ask them
to go to lunch with you. Just would you talk to them about
what's at stake here? You know, maybe they'll listen to
you. They're not going to listen to me right now." And see
if you can't get a network going. You don't have to share
any attorney-client privilege or any confidences of your
238
7 Tennessee Journal of Law & Policy (Special Edition) 239
client to try to enlist somebody in that fashion to see if they
can soften up that attorney a little bit. That's one
suggestion.
Two is to write a letter to the attorney. And just
say, "Look, here is what your ethical obligations are. All
I'm wanting you to do is within the framework of those
obligations. Please meet with me. I have a waiver from the
client, so that you can talk to me; so that you can provide
your file to me. But here are your ethical obligations."
Now, that may help. It may not.
You get blown off again, personally-and at this
point in my career-I would probably sit down and write a
letter to the Board of Professional Responsibility. Now, is
that going to help? Probably not. Is it going to make the
situation any worse? At that point in time, I don't think it's
going to make it a bit worse. But who knows. You might
get the Board involved. You might somewhere along the
way make that attorney have a second thought as to what
he or she is doing. But if you get that far, then you
probably are going to get to a point where you're dealing
with having to subpoena the attorney to court-having
subpoenaed the files. And get prepared for it and just do it.
If you find yourself in the situation of where your
services and your level of representation have been called
into question in a death penalty case, what are your
obligations? You know, just as if the client dies, the
relationship continues. Just because your services may be
questioned, it's not free time for saying "okay, I'm no
longer bound. I no longer have any obligations to the
client. I can do what I want. I can go talk to the state. I
can provide all the material." No, that's not the situation.
Now, post-conviction counsel, if he or she is doing
the job correctly, should get a release from the client so that
that release can be presented to the attorney to say okay, it
is all right for you to provide your work product files to
post-conviction counsel. It is all right for you to discuss
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my case with post-conviction counsel-attorney-client
privileged materials, confidentiality issues, and get that
core thing done. That way, the trial attorney should feel
that he or she is protected in terms of going forward.
Just because though, that kind of waiver has been
obtained, doesn't mean that the client is saying, "Okay,
that's fine, you can go talk to anybody you want to."
That's not giving you permission to go sit down and talk
with the prosecutor that's handling the case. And I would
caution, if you are in post-conviction counsel's situation,
you need to-when you craft the release for your client-
be real careful how you craft it. And you might want to
have those caveats in there: "By this I am not consenting
that you talk to anyone else. I'm not consenting that you
can talk to the state on my behalf." Get those parameters
outlined very carefully.
Going into a death penalty case as trial counsel, you
have an ethical obligation to keep your files as well
documented and as organized as you can. Sometimes I
know they get a little messy. I worked for a long time with
a gentleman, and that's primarily what I did was clean up
his messy work-labeling files and whatnot. But you
really should-if you find your files in that situation-take
the time. And you know, if you're doing death penalty
work, you're not going to get paid for it. Get over it. You
weren't compensated fairly the first time. Don't take it out
on the client on post-conviction. Spend the time necessary
to sit down, organize your files, and find the time to
meaningfully discuss the case with post-conviction counsel.
And to the extent that the strategy is consistent with what
you know the facts to be, you should cooperate with
counsel.
What do you do if you get the call from the state,
"Hey, we got a post-conviction. We'd like you to come
over and talk about it?" I'll tell you personally, in death
penalty cases, I say, "You can find out what I've got to say
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when I get on the stand. I'm just like any old witness."
You know how we've all had them say, "I don't have to
talk to you. Don't want to talk to you. Never going to talk
to you." It's kind of how I feel about these things. Why
should they be entitled, particularly if my client has given
me some pretty good parameters as to what I am, and am
not, authorized to say? I'm not going to sit down and talk
to the State about the case.
I guess to seriously bring it around and wrap it up:
just have thick skin. Don't ever, ever take it personally if
you're trial counsel in a death penalty case. Don't ever take
it personally. Know that going in on the front end. And if
that causes you a problem, don't do the case; just don't do
it.
PENNY WHITE: Thank you very much, Annie. Just by
way of summary, the Guidelines4 6 are very specific. There
is an obligation to conduct a full examination on the part of
post-conviction counsel, an obligation of trial counsel or
any member of the defense team to safeguard the interest of
the client even after the relationship has ended, and an
obligation to cooperate with successor counsel. And the
Guidelines47 specifically refer to maintaining the records in
a manner that is conducive to use-as Annie referred to-
and to providing the files and all information regarding the
representation to successor counsel, as well as sharing
potential further areas of legal and factual research and
cooperating appropriately.
And then finally, the commentary to Guideline
10.13, 48-the last point that Annie made-says that counsel
should share not only papers but strategic thinking. All of
46 A.B.A. GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF
DEF. COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES (2003).
47 id.
48 A.B.A. GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF
DEF. COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES 10.13 (2003).
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this should be routinely and openly presented to the post-
conviction counsel. To do otherwise is unethical.
I think-because we have only about twelve
minutes left-that rather than do the last hypothetical right
now, we will turn to your questions or comments. And
then if you don't have many questions or comments, then,
we'll talk about the conflict of interest hypothetical. But
I'd like to think that there are comments for people who
take issue or want to say "Amen, Amen." Again, while
they're getting to the first comment, I want to commend our
able court reporter from Watts-Boyd who's been working
feverishly over here. So bear her in mind and speak loudly
when you get the microphone.
BARBARA HURST: I'm very mindful of the fact that you
people do this actually on the front lines. I represented
three death penalty clients in a direct appeal. The statute
was struck down and has never been re-enacted in Rhode
Island. So I feel like I'm standing in the position, "easy for
me to say."
But I hear a lot of values behind what you're saying
that seems to be personal values, about how you view life,
how you view life worth living, how you view the
relationship between mental health and competent decision-
making and maybe some assumptions about certain
decisions being the product of a mental illness and not
simply a companion to mental illness, as well as the value
of life worth living with bipolar diagnosis that cannot
always, despite good medication, make for a happy life.
I mean, I wonder the extent to which counsel
representing clients in death penalty litigation are
inevitably in a conflict of interest position because all of
our personal values inform our perspectives about other
people's decision-making. I'm not sure it's possible to get
away from that. I don't know how you resolve that. But I
wonder whether if we were sitting over a drink, my feelings
242
242
7 Tennessee Journal of Law & Policy (Special Edition) 243
about life and suicide as a reasonable solution to a set of
problems might simply be very different from yours. And
how does that affect how we represent clients?
SEAN O'BRIEN: You were looking at me while you were
asking that. And obviously, I have strong feelings about it.
But I don't think it started out as ideological or my
religious values-my faith. It comes from professional
values of my role in the system that is, I think, an
oppressive system. I really recommend that you read,
Wilbert Rideau's book that recently came out, IN THE
PLACE OF JUSTICE.4 9 Wilbert was the subject of Rideau v.
Louisiana,50 the 1963 change of venue-pre-trial publicity
case in the U.S. Supreme Court. I'm halfway through it
right now-but he's talking about his life in solitary
confinement for a period of time, how the system just
really, literally abused and raped these prisoners through
the death penalty process. If you stop and you look at the
overall context of where the client is-what has happened
to the client, what is going to happen to the client-there's
nothing that says justice about it. I'm all about justice for
the client.
You also have to recognize that a client sitting on
death row-or sitting in a county jail, pre-trial-has no idea
what the quality of life in a general population of a
humanely run penitentiary could be compared to where
they've been.
Heath Wilkins is my example. Here's a kid,
sixteen-years old, allowed to plead guilty, waive mitigation,
and sentenced to death. The Supreme Court in 1989 said
that doesn't violate the Constitution.51  And then
49 WILBERT RIDEAU, IN THE PLACE OF JUSTICE: A STORY OF
PUNISHMENT AND DELIVERANCE (Knopf Publishing Group 2010).
50 Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963).
51 Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (Wilkins v.
Missouri, 492 U.S. 361 (1989) was the companion case to Stanford).
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subsequently, I was appointed on the case, and he's a
volunteer from day one. Old habits die hard, don't they?
I'm not criticizing Brad at all, but it's a word I want to get
away from. He was a suicide from day one. And we are
now getting ready for a parole hearing next summer. Now
that he's in the general population, he works for a company
called Talking Tapes. He reads books onto cassettes tapes
for blind people. The quality of life is so much different
from what it had been. That's context to me.
PENNY WHITE: Thank you.
BRADLEY MACLEAN: If I could respond to that too? I
struggled with that question, and it's through my
experience that my attitude has evolved. I've had several
clients who have sought to give up their appeals to the
point of filing papers with the court on their own. Several
clients. I only have one client, though, who has maintained
that position. And that client is clearly delusional-totally
out to lunch. Every other client has changed.
And I think that there are two factors. One is as
they live, they learn that they can live life where they are.
That changes their point of view. But I think also what
changes their point of view is when they do develop a
relationship with a legal team that's willing to fight for
them, they begin to see value in living. And I think that's
our job. And it is because I've seen that, and I've never
seen a client-who is not totally delusional-who hasn't
changed his or her mind. Then you know. That has really
affected my point of view with the whole thing.
The other response that I would make is that you
read in the cases, and you read Tennessee ethical opinions,
that say you've got to allow the client to go forward.
They're based on the premise that the Eighth Amendment
52
is strictly a personal right. And I don't view the Eighth
52 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
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Amendment 53 that way. I think the public has an
overriding interest in a fair and reliable process where the
sentencing decision is made in an appropriate manner. And
so, that's from a more philosophical point of view. That's
where I come out.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I wanted to pose to the panel
a dilemma which I actually faced. Number one, the client
had had several lawyers---death penalty-had had several
lawyers before the case got to me. Those lawyers were
excellent, excellent lawyers. Nevertheless, the client broke
up with each one of them. I think there were five. Then I
was given the case. And I tried to get along with him. And
then I wanted to interview his family, especially his father,
who he was suspected perhaps of abusing him. But he
didn't want to talk about it. He said this, "If you interview
my father, we're through. No more cooperation. No
helping out. No nothing. It's over. So that's it. I don't
want you interviewing my father." Now, I faced the
following: five lawyers had, you know, broken up with
him-excellent lawyers. And now I was actually getting
somewhere, dealing with him, motions filing, and
discovery filing. And now he said, "If you do that, it's over
and we're through."
BRADLEY MACLEAN: I don't view that as so much of
an ethical dilemma as I do a strategic dilemma. You've got
a problem in a case like that. How do you proceed in a way
that is most effective and that's in your client's interests-
and your job-when the client is interfering? And, you
know, that to me is not an ethical problem. That to me is a
practical problem of how you handle the case. I've got a
case now where the client insists on his innocence, and he
keeps telling me that you cannot mitigate innocence.
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you talking to my family? Because I'm innocent, and you
can't mitigate innocence. I don't want to deal with any of
those issues." And that has proven to be an obstacle in our
representation. No question about that. From an ethical
point of view, my view is I do whatever I can. From a
practical point of view, I've got to take into considerations
what my client may want to do to sabotage his case.
Because he can sabotage the case, and I don't want him to
do that. So you've got to work through that. It's a
problem. No question about it.
SEAN O'BRIEN: Yeah, I agree it's a problem. And the
problem sometimes comes with its only solution. It's an
opportunity. I look at things like that as an opportunity to
ask your client, "What is it? Why? What? Are there
certain things that you want me to stay away from with
your father? Can you think of things that I could talk about
with your father?" I mean, he wants to know about what's
happening, and so what am I supposed to do? It's an
opportunity to dialogue with your client about that, but you
don't argue. You just use it to explore. And eventually,
you're going to talk to the father. And eventually, you're
going to talk to the father with your client's permission.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I dealt with the father. In
fact, we put him in a veteran's home, at the client's
suggestion. I talked to my client and tried to arrange visits.
It was getting into that early background that the client did
not want me to do. That's the dilemma.
BOB WEEKS: Thank you. I am Bob Weeks from San
Jose, California. In the response to the question, you can't
mitigate the innocence argument. One line I had some
success with. I hear that from clients as well. You know,
under some circumstances, we can put on character
evidence to prove your innocence, and there's some
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California law that says good character alone is enough to
raise a reasonable doubt. So I tried that line with some
success. So I suggest that you put that in your arsenal of
arguments to use on your clients.
PENNY WHITE: Thank you, Bob. Well, join me please
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PENNY WHITE: I'm going to turn it over to our
distinguished guest, Tony Mauro, who will be the
moderator of this panel. I'll leave the rest to him.
TONY MAURO: My name is Tony Mauro, and I cover the
Supreme Court-or I'm a reporter who covers the Supreme
Court for the National Law Journal and American Lawyer
Media-and it's an honor to be in your midst. I've learned
so much in the last day from the excellent panels. It's been
tremendous. And, I think I now realize why Robin Maher
recruited me to fill in for her. She was supposed to be the
moderator, but she had a schedule conflict. And she called
me and asked if I would do it. I think I see why she wanted
me to. She knows that I cover the Supreme Court, and I've
covered it for 30 years. I write about all the decisions
they've handed down on the many areas of the law,
including EDPA and the effective assistance of counsel.
She knows that from that work I get to see the Court's
decisions at the level of abstraction that is so far removed
from what is happening on the ground, and I've learned that
again today. I think that's what Robin was hoping I would
learn.
It is amazing to see what the Court does. Of course
the Court isn't the only reason for this situation we've been
talking about for the last day, but I see now with this sort of
steaming costly mess that is indigent defense and how the
Court's Strickland' rulings and others have watered down
or betrayed the promise of Gideon.2 It's been sobering and
educational for me. But, it's not about me. It's all about
you, and I just wanted to say I'm so glad to be here. What
we're going to talk about is the economic part of the
equation, the entrance of the economic debate, the
economic crisis, and the impact it has had on budgets as
'Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
2 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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part of the debate over the death penalty.
As you all know, the economy and the cost of the
death penalty have become a debating point in many states
from California to New Mexico to Kansas. I have heard a
number of stories. For example, in California it's estimated
that eliminating the death penalty and going to life without
parole would save as much eleven million dollars, but I've
also seen articles that say that it's really 110-111 million
dollars a year that could be saved. These numbers range all
over the place, and I think one of the things we're going to
talk about is how do we effectively or accurately assess the
cost of the death penalty.
What we are doing to do is find out how this new
element of the debate-the economy and the economic
cost-is entering into the debate over the death penalty. It's
really been quite remarkable to see that legislators, at least
in some cases, seem to be more comfortable talking about
the death penalty as an economic "dollars and cents" issue
rather than a moral issue. And, I hope we can talk about
that seeming paradox. Maybe it's just that people are more
comfortable with that kind of decision.
Dick Dieter, from the Death Penalty Information
Center, was quoted recently and said, that "it is easier for
some people to talk about the death penalty in economic
terms." He said, "If it's just on gut and my morality versus
your morality the debate gets stuck and it's at a stalemate,
but as a pragmatic issue this is a new way of looking at it."
We have a very good panel to discuss the economic
issue from all angles. First up, we have Libby Sykes, who
is director of the Administrative Office of the Courts in
Tennessee. She's been in that position for five years and in
the office for many more years before that. Next, we'll hear
from Jean Faria who's been the State Public Defender of
Louisiana since June of 2008-and before that she was an
Assistant Federal Defender for the Middle and Western
Districts of Louisiana. Then we'll hear from Jon Gould,
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who is the Director of the Center for Justice, Law &
Society at George Mason University in Virginia. He has
done extensive research in this area. Then last but not
least, we'll have Malcolm Ty Hunter who will be
commenting on the remarks of the three panelists. Ty is the
Executive Director of the Center for Death Penalty
Litigation, a private nonprofit law firm specializing in the
representation of persons accused or convicted of capital
crimes. Before that he served as the First Executive
Director of the North Carolina Office of Indigent Defense
Services.
Before we start, I'll just mention that Libby Sykes,
who will speak first, has an important event in a couple
hours back near Nashville-a high school graduation that
is-she cannot miss and doesn't want to miss, and so I
think we'll all forgive her if she has to leave early. She will
start first.
ELIZABETH SYKES: I would like to thank my fellow
panelists very much for allowing me to go early. Tonight is
my great-niece and -nephew's, twins, high school
graduation. And, my niece is the valedictorian. She has
worked on her speech for weeks, and I sure don't want to
miss that tonight. So, again, I do thank you very much for
allowing me to go first. Also, I think I've been mentioned
here several times since I have gotten here this morning.
That way, when I leave, you can talk about me. But
anyway, it is my pleasure to be here, and I thank the
organizers for inviting us.
As we said earlier, our office, the Administrative
Office of the Courts, administers the Indigent Defense
Fund. And, of course, our fund and our budget for the fund
is in addition to the funds that the public defender's office
receives or those county funds. Payments are made
pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 13. 3 As Professor Black
3 TENN. S. CT. R. 13 (2010).
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said earlier, Supreme Court Rule 13 requires the judge to
appoint the district public defender or post-conviction
defender, if qualified pursuant to this rule and no conflict of
interest exists-unless in the sound discretion the trial
judge appointment of private counsel is necessary.
Rule 13 does establish the rates of compensation for
attorneys, investigators and experts. Also, as Professor
Black said earlier, noncapital rates are set at forty and fifty
dollars an hour. Those have been the rates since 1994.
We'll talk a little bit later-as I go into my program-what
it would cost even to equalize that $40 to $50.
Allow me to discuss a little bit about the history of
our fund. Here, I sort out some of the claims that we
process. You can tell, from looking at this, how we have
seen an increase in the number of claims that we pay.
During the 2000-2001 fiscal year-which again is twelve
months, July to June-we processed 54,000 claims.
During fiscal year 2006-2007 we processed 94,000 claims.
During fiscal year 2007-2008 we processed 105,221 and
during the 2008-2009 fiscal year we processed 115,000
claims.
Here is a little bit about our budget. As I talk about
our budget today, we are in the final-probably-week to
two weeks of our legislative session. The Indigent Defense
Fund is still at risk. I would like to encourage all of you-
you don't have to put all this down-that if you're an
attorney here, licensed to practice in Tennessee to call your
legislator before Monday and Tuesday to talk to them. I
truly would. I stood in front and had an opportunity to talk
with the House Budget Subcommittee.
One day this week I walked in to see Burney
Durham, who happens to be a law school friend of mine
from thirty years ago. He is the Chief of Staff for the
House, and also the Chief Clerk. I walked in and I said,
"Burney, I need your help. They're going to take another
million dollars of our Indigent Defense Fund." He said,
254
254
7 Tennessee Journal of Law & Policy (Special Edition) 255
"Sit there, Libby, and I'll get you in to talk to this group." I
had the opportunity to go in and talk to thirty leaders of our
House General Assembly about what that million dollar
reduction would mean to us and to the attorneys that we
pay. If you haven't made that call, I invite you to do it
before we do it next week, because our discussion is not
over with yet.
Fiscal year 2000-2001 illustrates that we spent $12
million, almost $13 million. As we've gone into fiscal year
2008-2009, you can see the amount increased to almost $29
million. We do not have recurring money of twenty-nine
million dollars. We have probably recurring money of
probably $24-25 million. Over the last several years-
since our economy started to plummet-we have supported
this fund by the use of recurring supplemental money at the
end of the year and nonrecurring money to sort of begin the
year.
I must say that the Bredesen Administration has
been very, very supportive of our fund. We were running
out of money at the end of the year, and they helped us in
requesting supplemental money and also some
nonrecurring money. But, as I say, it gets harder and
harder.
Last year there was an attempt to remove, I think,
about $5 million from the fund. Again, that was
unsuccessful. This year, that same legislator filed a bill that
would move the services of the Post-Conviction Defenders
Office to the Administrative Office of the Courts. I thought
that was a wee bit unusual, and I think Mr. McLain would
probably agree with us. In the last few days there was
another attempt to take about 4 percent, roughly $978,000,
from our office. Although they considered $978,000 a
small amount, to us that is a significant amount of the
claims that can be paid.
Also, we have heard some discussions this year
about a system that would potentially pay us in quarters.
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Okay. What does that mean? That means that they would
give us an allotment for a quarter rather than a full year.
We would accumulate our 30,000 claims that we receive
during that quarter until the last week or so of that quarter,
and then we would determine if the claims exceed the
allotment. For example, you are allotted $5 million. Then,
you determine how many claims you have. If they are in
excess of that $5 million, then you cut the claims
accordingly to the point that they are equal. So, again, I
encourage you to call your legislator before next week.
Capital case expenditures are interesting. You'll see
that in 2000-2001 we spent $2.7 million. This last fiscal
year, 2008-2009, that amount was $1.7 million. For the
past several years expenditures have actually looked pretty
much flat. I asked some of the staff to look at that in the
last few days to see if they could tell us what is happening.
And, what they said to me was that between the years 2002
and 2003 we paid 715 claims out of our $100,000 plus that
was considered capital. In the fiscal year 2008-2009, the
claims dropped to 428. So, that is a 40 percent reduction in
the number of claims that had come into our office that are
capital. I assume that is because of the reduction in the
number capital cases pending.
I divided the capital case expenditures for 2008-
2009 into investigators, attorney fees, and experts. You can
see that $294,000 was paid for investigators, $883,000 for
attorney fees, and another $554,000 in expert services.
I'm not going to go through all of this, but a little bit
of a capital case is defined by Rule 13 as a case in which a
defendant has been charged with first degree murder, a
notice of intent to seek the death penalty has been filed, and
no order withdrawing the notice has been filed. Again, as
Professor Black stated earlier, the Rule 13 does require the
appointment of two attorneys.
Section 3 of the Rule, establishes the minimum
qualifications and compensation of counsel in capital
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cases.4  And, Section 5 of Supreme Court Rule 13
establishes the procedures for the approval of investigative
and expert services and establishes the maximum hourly
rates for compensation.
5
In your materials you should have a copy of all the
rules, so I'm not going to go through all of the requirements
for lead counsel. But voter, I must say again, that these are
our current rates of compensation in capital cases-a little
better, Professor Black, than the $40 and $50 an hour. The
lead counsel when out of court, is paid $75 and lead
counsel when in court is paid $100. Co-counsel when out
of court is paid $60, and is paid $80 when in court. Post-
conviction counsel is paid $60 when out of court and $80
when in court. Rule 13 does not establish a maximum limit
for capital cases.
As I said earlier, Rule 13 also establishes an expert
and the maximum hourly rates of compensation for our
experts and investigators. I'm well aware that most of these
experts make a higher hourly rate than the attorneys do. I'm
not going to read all of those to you.
What I did on the next one is look at some of the
cases that are really at different levels over the last few
years as to what we've spent. Some of the trials are still
going on, and some of them haven't been tried. I did this
by sort of looking at some of those earlier cases in 1994,
and the expenses from our fund. The person may have been
represented by the public defender's office, but that year we
paid for his representation. We had spent $6,142, and that
was the date I believe he was tried. Up to the times of Mr.
Cobbins,-listed at the top of the document, as we have
spent so far, out of our funds-and he was tried in 2009 for
$346,139. So I think you can look at the document as it
clearly shows we are spending much more out of this fund
now for capital representation than clearly we did many
257
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years ago.
What if the capital rates were increased by $25 per
hour? What would it cost? At the time I figured this, a
year or so ago, it was an additional $323,000. If the capital
rates are increased by $50 an hour, it would be an
additional $646,000 a year. The one thing that I've really
really really wanted to do-just a tiny little thing-is to
increase the rates--do away with that $40 and $50 an hour
and to equalize. We would pay a minimum of $50 an hour,
and the cost of that is $2.5 million. If the noncapital rates
are increased to $75 an hour, that would be an additional
$9.5 million a year.
ADELE BERNHARD: Seems reasonable.
ELIZABETH SYKES: Seems reasonable. You know, no
comment on this one. I'd be happy to answer any
questions. I won't be here at the end when you take
questions, and I would be happy again to take any and
answer any questions that you might have. Yes?
MARK STEPHENS: The State's budget is about $28
million; is that right?
ELIZABETH SYKES: Right.
MARK STEPHENS: And--
ELIZABETH SYKES: Oh, I'd like to say it's probably not
$28 million. We do not have recurring dollars of that
amount. We have been success--
MARK STEPHENS: I mean the total State budget?
ELIZABETH SYKES: State budget, you mean billions?
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MARK STEPHENS: Yeah.
ELIZABETH SYKES: Okay. You tell me.
MARK STEPHENS: $28 billion for a state budget,
roughly, $40 million for the public defender's budget, and
roughly $28 million for the Indigent Defense Fund. That's
about $68 million. I don't know what the post-conviction
defender budget is. Do you know?
ELIZABETH SYKES: No. Maybe
MARK STEPHENS: But, we're spending $70-80 million
on indigent defense on a $28 billion budget. We're
spending less than 1 percent of the State money on indigent
defense. Contextually is that about right?
ELIZABETH SYKES: If you say so. Our budget overall,
the judiciary's budget overall, this $28 million now
represents over a quarter of our budget. In the last two
years we have lost 21 percent of our budget discretionary
funds. Twenty-one percent. Although, we have made
every effort to protect the indigent defense funds that we
have. I am not at all defensive about this either. I really
don't consider myself or our office sort of the enemy in any
of this. I really don't. I mean, some of you may. I really
don't. I think we all do very much consider ourselves
partners. We have, over the years, as we took a 15 percent
cut last year in our office and, again, another 6 percent cut,
which has required tremendous lack of-we've closed
every law library we have. I've laid off fifty people, but we
have protected the Indigent Defense Fund and have made
every effort we could to increase that rather than decrease
it.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Why did the AOC take the
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position-other than practical reasons-that you don't have
the money to pay for private attorneys if they've got more
appointments than the public defender's office? Why does
the AOC become an adverse party in caseload litigation for
public defender offices if we're partners? If we're on the
same page? That doesn't make any sense to me.
ELIZABETH SYKES: I'm sure in the earlier session you
did talk about the ongoing litigation here in Knox County.
We took our position because of the impact that it will have
on the Indigent Defense Fund. If I am giving $20-25
million-or whatever it is that we have in any given year-
and we run out of money in December, we sit and we'll
have to wait six months before we can get any
supplemental or additional funds to pay claims. If we do
that, it will impact on every court in this state where
attorneys are not being paid. My position is you will have
fewer and fewer attorneys that will even take the $40 and
$50 an hour if they know that they're going to have to wait
months to get paid. Our fear is what the impact of that
would be on the rest of the state.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Do you see an answer? This
whole symposium is trying to figure out a way to improve
the quality of representation as a whole for indigent
defendants, whether it be through a public defender's office
or through private attorneys. I mean, the ultimate goal for
everybody is to fulfill Gideon's promise. I understand your
office is hamstrung to these as that your budget is as
pathetic as the state's budget is. But, if it takes rocking the
boat throughout the whole system is that a bad thing?
What would the AOC's position be?
ELIZABETH SYKES: I'll leave that up to you on how you
might want to rock the boat. What I have noticed in the last
several years-and at the General Assembly-is that you
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have fewer and fewer attorneys there. You have fewer
people that understand. You have fewer and fewer people
that understand why we have to spend $264,000 and
$832,000 to represent Tony Carruthers. I think that
educating them and educating especially the leadership is
very important. I also think the process that you have to
work with is not only in litigation but also with the people
who do the funding, and that's the General Assembly. We
have to have the funding, and they have to understand the
importance of why this fund has to be appropriately funded.
For example, the idea of paying us by quarters-feeling
like that their criticism of our office is that we have no
control, and we have let this budget get out of control. I
don't believe that I have allowed-I've been at this office
for much longer than this. I've been the director for the last
several years, and I don't believe at all that we've allowed
this budget to get out of control. We have paid all of our
claims in accordance with Supreme Court Rule 13; it just
costs more. There are more people out there that need your
services. There are people that could have afforded your
services a couple of years ago that can't now. The economy
is bringing more and more cases to the courts that need the
representation. So, I agree that we all have to be partners,
but I believe that much of it. Again, I would invite you to
become involved in the legislative process. Ms. Green?
MARY ANN GREEN: Libby, do you have any
suggestions for educating the legislature?
ELIZABETH SYKES: Well, you could probably have
done a better job than I did. You know, I stood there when
I had ten minutes to address that House Budget
Subcommittee today. One day this week, I tried to talk
about some of the cases that are here in Knox County, and
that if we are given a certain amount of money a year the
issues that would arise if we have to live within that
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amount. What am I going to tell Judge Baumgartner? He
can only try one of those this year and the next one? Say
okay we're done for the year, we've spent all our money,
but next year we can do the next one and the next one and
the next one? I think the legislators understood that. And,
I think that they also understand that $40 and $50 dollars an
hour is surely, surely, surely not enough money, but, I don't
know.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: My take on that is that it
sounds an awful lot like what prison administrators used to
say until the federal government came in and shut them
down and said you have to say no, you just can't keep
stockpiling. The prison warden said we have no right to
say no. How is it any different? I mean it's
unconstitutional.
ELIZABETH SYKES: Yes?
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I'm from Washington State
so I don't know what you do here, but are there
qualifications for the appointed counsel that you pay? Is
there any review of their qualifications or their work?
ELIZABETH SYKES: No.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: No?
ELIZABETH SYKES: No, not by our office.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Do you have any idea how
many cases lawyers have when they submit bills to you?
ELIZABETH SYKES: I don't know that. I could probably
tell you. I mean our system has the ability to tell. We key
every line an attorney sends us as far as what work they do.
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We know daily how many hours they're billing us for.
What we don't know is what other cases they might have.
But, I can tell on a given year how many claims that have
been submitted by an attorney.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Do you know what the most
would be?
ELIZABETH SYKES: I don't have any idea.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I mean one idea I have in
terms of following up on the other question-I know in
litigation your office might take the position that it's going
to cost a lot of money, but we also know that it should cost
more than it does. It might help to alleviate the pressure on
the legislature to have a court order that says the caseload
has to come down. That would allow you to go to the
legislature and say, "Courts have ordered this. You can
blame it on them, but we have to have more money to do
that." It could be that if your office did have qualification
requirements, for example, like Massachusetts has for
appointed counsel, then there would be pressure to get the
payment up because you're not going to be able to find
qualified people to do it at the prices that you're paying.
Also, if you collected data on the number of cases each
lawyer is doing and billing you for, then that would also
demonstrate the humongous caseloads that people are
carrying in order to make a living at the payments that
you're making, and that would help support the position of
in the legislature. And finally, I have a question. Would be
of any benefit to you, your colleagues, everybody here, and
on the legislature, for some of us who are from out of town
to write an op-ed for local papers based on our being here.
I don't know if that would help or hurt. But if it would
help, I'll do it.
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ELIZABETH SYKES: I'll let you all decide that after I
leave when you talk about me. Yes, sir?
KENT BOOHER: I'm Kent Booher from Loudon County.
The problem that you've got-those of us who are
accepting appointed cases also have clients who are paying
us. The payments that we're receiving on the appointed
cases, quite frankly, our other clients are subsidizing them.
So, to somehow try and figure out how many cases I have
that I'm using to support my firm is really not going to be
an accurate number. Because at any given time I may have
twenty or thirty appointed cases, but I may also have thirty
to forty, or maybe even as high as fifty cases where I have
clients who have actually come in to pay me. And we're
doing the work for them. The real problem that I have is
that my clients who pay me are being indirectly taxed to
support the Indigent Defense Fund. Frankly, that's not fair.
At some point in time somebody is going to figure that out
and who knows, maybe there will be some sort of equal
protection lawsuit brought to force that indirect
unrepresented taxation on folks who can afford to pay me
who are supporting those who can't.
ELIZABETH SYKES: Yes.
ADELE BERNHARD: I'm just wondering, is there an
opportunity for you to sit down at some kind of criminal
justice roundtable where you can speak with police, and the
prosecutor and defenders and say, "Hey, let's take a look at
what this is all costing every time you decide, Mr. Police
Officer, to do a sweep of the downtown part of town and
make another fifty arrests for X, Y and Z as response to
citizens complaints." That's going to end up costing us.
Then you'll be able to tell them how many millions of
dollars are spent. We as a community could decide
whether that's the kind of action we actually want to take,
264
264
7 Tennessee Journal of Law & Policy (Special Edition) 265
and whether the results in terms of drug use prevention are
worth it in terms of what we're all paying for that-because
no one really thinks about it. They see these two separate
things as separate pockets. Over here there's safety and
then over here there's defense. We don't understand that
they're all completely connected to one another. Maybe as
citizens we'd rather walk around and talk to the kids than
end up paying more tax dollars for this whole system that
lurches into place. Is there any opportunity for you to do
something like that?
ELIZABETH SYKES: I would love to participate in that,
and I think that we could provide some statistics on what
those type of things-what they do-cost.
ADELE BERNHARD: Yeah, people don't see it.
ELIZABETH SYKES: People have asked me before
whether the whole misdemeanor sentencing is effective. If
you'd look to see what we spend for the representation of
appointment of misdemeanors, it's many many millions of
dollars.
ADELE BERNHARD: Millions.
ELIZABETH SYKES: But, could you just decriminalize
that? You know, I'm not here to say I'm in favor of that
even though I am a bleeding heart liberal. But, this year
there was an opportunity at the General Assembly. There
is a bill-and I think it's still moving along, those of you
who follow it a little bit closer than I am-that we have this
class-it's for aggravated robbery. There are some
members of the General Assembly that want to increase
that parole eligibility after you serve 85 percent rather than
20 or 30 or whatever, and they're talking about doing away
with the initial prison time for 19 D and E felonies to make
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up for that. So at one time I thought, well, that sounds like
an opportunity to be able to save a little money and to
increase what we pay. Then they went back and they said,
well, sometime down the road there is still that possibility,
and so you couldn't say that counsel was affected either
way. But we would welcome whatever opportunity.
TONY MAURO: Thank you, Libby, and have a good-
ELIZABETH SYKES: Thank you.
TONY MAURO: -- celebration.
ELIZABETH SYKES: Again, thank you very much.
JEAN FARIA: Good afternoon, I'm Jean Faria. I'm the
State Public Defender from Louisiana, and as my friends at
home said to me when I took this job two years ago with
worsening economy and having just come off of Rita and
Katrina, don't move your head too fast or the rest of your
marbles will fall out. It's sort of been like that all along the
way. The first summer that I had the job we had Hurricane
Gustav, and the Supreme Court Justice Chief called
because she couldn't find any public defenders as we hadn't
been there long enough to have coups made and put into
place or make continuity of operations plans. She called
me in and she said, "I can't find any public defenders
anywhere. Will you go to the prison and do all the
Riverside hearings?" "Sure, chief." "Be glad to do it," I
said and often went. It's been that way in terms of funding.
Now, of course, we are in real serious problems with what
has happened in the Gulf, and what is happening to a one
billion dollar industry. We just recently heard on Monday
that the $6.6 million increase that I was given in the
Governor's budget may be at risk, so we have a number of
strategies, many of which have been talked about today and
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yesterday in this room. That goes to sort of the theme of
when I talk about capital work. You have to have a plan.
When I took the position it was in the context of a
brand-new state agency being created, which was created
because of the crisis in indigent defense and the delivery of
services in that state. At the same time that that was going
on, we grandfathered in all of the people who had been
there for a year before the change in the law. So that
created and continues to create some challenges for us.
Overall, my budget last year was $28.9 million when you
add in the locally-generated revenue. As many of you may
know, most of our financing of our public defender system
was historically from a $35 fee on traffic tickets. So, if you
happened to be lucky enough to have an interstate going
through your land and your jurisdiction, then you had
money. But, if you didn't have an interstate, you didn't
have money. Those of you who've traveled through
Louisiana know that there are three major interstates. If
you're on it, you're rich, and if you're not, then you don't
have money. And, if you are in a place like New Orleans,
which is still recovering from Katrina and the loss of
funding there, that base is also gone.
The other thing that has affected the local revenues
has been the use of traffic tickets or traffic cameras at the
intersections that catch speeding and running of lights.
Well, all the major metropolitan areas have implemented
those and guess who wasn't at the table when that little
piece of pie was being divided up-which is a critical piece
of local funding? The DAs, the sheriffs, and the City and,
of course, the company itself were left out. They're the
recipients of the money in Louisiana. So, locally-generated
revenues are falling.
In calendar year 2009, $46 million was the total
sum of funding to spend on indigent defense, and for the
district attorneys there was $116 million. Of the stimulus
money that came into the state, $20,750,000 went to law
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enforcement and the district attorneys and $250,000 went
to the Supreme Court for a mental pilot program. For the
first time ever, $50,000 went to the public defender, the
State Public Defender, to study data systems and the one
that we would select. I frequently characterize myself as
the little Charles Dickens person with the bowl and cane
saying, "May I have some more please, sir", in the OLIVER
TWIST version. So, there are a lot of disparities, and that's
not going anywhere.
I am here to say that given all that we have seen-
particularly in the capital area, and we'll talk with you just
briefly about that in a minute-you can't give up hope and
you can't not do anything. When we came in we started to
make the changes that we felt were appropriate-we being
my fifteen member board who is headed by a very
conservative republican who has turned out to be a total
champion. I mean the best. We sat down and said, "Okay,
what do we think we ought to do. Well, I think we need a
media strategy. I think we need to meet two-thirds of the
legislators, all of whom are new, and very few of whom are
lawyers. We need to have editorial boards. We need to
meet the local legislators whenever we travel." So, we did
a road show. We went to the Times Picayune. We went to
New Orleans. We went to every single little podunk place
that had a newspaper, and we sat down and talked about
what we're going to and how we're different. Even though
all the faces look the same, it really is going to be different.
We will be coming to you and talking to you during the
legislative session to talk with you about funding issues.
Then we started meeting with district attorneys in the hot
spots. We don't have the greatest database. We have
roughly, on average, 110 open capital cases at any given
time. The problem that we have in New Orleans is that we
have a new district attorney who is fighting a $14 million
judgment against him, or his office, for a wrongful
conviction of a gentleman named John Thompson who is
268
268
7 Tennessee Journal of Law & Policy (Special Edition) 269
one of the seven exonerees off of death row in Louisiana.
John Thompson was able to get this and keep this
judgment. It went up to the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals.
6
The United States 5th Circuit Court of Appeals said, yeah,
you get to keep that judgment and writs have been granted
by the Supreme Court. So, that is a very interesting topic
for them to be pursuing.
However, we have a lot of mistakes. We have this
Kyles v. Whitley7 problem that was a New Orleans case.
We just have a history of not having prosecutors who really
8understand Brady and Giglio.9 If that continues on-now
with the Anderson case wherein there was a taped
statement of a witness who said she had slept through the
entire event, and she didn't see anything. One of the two
prosecutors who did the videotaped statement was one of
the prosecutors at trial and didn't say anything when the
witness said, "I will never forget that face when I saw him
come out underneath that streetlight." As part of our
contractual relations with the Louisiana Crisis Assistance
Center, they did the motion for new trial which the
prosecutors fought tooth and nail saying that, "Hey, the
jury heard both sides of the story, even though the
impeachment evidence wasn't available to the defendant,
but they didn't believe the defendant's witnesses so
what's-no harm, no foul." It was reversed and LCAC is
now going to represent that gentlemen.
We spend about $8 million a year on capital cases,
that's 110 cases out of approximately 280,000 cases a year.
So you can see that it eats a great deal of our budget. And,
we are not allowed by state law to have defenders as state
employees. They are not parish employees. They are not
state employees. They are something else, which is yet to
6 Thompson v. Connick, 578 F.3d 293, 296 (5th Cir. 2009).
7 Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995).
8 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
9 Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
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be defined. That's another one of my tasks on my list of
things to do. The House of Governmental Affairs wants to
know who I'm going to contract with and what that contract
is going to say. We represent at the trial court, capital
appeals, and capital post-conviction level, and that $8
million represents all stages of the representation. We have
post-conviction representation by statute. There is a right
to counsel in the capital cases. So, you know that is the
area of the greatest concern for the district attorneys. The
only thing that they have come to the table to fight me on
was the capital guidelines-not the performance standards,
not the guidelines we were talking about today, but actually
the structure of how we look at and monitor capital cases.
Right now we have panels that are contracted
regionally, which is not working very well because the
acceptance rate for the Orleans District Attorney is 100
percent. So, 100 percent of the capital cases that come in
as first-degree murders move forward as first-degree
murders, and that is basically bankrupting us. When we
were doing our media strategy, the second component of
"have a plan" is, go to the hot spots, when you discover
where they are by doing the data research, and meet the
District Attorney. So, we did that.
Frank Neuner-my board chair, Mr. Republican-
everybody likes to talk to him because he's the stable guy.
We go in, and I sort of sit there kind of quietly in the
beginning. Frank begins this dialog about we're a
reactionary and responsive agency. That's what we are
here to do. He said that we have very limited funding and
goes through this whole financial discussion. By the end,
invariably, you've got this guy across the table going,
"yeah, okay." Yeah, I get that, and it's like I could have
said the same thing, but it's not the same coming from a
line defender. So it has been very effective. In the really
large jurisdictions like Jefferson Parish where we had
twenty to thirty cases at any given time, they've taken the
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position that it's too expensive. We can't afford it, and
we're not going to do anymore. We will only do it in those
cases where we politically cannot survive. You have these
conversations that are not ones that you just go in and have
one conversation. You have to keep that conversation
going.
Every opportunity that we get to go into a district-
whether it is to have a district-wide criminal justice
discussion by bringing in all the judges, the DA, the parish,
the municipal, and the police juries to bring in everybody to
the table and talk about them wanting to do all of these
capital cases Leon Cannizzaro, Mr. DA of New Orleans,
that's what you want to do. Well, there's got to be a trade-
off. We can't do 37,000 municipal court misdemeanors. If
we're going to be giving over 50 percent of our capital
resources and 25 percent of all of our regular resources to
this jurisdiction, something has got to give. So, what they
decided to do in municipal court was they moved all the
first offense marijuana cases, and they moved all the
misdemeanors to municipal court. They have reached an
agreement that they will not allow any of those to be
enhanceable and none of those are jailable offenses. So,
that was the trade-off that we got in order to be able to do
more capital cases.
I mean, you find yourself in these crazy political
positions but constantly pushing on the media, pushing on
the local legislators, pushing on the DAs that are bringing
these cases, and going to the state bar association, passing
resolutions to agree to reclassify misdemeanors, to backing
legislation for reclassification. It's a constant moving
target. It's like three-dimensional chess, but it has to be
done over and over and over again. The hard part is
keeping the day-to-day hope that we will be able to
properly fund the Sixth Amendment right to counsel,' 0
whether or not it is a capital case-which where I'm living
10 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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we're not getting rid of capital cases. That discussion has
not happened on a legislative level.
Right now, as we speak, there is a bill going
through our house, our legislature, to allow for and
speeding up voluntary executions; to help volunteers get
there faster. The conversation on a legislative level, within
that body, is not happening. That's why becomes
imperative that there be smaller conversations with many
stakeholders present to discuss the impact.
We have litigation pending in one of our
jurisdictions, and one of the reasons they have historically
have been in trouble is because the high number of capital
cases that they've had. Really excellent representation from
LCAC-there are a couple of people here who are
affiliated with LCAC. The quality of their representation,
the motion for new trial project that we have entered into a
contractual agreement with them to do for us, and the
advocacy of those panels has made a difference with the
funding problem.
Every single courthouse, every single DA is
screaming and yelling that they don't have enough money.
So, the first thing that we say to them is that these are real
expensive cases. It's going to take X amount of dollars, it's
going to take X amount of time, and we're going to need X
amount of witnesses. We bring that data in that we are now
collecting, and we'll be more selective. Okay. Whatever.
If that's what I'm going to get is we'll be more selective-
and in Jefferson Parish more selective means one case as
opposed to continually twenty-four cases. It hasn't made
that impact yet in New Orleans. But New Orleans, like
everything else in Louisiana, is different because in New
Orleans although there is no right to a preliminary
examination. The judges and the practice there is for the
defenders to have PEs. So, by very aggressive preliminary
examination practice they're able to knock a lot of those
cases down to seconds and to manslaughters and to put
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them back into the public defender system.
The idea from our perspective is you have to have a
strategy, and you have to have a plan. You don't get to sit
in your office and just take a look at numbers and crunch
numbers and decide, "Well, we're going to put a certain
amount of money over here and a certain amount of money
over there." It absolutely required my board chair and me
to go to every district to see what the practices were in
every district. It's very similar to what Dennis Keefe said
yesterday when he said, "You know, I don't know if you
can really compare jurisdictions across a state. I'm here to
tell you, at least in Louisiana, you can't because New
Orleans ain't nothing like Shreveport. I mean, it's just not.
And, Washataw Parish is not anything like Alexandria.
They're very, very different. They're grandfathered in.
Those, not just the people but the practices, are
grandfathered in." So, you have to look at that.
The reality for us was not only did we have to look
at that, but people saw our visits and repeated visits as sort
of acknowledgement of those differences and
acknowledgement of who they were and a connection that
has served us very well. As we've continued these
conversations and continued this media strategy, the
repeated discussions with the media, and the repeated
discussions with the district attorneys-I can't tell you how
invaluable standards, all the things I've heard in this room
in the last two days, standards are. Understanding what
those standards mean, making sure that people perform to
those standards, supervision, and adequate funding is
essential. All of the things that have been said in here,
those things are going to have to be stressed to legislators
who are not lawyers and to prosecutors who have never
defended. They don't see what we do. That was said
earlier today. I couldn't agree with that more. They have
no sense of what it is that we do. That our world is not
having a case handed to us and what it is that we have to
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do.
The people who tell the story the best, from my
perspective, are exonerees off of death row. Those people
are the people who, every time that their grace-what
people hear when they tell their story, about the years that
they spent on death row and how close they came to being
executed. How, no, they're really not bitter about any of
that. They're just really happy to be free, but they wished
that they had had better representation. They wished that
they hadn't had to spend those 400 combined years that
they were sentenced years to. If they live-I'm sorry-
with my noncapital, I have thirty of those. But, these
capital people don't resent anybody. It's just astonishing.
It's just astonishing. So, yes, you need a strategy, and yes,
you need to think about the budget, and yes, you need to
think about the media. Yes, you need to think about talking
to and convincing DAs that it costs too much money, and
it's too much trouble. But you also have to be able to fund
the cases that are tried properly, so that they are not too
much trouble as they go forward. That's the Louisiana
experience. Thank you.
TONY MAURO: Before you turn it over Jon, just one
more question. You mentioned, and Libby did too, this
trend of fewer and fewer legislators are lawyers now. So
how do you have this-I mean, you said-is it some more
of these exonerees that make the case or is it the money, it's
too expensive, or can you mention Gideon?"
JEAN FARIA: Well, from my perspective, the exonerees
are the best example because what happens if there's
inadequate funding, and a person actually is convicted of
something that they didn't do. That is the piece that people
are willing to listen to.
The piece in Louisiana about-we have a post-
274
" Gideon, 372 U.S. at 335.
274
7 Tennessee Journal of Law & Policy (Special Edition) 275
conviction task force that's going on right now. It's doing
capital work and noncapital work. The Supreme Court
brought in---on one day-the Supreme Court Task Force.
On one of the days of the task force the first two people
who came in were mothers of two young women who were
killed by a serial killer in Baton Rouge. I don't know why,
but we always seem to have at least one serial killer. So,
that was really very difficult and the level of anger is really
very problematic. It's one of my huge complaints about
prosecutors, and how they utilize victims. You know, in my
capital cases that I have done, they roll them out when they
need them for something, and they don't deal with them as
people. So these two women were just very raw and very,
very angry and hurt. That was what they talked about. The
DAs that were on the Post-conviction Task Force were just
all, you know, "Yeah, go for it." The exonerees came in
later, in the afternoon. They told the court, and most
everybody on there-almost everyone is not a public
defender so they didn't know this-that all of the people
who get on go forward-of 50 percent of the people in
Louisiana who are ever released, are released from parish
prisons. They never get to a place where there is a law
library and inmate counsel substitute. They're time barred
before they ever get to a facility. So, they couldn't ever get
post-conviction.
So you can't really go into all of that detail with
folks because they look at you and their eyes glaze over.
So, they say this is what happens. We've had thirty people
we've been able to actually identify who are actually
innocent. This is what happens when you have four
minutes for every client, and that's what we're trying to do
is quantify it. That's what they data is all about. Right?
This is the only reason you want people to keep time sheets
and do all this stuff. It's not because you don't like them,
and you're their boss. It's because you need that to go to
the legislature to say here are the thirty people who went to
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prison for something they didn't do, and this is how much
time they got from their lawyer. And this is the amount of
resources that were available to them, and this is what
happens. When you say people don't have respect for the
law-all of these criminals and thugs around here-if you
have a law and you don't honor it-like the Sixth
Amendment right to counsell-you don't adequately fund
it. You don't adequately resource it. This is what happens.
So that's the level, and it's visceral. It's not really-without
the lawyers in the legislature, it's become very difficult.
JON GOULD: In my years of giving these presentations
I've learned two things. Number one, try not to be one of
the last guys on Friday afternoon keeping the audience
from departing and, number two, don't follow Jean Faria.
So, you can see how well I've succeeded already. Jean and
I were talking before this panel. We were joking that
usually I'm the one who's on the optimistic side, and Jean's
kind of slapping me around, saying, "Come on, you're
being Pollyannish about this." But, I actually think today
we are switching roles because even though you hear
Jean-I don't know whether she thinks of herself as being
half-full or half-empty on this-I very much think that the
glass is half-empty when it comes to the question of
whether the current economic situation gives us an
opportunity for reform or cost savings when it comes to the
death penalty.
I recognize that the reduced revenue for states and
the federal government has given reformers an opportunity
to argue that the administration of the death penalty is too
expensive, but actually my research on the cost issue
suggests just the opposite. What's happening here is that
we are not spending enough money on capital defense-
with really tragic consequences. The other problem here is
the situation is actually much worse for noncapital cases. I
12 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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say at the beginning that this is apart from questions of the
purpose, if you will, of the death penalty.
If we accept for the moment the public thinks that
the death penalty is legitimate, the death penalty as
administered isn't very effective. Nationally, just 25
percent of capital defendants who are brought to trial end
up being sentenced to death. We know that of the other 75
percent-most of them, the vast majority of them-are not
walking out of court that day. So if the question is, "Is the
death penalty cost-effective," I think the answer is no. But
that's a different question than the one that I want to focus
on today, which is the issue of cost of capital defense.
Here's my concern. You all, I'm sure, are either part
of or have read the statements of reformers who are trying
to get rid of the death penalty-who talk about how it's too
expensive. The death penalty is way too expensive. But,
my fear here is that if we are saying that in the context of
indigent defense, then the natural implication for policy
makers and the public is to think that the cost of noncapital
representation is both acceptable and cost-effective. I think
all of us in this room know that that is simply not the case,
and we can neither glorify or institutionalize that position.
I come at this question from a little bit of different
background than most of you. I am what I would like to
call a recovering lawyer. I was trained as a lawyer and did
practice law for a while. But I'm actually a social scientist,
and I head a research institute at George Mason University
just outside of Washington, D.C. George Mason
University has a number of different people, and our
research center brings together people from a several
disciplines to do social science research on questions of
legal importance. We have the Spangenberg Project 3 now
with us at George Mason University. So when I talk about
the issue of cost here, this is based on studies that I have
done or been part of, both looking at federal capital defense
13 The Spangenberg Project, http://tsp.gmu.edu/.
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as well as capital defense in this state-and Texas as well.
I have made the mistake of choosing to throw a
bunch of numbers at you today without a PowerPoint, and
we're going to see whether I can keep your interest and
whether I can explain it. But to simplify things, there are
four points to walk away with when I'm done here today.
First of all, I'd like us to have a little bit of
understanding of what has been done to estimate the cost of
the death penalty. Then I'll talk a little bit about why
capital cases are more expensive than noncapital cases to
litigate. My third point is really this argument that capital
defense is not expensive enough. I know that doesn't play
politically, but for the moment let's just put politics aside.
Capital defense does not offer enough resources, and it
comes with tremendous tragic consequences for those
involved. Finally, I'm going to finish with an argument for
why it's ill-advised for us to keep pushing the cost
argument for reform of indigent defense.
For those of you who have done any reading on
this, you probably know there have been a number of
studies on the cost of the death penalty. Part of the
difficulty in trying to understand the cost of the death
penalty is that people have used various definitions of what
cost means. So, for example, some people have focused on
adjudication costs--or I should say litigation costs-but
they haven't distinguished between defense or prosecution
costs. Others have lumped together all litigation costs-
meaning trial, direct appeal, and collateral appeal. Other
studies try to throw in the cost of incarceration. And then
some of the most-to my mind-interesting and difficult
studies are those that look at what they call the opportunity
cost of the death penalty. By that, what they're looking at
is the social cost of additional crime that is not being
prevented or dealt with because money is being spent-as
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My point here is not that any one of these studies is
illegitimate or indeed that any one is better than the other. I
think what's important to recognize here is that they're
defining costs differently. But even with all of those
differences they arrive at a similar conclusion,-which is
not going to surprise anyone in this room-which is the
cost of litigation and punishment is more expensive for
capital matters than noncapital matters. And you're going
to look at me and say "Duh. I knew that. What's the value
of any of these studies?" And what I will respond back to
you-and I know some of you have heard me make this
argument before-is that the value of the research here is to
quantify what we think we understand to make sure that we
truly understand it. Now, some of you will say, "Well
you're just quantifying the obvious," and I will say, "It may
be it obvious to you, but it may not be to others." And
more importantly, we may be wrong in what anecdotally
we think is going on in the criminal justice system, and
that's why these studies are done.
My own research looks at more than the cost of the
death penalty. On the indigent defense side, it looks not
just at cost but the quality and availability of counsel. And
I really would caution us to get away from simply
discussing cost, because cost has us forgetting the fact that
what we're ultimately after here is quality defense.
Because without quality defense, we are not getting the
Sixth Amendment standard14 . I will argue a little bit later
that to some extent cost is synonymous with quality in
particular situations. But this attachment to cost in this
period of declining revenue, while understandable, has us
digging a hole that is problematic. The research that I'm
going to talk about is true of both pleas and trials and about
state and federal court. And my findings are consistent
with what other studies have shown, which is that capital
defense is more expensive than noncapital defense. And by
14 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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noncapital defense, we've got to be careful here. It means
capital-eligible unauthorized cases. And as we know-or
as I should say we might expect-the capital cases are
more expensive. This is true, irrespective of jurisdiction
and irrespective of whether it's the federal system or the
state system.
So the question is, "Why is that so? Why are
capital cases more expensive than noncapital cases? My
guess is if I asked you for a show of hands, most of you
would have the answers immediately. We know that, first
of all, structurally the defense of capital cases is different.
You generally get more attorneys, you get a higher hourly
rate, the courts generally aren't putting caps on your time,
and the courts are generally granting you greater deference
to bring in experts and other expenses that you might not
get elsewhere. But capital cases are also being litigated
differently. And they take longer. So let me start off with
a few numbers.
In the federal system, if we look at the median
length of time that a case takes-so this is from the
appointment of counsel to resolution in the trial court,
either an acquittal or a sentence being handed down-for
capital cases it's 727 days, for capital-eligible unauthorized
cases 96 days. 727 to 96. This has been replicated at the
state level too. In Kansas, for example, the average number
of days that a capital trial takes is 34 days. Compare this to
a noncapital murder trial, which takes nine days there. 34
to 9. These things take longer. Why do they take longer?
The authorization process takes longer. Jury selection
takes longer to get a capital-eligible jury. We have the two
stages of trials, and some courts are using three stages.
But, also the research suggests-because the stakes are so
much higher-that the litigation is more zealous. And we
may not want to admit that, but the research is showing that
the attorneys are putting in more time. And the
investigators are putting in more time. Research shows, for
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example, that both sides are filing more motions in capital
cases than they would otherwise.
Another thing to keep in mind is that capital cases
are often more complex. They have more defendants and
more victims. These things take longer. But even though
capital cases cost more, they have shockingly low amounts
of time and resources spent on them in a number of
jurisdictions-in a number of cases. Indeed I will argue-
and you will get tired of me saying this but-I don't think
that the problem is that the death penalty is too expensive.
Although, of course, I understand that the objection is a
worthy one for arguing for the elimination of the death
penalty. That's not the problem. The problem is that too
many defendants who are facing the prospect of death at
the hands of the state are not getting sufficient resources to
be able to defend themselves. Let me give you a couple of
examples from the research.
If you compare the amount of money that is spent
on capital defense in the federal system versus in most state
systems, in the federal system defendants are getting
roughly ten times more money per representation than they
are in the state system. Libby showed you earlier that in
the most expensive death case in Tennessee the defense got
$346,000. That is a hundred thousand dollars less than the
average death case in the federal system. Indeed, the most
expensive death case in the federal system is $1.4 million
more than the most expensive case here in Tennessee. And
that's per defendant. One of the most expensive death case
in the federal system comes out of the District of Columbia.
Three defendants, all getting about $1.7 million in defense
expenses.
Some of the difference in cost is because the hourly
rate for federal defense attorneys in capital cases is
significantly higher, about a $175 an hour at present. Many
people in other states would very much want that kind of
hourly rate. But that's not what's driving a ten times
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difference. There are other things going on in terms of the
quality of the attorneys and the effort that is going into the
state capital cases. Moreover, there are problems even in
the federal system. Over the last couple of days we've
heard the admonition--"Go to your federal court. If there's
a problem, you need to file suit. You need relief. Go to the
federal courts, you'll find the solution there." But, that's
not necessarily the case.
If you look at federal capital trials, there is a cut
point in defense resources that divides capital defendants in
general from those receiving the lowest one-third in
attorney time and expert expenses. That one-third of
capital defendants has twice the chance of a death sentence
at trial than the upper two-thirds. I will give you the cut
point, and many of you will say, "Oh, I wish I had that kind
of money to defend in state court." It's $320,000. That's
the one-third mark. But if you are receiving less than
$320,000 in defense services at a capital trial in the federal
system you have twice the risk of a death sentence than if
you are receiving anything over the $320,000 mark.
Research suggests that there is a link between the
cost of capital cases and the quality of the representation
being provided, so to me that division between the low cost
cases and other capital trials represents a potential Sixth
Amendment violation 15. But I'm also concerned about how
this translates to noncapital cases. 16 When people say that
money would be saved if the death penalty were
eliminated, I'm worried that we're implicitly saying that
the resources and quality of litigation in noncapital cases is
acceptable. That's what we're going to be to be living with
15 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
16 A small portion of Professor Gould's remarks delivered at the
symposium were excised since they were based on a forthcoming
report on which the speaker was working on behalf of the federal
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if the death penalty is ever eliminated, and yet the quality
of representation at these dollar levels simply isn't
acceptable.
There's been a lot of advocacy lately that capital
cases cost sixteen times more than noncapital prosecutions,
but that difference is surely not because of the structural
differences between death cases and noncapital cases. It's
not solely because of the number of attorneys or because
you need a death-qualified jury, or because there are the
two stages of a trial. More troubling, it's also because the
noncapital cases are being litigated even worse than the
capital cases. And in this climate where we are trying to
get every dollar out of the criminal justice system, what we
are really setting ourselves up for is a public that will be
satisfied with even a more substandard criminal justice
system.
I know I'm out of time, but I cannot close on an
absolute downer because it goes against my nature. There
potentially is a sign on the horizon that may be a positive-
and this would be both for cost and for what happens in
capital cases. We are seeing nationwide, and particularly at
the federal level, prosecutors bringing fewer capital cases.
If you look at the burgeoning data from the Obama Justice
Department, and you compare it to what we saw in the
Bush II Administration-and in fact in the Clinton
Administration-the Obama Administration already is on
pace for a record low number of capital authorizations. We
are also seeing that in some states. In fact-our lunch
speaker who couldn't make it here today-David Dow, was
quoted in a newspaper, I think it was in Texas today,
talking about how capital authorizations in Texas are down
by a large percentage over previous years. While I think
this cost argument is dangerous when it comes to the
context of indigent defense, what we may see is a twin
potential victory in the making as prosecutors bring fewer
capital cases. We will be litigating fewer of them and
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saving money in the interim. With that, thank you very
much.
TONY MAURO: Actual question. I thought that the total
universe of federal and capital cases is still to a low
number. Is it? Is it not? Is it? What is it? How many
federal capital cases are there?
JON GOULD: Total?
TONY MAURO: Yeah.
JON GOULD: You mean from the beginning of time?
TONY MAURO: No.
JON GOULD: It was-from the reinstitution of the federal
death penalty-we're still under 500 cases. This isn't that
many, but as we've all talked about the last couple of days,
the federal example, to some extent, sets the standard
elsewhere. So what's happening at the federal level does
have consequences for what's happening at the state level.
MALCOLM HUNTER: A very interesting panel. What
was the title? What was supposed to be the title?
VARIOUS AUDIENCE SPEAKERS: Silver lining.
MALCOLM HUNTER: I'm going to provide all the silver,
I think, for the panel. I would like to start commenting, just
briefly, on my reaction to each of the panelists, which all of
them were very different, but very interesting and very
illustrative in some ways. And I thought Libby Sykes-
God bless her-on her way to her grand-niece's gradation,
is the perfect picture of the beleaguered court official who
is saddled with a program that is not really their program.
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And they're doing the best they can to explain a program
that's not really something they do, or that they understand
and to try to and sell that to a legislature. And it's no
surprise that that's a very tough job. In North Carolina, ten
years ago, we cut loose from the Administrative Office of
the Courts. And one of the big worries lots of lawyers had
was, "Well, they're the only ones who are protecting us.
We'll get nothing if it's not the judges coming in there.
You know, we're better off getting the crumbs that fall off
the judge's table than in fending for ourselves." And we
didn't know the answer to that; we were predicting the
answer to that.
But I think the answer was if you've got someone
who goes in there who can talk about advocacy, and talk
about how important it is, and what the terrible
consequences are for poor advocacy, even though they
don't have a robe, even though they may be disposed not to
necessarily trust that. person, you do better. You do better
with the public. You do better with the legislature. And
you do better with everybody. And so I felt a lot of
sympathy for Ms. Sykes, and it did remind me of where we
were before we cut loose.
We're more partners with the AOC now than we
were before; well we weren't partners when we were under
the AOC. We were the-as one of my friends used to like
to say-we were always the red-headed step-child in the
family. And now we are more partners. And in fact, we're
a competition. We're in this. They're looking for money
to line their robes with ermine, and we're looking for
money to pay our lawyers. And so we go in there, and we
have a discussion about what we're going to do. But I'll
just say we cut loose in North Carolina, and we've never
regretted it.
My takeaway points from that-and I think Jean's
exactly right-is we people need to get the message that we
are a completely reactive agency. Our costs are directly a
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result of what these prosecutors decide to do, and nobody is
looking at what these prosecutors are doing. And we have
had a little fun in North Carolina talking about that. When
we first started out in the early 2000's, we were spending
about $10 or $12 million a year on trial-level capital cases.
Then by 2007 we were spending about $17 million on trial-
level capital cases. By Tennessee standards, that means
that we're swirling completely out of control on our
spending, and so we were getting a little pushback from
other people about why we were spinning. So we decided
we were going to do a study.
We, right from the beginning, tried to keep very
good data. And so we looked at that. And one of the
things that we figured out is the reason our spinning had
gone up from $10 million to $17 million is every year these
prosecutors are bringing out more so-called capital cases
than they're closing. In fact, the number of capital cases we
were carrying was almost 50 percent higher in 2007 than it
was in 2002. They obviously had no idea, or they would
have never brought up the subject in the first place. But
then we didn't stop there, and we started talking about,
"Well, what are the things that are driving our expenses?"
And I'll just read you a couple of the bullets we had in this
report we gave to this legislature. We said, "The two
primary factors that drive IDS expenditures in potentially
capital cases at the trial level are whether the district
attorney decides to prosecute the case as capital or
noncapital. And the practice in North Carolina of charging
almost every intentional homicide as first-degree murder."
And I don't know if this is true-it's probably true
in most places-but in North Carolina if there's anything
that can be argued that is an intentional murder, it's first-
degree murder. Nobody gets charged with a second-
degree, much less voluntarily manslaughter, unless you
have a uniform. So we talked about that. We talked about
the fact that in North Carolina. We have a very broad first-
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degree murder statute, and we have a very broad capital
statute, which means we have 500 new, potential capital
cases every year that we have got to figure out lawyers
for-spend this extra money on. And so what happens to
those cases?
Well, they're charging 85 percent of these cases as
first-degree murder. Well what happens to these first-
degree murder cases? About 15 percent of them end up as
first-degree murder convictions. About another 35 percent
of them end up as second-degree murder convictions. Half
of them end up either dismissed or voluntary manslaughter
or involuntary manslaughter or following too closely or
something. But these cases completely wash out. Yet
we're spending hundreds of thousands, millions of dollars
on getting these cases resolved-which sort of brings me
indirectly to Jon's comments, which I really like. It was
very stimulating. I thought your take on this whole thing.
I tried to think, "Okay, well what do I think about that?"
And I said, "I think something cannot cost enough to be
good quality and still be a waste of money."
I think what we have to look at is what are we
getting, whatever we're spending. Maybe we're not
spending enough to do it right. And you know what? I
agree with you 100 percent. We're not spending enough to
do it right, but it can still be a waste of money. Because
what are we getting for it? And part of that is, are you
getting capital convictions? And in North Carolina-and I
think this is true in a lot of places around the country-the
number of capital prosecutions has dipped. You would
think that if the prosecutors were being choosier, then their
win rate would go up. But it's been just the opposite. In
the 1990's in North Carolina we routinely would have fifty
or sixty capital trials a year, and about half of those people
would get the death penalty. Last year we had eight capital
trials in the state. Two people got the death penalty; they
were both offered pleas. So nobody is on death row last
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year in North Carolina who the state thought really needed
to be on death row. The year before that, there were twelve
capital trials. One person got the death penalty. So far this
year, there have been five capital trials, and nobody has
gotten the death penalty.
So when you're talking about how much you're
spending on this-even for people who, quote, "believe in
the death penalty," -at some point you'll have to say,
"well the public doesn't believe it anymore." The public
says they support the death penalty if you ask them. But
North Carolinians-when you put them in the jury, and
they all have to be qualified as people who could give the
death penalty in a case-they are saying no. When they
hear the whole story-even with imperfect lawyers, and
they certainly are, and even in the context of a capital trial,
which is not the best way to tell your story necessarily-
juries are saying no. And in North Carolina it only takes
one juror to cause a case to go to life. And so we went
back to look and say, "Well, how many are we having like
that?" Almost all of our juries in the last three years have
been unanimous. They've almost all been unanimous for
life. So there has been a sea change in North Carolina,
which doesn't have to do politics, but I think it has to do a
lot with exonerations. We've also had a number of very
high-profile exonerations. And I think the public has
learned that even though some nice-looking young man or
young woman from the prosecutor's office comes in and
acts like they're entirely convinced this person is a horrible
killer, that doesn't make it true. I think for a lot of people
that was a shock. And I think the press has been extremely,
extremely helpful in that-at least in North Carolina.
We've gotten big exoneration stories out of all of our major
news networks.
I wanted to tell you one other fun study that we did
at IDS. It's not directly related to capital litigation, but has
to do with waiting in court. You know how when we have
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a lot of appointed lawyers, they go to court and a lot of
their time is spent not litigating, but waiting their turn.
While the most important person in the courtroom, the
judge, or the prosecutor,-who's the second most important
person in the courtroom-are deciding when we're going to
hear your little matter. Then you do your little bit of
business, and then you get to go home. And what I have
been arguing at the legislature and everyone else is, "Yes,
the judge is the most important person, and let's just assume
that the prosecutor is the second most important person. I
don't even want to argue about it, but the most expensive
part of that courtroom is indigent defense." Even if they're
getting a lousy $50 an hour, there's twenty of them out
there. We're spending more on indigent defense, and yet
we organize this whole courtroom around the convenience
of less expensive elements of it.
So just from a matter of spending the state's money,
we ought to be disposing of these cases in a way that is
more efficient. So we did a waiting in court study for
misdemeanors, and we found out that we were spending
$10 million a year in North Carolina on lawyers waiting in
court. And the study is at ncids.org, 17 but we have had just
a tremendous amount of fun. And then the issue isn't an
issue of power, it's an issue of how are we spending the
state's money? Why are we organizing things in a way that
we're having people lounge around and wait for their turn
to get into court? So, it's not about power, it's about
efficient spending for the state. I like costs as a different
lens to look through. And again, Jon, I'm not disagreeing
with anything you said. I thought your remarks were very
interesting and stimulating, but I have found that the
economic downturn has given us opportunities for reform.
17 N.C. OFFICE OF INDIGENT SERVICES, FY05 PRIVATE APPOINTED
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I think when we have economic downturns, the
government and the legislatures and courts look for what
do they look for when they don't have as much money as
they want to spend. They look for government programs,
which cost a lot but don't deliver much value. And I would
say capital punishment everywhere we have it, in almost all
cases, is conducted in a wasteful way even though it's not
done well. It's done in a wasteful way and therefore ripe
for reform.
And again, I loved what Jean was talking in going
to these prosecutors. We have to back the camera up and
not just look at what defense lawyers are spending and not
just having an argument over whether a defense lawyer is
entitled to an investigator or a defense lawyer is entitled to
a DNA expert. But back the camera up and look at the way
the whole system works and what system reforms we can
do because, again, there's nothing we're doing that we're
not just trying to respond to the other side.
Another point that somebody made earlier-and I
think we have to understand, and I've certainly seen that in
my time-is that reform is implied criticism of the status
quo. And so when we go in and say, "Boy, the
representation is terrible here," people understand that
you're talking about what they've done. And that's hard for
people to hear. And judges understand that they're
responsible for that court, and they don't want to hear that
the justice that's being dispensed in that court is not good.
And so there is always going to be pushback and will be
pushback. I think it's just human nature. I do think the
litigation we're having is helpful and encouraging, even
though right now it doesn't seem to have gone very far. But
I think we're building toward a tipping point, and I hope it'll
be a tipping point where I still have enough of my faculties
to appreciate and celebrate when it happens. But I think
there are more and more stories coming out. There was a
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great story in The New Yorker18 just several weeks ago
about a murder trial in Manhattan of-I don't know if they
were from Lithuania-but they were immigrants who came
over and got involved in a murder. Janet Malcolm of all
people, great writer, wrote a story. Did anybody read that
story in The New Yorker about the murder trial? Well, I'm
in bed with my bride of, it will be thirty-nine years next
week, and she's reading the New Yorker as is often the case.
And then she finishes this story, and she looks at me and
she says, "You know, I really admire you for putting up
with what you've put up with for all these years-you
know, doing criminal defense." I said, "Boy, thank you
very much." And she had just read this article in The New
Yorker. She'd never told me that in thirty-eight years.
And so these stories are powerfully important, I
think, and are very helpful. So I think that is important. I
think stories are important. I think we have to push, and we
have to tell the truth. One thing that's only been touched
on, but I think is true is our indigent defense problems-
and I said this in North Carolina where I think our funding
situation is a little bit better than certainly some other
places in the South---our big problem is not money. Our
big problem is accountability. I think that private lawyers
have such a big advantage over public defenders in dealing
with their clients. Because one thing a private lawyer has
to learn how to do-as a private lawyer they have a
completely different relationship with their client. They
really understand what a client is. Because with a private
lawyer, someone comes into your office, and they're
deciding whether they're going to put their hand in their
pocket and give you a big stack of money or not. And you
have to convince them as a private lawyer "I'm the person
18 Janet Malcolm, Iphigenia in Forrest Hills, THE NEW YORKER, May
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for you, I'm going to give you the best job that I can
possibly give you. You're going to be in good hands."
And if the person is convinced, they give you the money.
And they think they've done a good thing, and you think
they have confidence in me. And you're off to the races.
Well, needless to say with public defenders or
appointed counsel, it's completely different. I mean, for
most public defenders you get a new case, you say, "Oh,
my God, that's the last thing I need." You're not getting
any bag of money with that case. You're just getting
another case. You've got to worry about and neglect all of
your other cases. And the client has not decided the client
likes you, or that you're doing a good job, or that he wants
you. And so, I think public defenders have a huge problem
in client relations that they don't even understand and that
private lawyers don't even have to deal with. Not to say
that private lawyers don't have some problems with clients
from time to time. They do, but I really think there's
something about the way that we assign cases. I would like
to have a system where people who are indigent get to pick
from a roster who they want to represent them-the way
people do that have money get to pick who they want to
represent them. I think that would change indigent
representation. It wouldn't cost a dime, and I think that
would change indigent representation. I'm going to leave
some time for comments here, but thank you very much.
Thanks to our panelists. And now we'll entertain questions.
TONY MAURO: Well, thank you. We'll all be looking for
that New Yorker article.
MALCOLM HUNTER: It's not a glowing picture. There
was one public defender and one private lawyer.
TONY MAURO: Okay. Before we go to the audience, a
couple of comments from-other comments?
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JON GOULD: Malcolm, I really like the statement you
made about, "Something cannot cost enough to do it right,
but still be a waste of money." And I agree with you
completely. And in fact, there will be a few studies out in
the next few months where I think you will find it
surprising what judges are saying about the cost
effectiveness of the death penalty. So I don't disagree with
you at all about whether this is a waste of money or not.
I think potentially I did not make my second point
fairly clearly. And it's this: Maybe the way to do this is to
ask for a show of hands. How many of you practice in
jurisdictions that have the death penalty? Just by a show of
hands, so keep them up for second. How many of you
believe that if the death penalty were eliminated in your
state that your agency or the amount of money you had
that's currently spent on indigent defense would remain the
same. You would be able to keep it all that you currently
you have if the death penalty were taken off the table?
Okay. So we have some either optimists or Pollyannish
folks, but I think for the most part you've all just proven my
second point, which is that if we get rid of the death penalty
what we have then is a level of indigent defense as is
probably practiced right now-or pretty close to it-
without a lot of additional resources being brought to bear.
And all the research that I have done and read suggests that
the level of defense is better in capital cases than it is in
noncapital murder cases. And I want to put the question to
you all. Are we then going to be looking at a system
where, on average, defendants are getting worse quality
representation if we don't have capital representation?
That's more of the provocative question I was trying to ask.
MALCOLM HUNTER: Well, you know, if someone told
me you can have all the money you want for noncapital and
in return we throw somebody into a volcano once a month,
293
293
7 Tennessee Journal of Law & Policy (Special Edition) 294
I would say, "Nuh-uh, I'll do without the money." I'm not
interested in throwing somebody in a volcano. It doesn't
even depend on whom. But, there are lots of people here
from states-Michigan is a place that they've never had the
death penalty. Congratulations. But they have terrible
problems, and it's not because they don't have the death
penalty. Their problems would be worse if they had the
death, but their problems wouldn't be better. And I think
it's easier to deal with it. I think that the death penalty has
had a distorting effect on criminal justice everywhere it is.
It is true that it's pumped some money some places. But I
think its impact has been almost entirely-not completely,
but almost entirely-predominately negative on the law
and on the way people act in court. It's been quite, quite
negative.
JEAN FARIA: How many people are on the row in North
Carolina?
MALCOLM HUNTER: 140.
JEAN FARIA: We have eighty-four, but we have the
highest incarceration rate per capita of anyplace in the
world. 37,000 people are incarcerated. And we have a
population of about 4 million.
NORMAN LEFSTEIN: Well, you've only been a public
defender for two years, so--
JEAN FARIA: Well I'm working on it.
MALCOLM HUNTER: Give her another two years.
TONY MAURO: Any questions? Over there.
CARA DRINAN: I'd like to follow up on Jon on your
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point, and I think maybe I actually like the cost arguments.
Like when I first heard you say that you thought that
argument was ill-advised, my ears perked up. And I like it
because I think it's an argument-can money talk? It's an
argument they (inaudible) jurisdictions where, as Jean was
saying a moral discussion abolishing the death penalty is
just off the table. But I wonder if a way to harmonize our
positions-your concern that it's ill-advised and my
thinking, "well, it's a great idea," -is push the practical
money argument-is just to refine the argument, right? So
if you're posturing that we take away capital punishment,
and we are left with the same amount of money that
noncapital cases still have, to me that doesn't have to be a
natural consequence, right? If we frame discussion as,
"Abolish the death penalty," in response to funding
organizations saying where does the money come from--
that's, to me, when the abolition argument comes up.
Where does the money come from? It comes from not
spending millions on capital cases and funneling those into
the noncapital cases. Would you accept that refinement?
JON GOULD: Well, I'm being a little provocative here.
We all know that to some extent the cost argument works.
I come from the State of Virginia. They're only two
arguments that ever work in Virginia: reducing cost to the
tax payers and reducing crime. Everything else in terms of
the Fourth Amendment,1 9 Sixth Amendment 2°-
MALCOLM HUNTER: Just noise.
JON GOULD: Exactly. We don't care about that. We care
about whether it's going to come out of someone's
pocketbook, or whether you're going to get hit over the
head by somebody else. So, yes, in terms of the death
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penalty, as Malcolm says, right now what works is the cost-
effectiveness argument. What I'm saying-what worries
me here-is that cost argument has-the natural
implication of the cost argument is that we then have a
system of defense in murder cases where you all are putting
in significantly fewer hours and using significantly fewer
experts in a noncapital murder case than a capital murder
case. And for those defendants who are not being charged
capitally, I'm posturing that they are getting a worse
defense than those who are being charged capitally. And
that's what concerns me.
MARY ANN GREEN: This is primarily to Jon and to
Jean. I'm sorry Libby has gone because on her list of cases
and the amounts were spent on them. Conspicuously
missing was the one case in Tennessee that has resulted in
exoneration. Have there been any studies about the costs of
cases that go all the way to an acquittal or exoneration as
opposed to those cases that do not?
JON GOULD: To my--do you know the answer to this off
the top of your head?
JEAN FARIA: No. To my knowledge, no.
JON GOULD: Yeah, I don't know of any either.
MARY ANN GREEN: You were talking about your
exonerees, and I just wondered if that were an argument
that could be presented?
JEAN FARIA: Well, one of the things that we are now
trying to do-the Innocence Project in New Orleans-we
actually give them funding because from my board's
perspective. The work of a lot of people leads to these
horrible situations, and so we feel duty-bound to assist in
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funding the noncapital post-conviction. So it's part of a
strategy, a media strategy that we're developing. They just
hired a new person for media. I have on my staff of sixteen
people for a statewide program-I have a special projects
advisor. She's a non-lawyer, and that's one of the media
pieces-one of the things that she's doing. And we're going
to be looking at that data because it's not been collected-at
least in the noncapital post-conviction area. It's not been
collected by us. I mean, we could have some estimates, but
as is true in most new cases, we have this tremendous
reluctance to do time sheets, which we're working on
because the culture is-
MARY ANN GREEN: But what I'm thinking of is what is
a life worth?
JEAN FARIA: Well, yeah, that's a complicated question.
But, yes, I think that is something that needs to be captured.
And I think that is going to be very helpful in getting to
some idea of the cost of this.
JON GOULD: The other piece is that the vast majority of
exonerations so far have not been capital cases. And so
there just haven't been that many to work through. Now
you can kind of go get the cost by going in from the back
end, and it is possible to make these estimates. But I'm not
sure. I guess the argument does work. That this is a sum of
money the taxpayers had to cover that they should not have
had to cover otherwise. And they're not inconsequential
amounts of money per case. What you want to do is be
able to sum them up to some larger figure either statewide
or nationally.
TONY MAURO: Any others? Okay. Before we adjourn,
two things. I want to thank the panels for a very good-
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(Audience applause).
TONY MAURO: So I'm going to give Norm the final
word, as he should have. And are you planning something
else?
NORMAN LEFSTEIN: Well, you folks are the real true
believers committed to a late hour at four o'clock. I want to
make an announcement. I also want to give a chance to
Stephanie Baucus from the Department of Justice to say
something about a handout that she has available. I want to
remind you that if you have evaluation forms and have not
handed them in, that you leave them on the table just
outside the door. Let me turn it over to Stephanie, just very
briefly, and then I want to make one last comment.
Stephanie?
STEPHANIE BAUCUS: Yes. Thank you, Norm. I will
be brief. You know, this is great to be back here in East
Tennessee because this is pretty much where I grew up.
But I am now working with the Obama Administration at
the US Department of Justice, so I'm really happy to be
with you guys. I've met a good number of you but not
everyone, so what I'm going to do is stand out in the back.
The reason I was very late-and I apologize today-is that
I had some copies made-and by made I made myself-
and it took a really long time. And in any event, I have
enough cards for every single person, and I have enough
copies of an indigent defense speech that I wrote for every
person. And I have been assigned to be your liaison in
several different ways, because I'm the ADA liaison for the
leadership at the department. So that's for the attorney
general and the deputy associate attorney generals as
well-attorneys general. And we work with a variety of
different groups. And I'm also the defense liaison, defender
liaison, so I'm very interested in these issues for a variety of
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reasons-and passionate about this. And I've done a lot of
work, as you might see by the desk. I have a bunch of
other PowerPoints here on these issues that I work on with
state legislators and counties, and I'm very interested in a
lot of the things I just heard and some fascinating ideas that
people have. I work with Laurie Robinson and her staff
and other components at DOJ, and I'm very interested in
working with all of you. And I hope that you will take my
card and call me and give me your complaints and your
ideas. Thanks very much, and turn it over to-
GEORGIA VAGENAS: Stephanie, you mentioned that
one of the power-this PowerPoint-the handouts have to
do with grants. And you mentioned something about the
new grants coming up. I don't know if there were some
deadlines that you wanted to mention to people.
STEPHANIE BAUCUS: Yes. Yes, I'm sorry. I had
twenty minutes of sleep the night before last and two, three
hours last night, so I'm kind of sleep deprived. One of the
handouts that I do have is the Program Plan. And some of
the excerpts from our-what we call our Program Plan,
which is a weird name-for grants that are available right
now. If you wanted to consider applying, some of the
deadlines are in fact coming up soon. And as I think we all
know in this room, there aren't enough grants for public
defense. There are more this year than there were last year,
and there will be more next year. And another handout that
I have that deals with that is next year's budget request.
And one thing that's important in that-if you look at it
now and you say, "Gosh, you know. I wonder how they're
going to write that. I wonder how they're going to actually
turn that into a grant solicitation." Then let's talk about it.
Let me hear your concerns. Let's hear what you want to go
into that. Let's think about it now, because now is the time
to hear your ideas before Congress actually appropriates the
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money-those grant solicitations get written. So that's why
I brought all of this stuff, because I'm all about being
practical. And this is your government, so let's make it
accessible to you. So I have presentation copies for you,
cards with contact information, and the grant information
for both this year and next year. And I'm here to help, so,
from the federal government. Thank you.
ADELE BERNHARD: Great.
NORMAN LEFSTEIN: Thanks very much, Stephanie.
We appreciate it. Well, lastly, my thanks to our concluding
panel. Always enjoyable to hear from all of you, and I
especially appreciate Tony Mauro filling in at the last
minute as our moderator of this last panel. I want once
again to thank the College of Law, Professor Penny White,
and her colleagues for serving as our hostess and host for
this conference. They've been absolutely splendid to work
with. Our goals in planning this conference were to make it
enjoyable, to make it educational, stimulating, and we hope
we've succeeded in all of those goals. We appreciate all of
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